Is causality defined between events or state of affair?

[vectorcube]

This is a technical matter.

There seem to be two approach in defining causal connections. One is the event approach where if "a cause b" , then a, and b are events. The second approach is to see a and b as "state of affair". There are noticable differences, because "event" is a loaded word. It automatically assumes a underlying background spacetime where it could be specificed by 4 numbers. "State of affair" on the other hand does not seem to have this limitation, and seems to be more general( because we can talk about possible worlds).

[ACB]

I have resurrected this thread as it seems interesting. Does anyone have any views on it? Are causes and effects (a) events or (b) states of affairs? How are events related to states of affairs? Can we talk about events (and spacetime co-ordinates) in other possible worlds? Any other comments?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by ACB

I have resurrected this thread as it seems interesting. Does anyone have any views on it? Are causes and effects (a) events or (b) states of affairs? How are events related to states of affairs? Can we talk about events (and spacetime co-ordinates) in other possible worlds? Any other comments?

It seems to me that causation is a relation between events or kinds of events. The occurrence of an event is a state of affairs.

[Reconstructo]

I was looking for quotes and found a little interpretation of Wittgenstein on causality. I thought it might add to the discussion.
Silliman's Papers
Where the traditional philosophical approach has assumed causation and, from there, made a problem, Wittgenstein dissolution would proceed by showing that the language of causation was confused and this confusion gave rise to the problem. There are two confusions concerning causality: first, that causality was a form of necessity distinct from logical necessity; second, that causality could be stated.

Given Wittgenstein’s language, it is impossible to imagine any sort of causality that is beyond the causality of the logic of language. “The only kind of necessity,” he writes, “is logical necessity.” Since logic is the mirror of the world, and the world is the case, there could be no sort of causation not shown in logic. There is no causality apart from that which is found in logic, that is, nothing is necessitated unless it is necessitated by logic. If states of affairs are caused by will or by prior states of affairs, then that must be shown in the mirror of logic.
We cannot speak of causality, either the illusionary causality that gave rise to the problem, or the logic reflected causality of Wittgenstein’s. In the first case, if causality is above the world, above the assemblage of facts, then it would be like the ancient’s superstitions of gods and of fates. Causality, if it were this sort of thing, would be beyond the facts of the world and we couldn’t speak about it. In the second place, in Wittgenstein’s language, we cannot speak about the logic of language because we would need another logic to speak in, and so on ad infinitum. We cannot, Wittgenstein holds, speak that logic, The logic shows itself, but it cannot be spoken of. Thus causation is either in the world, unspeakable and showing itself through the structure, or outside the world, and unspeakable and indescribable. Either way, to think that we could speak of causality would be confused.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Reconstructo

I was looking for quotes and found a little interpretation of Wittgenstein on causality. I thought it might add to the discussion.
Silliman's Papers
Where the traditional philosophical approach has assumed causation and, from there, made a problem, Wittgenstein dissolution would proceed by showing that the language of causation was confused and this confusion gave rise to the problem. There are two confusions concerning causality: first, that causality was a form of necessity distinct from logical necessity; second, that causality could be stated.

Given Wittgenstein’s language, it is impossible to imagine any sort of causality that is beyond the causality of the logic of language. “The only kind of necessity,” he writes, “is logical necessity.” Since logic is the mirror of the world, and the world is the case, there could be no sort of causation not shown in logic. There is no causality apart from that which is found in logic, that is, nothing is necessitated unless it is necessitated by logic. If states of affairs are caused by will or by prior states of affairs, then that must be shown in the mirror of logic.
We cannot speak of causality, either the illusionary causality that gave rise to the problem, or the logic reflected causality of Wittgenstein’s. In the first case, if causality is above the world, above the assemblage of facts, then it would be like the ancient’s superstitions of gods and of fates. Causality, if it were this sort of thing, would be beyond the facts of the world and we couldn’t speak about it. In the second place, in Wittgenstein’s language, we cannot speak about the logic of language because we would need another logic to speak in, and so on ad infinitum. We cannot, Wittgenstein holds, speak that logic, The logic shows itself, but it cannot be spoken of. Thus causation is either in the world, unspeakable and showing itself through the structure, or outside the world, and unspeakable and indescribable. Either way, to think that we could speak of causality would be confused.

How is any of the above relevant to the OP?

[Reconstructo]

Causality is the relationship between an event (the cause) and a second event (the effect), where the second event is a consequence of the first.[1]