Mind to Mind: Mr. Dennett & Mr. Gautama Exchange Ideas

[LWSleeth]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

Yes but the issue is that 'experience' was always understood by the empirical philosophers to be limited to the collection of data that could be experienced by any observer - meaning it must be 'objective', by definition. William James, and some of the other pioneers of psychology, tried to broaden the scope of empiricism to include 'data available to introspection', as did the phenomenologists. The problem is that, in the absence of the normative framework provided by Buddhism (or by 'dharma' more generally) there was nothing to prevent this 'introspective data' from being completely personal or idiosyncratic. And besides, your western empiricists always were, and remain, hostile towards anything resembling spirituality (none more so than Dennett).

I might put it slightly differently and say that "experience" is considered sense experience by empiricists, and while sense experience is focused on things external to the observer, the experience itself is still purely subjective (because it takes place uniquely inside each individual). In other words, there is no possible way for experience, no matter what sort, to be anything other than subjective; it's just that there are two major categories of focus, the focus on externals (and consequently sense-dependent), and by a relative few, the interior focus on one's own consciousness before it is intwined in the senses. The requirement for confirmation by any observer is a practical measure for ensuring competency and honesty while studying the external world.

Now humanity has developed quite the expertise with externalized study, and consequently we have a horde of experts in that field. The experts may train from an early age to develop their external study skills, get scholarships because they are good at it, and then go on to make a living using it. Some write books and receive Nobel prizes. With all that success and reward, there is now a sizable number of people who believe science is next to godliness, that because it has worked so well on externals it works on everything, and even conclude that if science can't discover it, then it can't be true. This is the basis of physicalism.

Someone like Dennett comes along (getting back to the theme of this thread) who fully relies on externalization, and claims he can explain consciousness; of course, he insists any discussion fit his externalized model, not because he knows all consciousness features can be externalized, but because he believes a priori in physicalism (and epistemologies that reveal physicalness).

Further, that point I made above about all experience being subjective is a problem to Dennett's model because no one can explain (without dualism) how some single internal observer can arise from the zillions of mental activities the observer experiences. So Dennett has to get rid of that pesky subject, which he does by simply refusing to allow it into the discussion!

If you watched that video interview with Wright, when Wright implied an observer, Dennett merely answered it should not be included in a consciousness model. If he is asked why so many people report a sense of subjectivity, he just says we merely "think" it exists, but it doesn't really.

But that is no explanation at all because he never explains why we think it exists. So it seems to me that Dennett's solution to physicalism's inability to account for sentience is to simply ignore it.

The Buddha, in contrast, attributes it to a feature that can only be discovered by tracking backward in consciousness, back before entanglement in the senses, before the brain, before the body . . . back to the originating place for all phenomena. That is the part of consciousness that remains constant while all the other stuff moves about. Dennett says we are only that which moves about, the Buddha says we only identify with all that moves, but we are something even more basic and constant.

Does the Buddha's model defeat dualism? Yes. If what moves arises from an overall constant plane, then you simply have two conditions of one underlying reality (true, what causes things to arise and return isn't explained). Rather than dismiss or ignore what the vast majority of humans report about themselves, the Buddha's model accounts for the reports.

[jeeprs]

the experience itself is still purely subjective (because it takes place uniquely inside each individual)

Actually I beg to differ. Even though this may be true in a sense, in practise 'objective data' is what any number of people can exactly agree on, and especially quantifiable data, specifically the 'primary qualities' of mass, velocity, and so on. In this sense, it does not take place uniquely inside each individual; each individual can be reasonably certain that the other is seeing exactly the same thing. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and between objective and subjective characteristics, was especially associated with Galileo.

Anyway, not important. As for Dennett, it seems to me there is an obvious defeater for his argument which is so trivial that it makes you fall about laughing. Physical pain is apodictic - cannot plausibly be denied - and entirely subjective - cannot be experienced objectively. Surely somone else must have made this observation somewhere. Al these materialists are simply ideologues. I think they all suffer from a condition of some kind.

As for me, it is winter in the Southern Hemisphere, and I'm off skiing for a week. Been great being part of this and other discussions, I will be back later.

[LWSleeth]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

Actually I beg to differ. Even though this may be true in a sense, in practise 'objective data' is what any number of people can exactly agree on, and especially quantifiable data, specifically the 'primary qualities' of mass, velocity, and so on. In this sense, it does not take place uniquely inside each individual; each individual can be reasonably certain that the other is seeing exactly the same thing. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and between objective and subjective characteristics, was especially associated with Galileo.

As conscious experience, it must take place subjectively, whether it is experience through the senses or experiences that are strictly of our internal life. My only point is that no matter what triggers experience, experience is always subjective.

[jeeprs]

It is indubitable that there must always be a subject of experience, but I don't think this is necessarily what 'subjective' means. The word 'subjective' is used to distinguish aspects of experience, or judgement, from those elements of experience that are 'objective'.

Furthermore some experiences are entirely subjective, and some are not. For example, my thoughts and sensations are subjective in that they are directly perceptible only to me. However if you and I both witness an event, then we might have subjective views or opinions about the event, but there is also an element or part of the experience which is common to both of us and to any observer who also witnessed it.

If 'everything is subjective' then the word does not add anything or describe anything insofar as it applies to everything equally. It does not qualify anything.

(However I do agree that modern thought has made an enormous error by believing that 'objectivity is the sole criterion of truth', an error which is repeated every day on this forum.)

[LWSleeth]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

It is indubitable that there must always be a subject of experience, but I don't think this is necessarily what 'subjective' means. The word 'subjective' is used to distinguish aspects of experience, or judgement, from those elements of experience that are 'objective'.

Well, I suppose we better decide on definitions we are each using before we debate any further. There is of course a way we use the terms "objective" and "subjective" to signify types of interpretations where we say an interpretation is an unbiased reporting of facts, or we say it is colored by subjective influences; some also talk about objective reality in the sense reality exists independent of conscious interpretation.

But in this discussion we've been talking about sentience, and if the functionalist model accounts for it. Really what we need to know is what exactly defines experience; that is, not "types" of experience, but the very phenomenon itself.

I use a simple definition in my work, and that is: experience is sensitivity that knows it senses. Dennett doesn't add the second part of my definition ("knows it senses"), but only admits consciousness is sensitive. Being aware that we feel things is the problem for a physicalist model because it creates a singularity, a uniquely knowing "subject,"that should not be there if consciousness has derived from billions of neurons and lots of brain functions.

So by "subjective" I mean that part of consciousness that knows it feels. Just to make it a little more clear what I'm talking about, there are lots of things able to feel/sense -- a motion detector or Geiger counter for examples, are able to sense vibrational information -- but unlike consciousness, those things don't know they feel vibration (i.e., they don't subjectively experience). That second layer of awareness is what Dennett is trying to get rid of with his model (because, I opine, it seems so unlike anything physicalness can achieve, and he is a committed physicalist).

This "knower" aspect of us has been modeled (and ridiculed) as a homunculus, a little man sitting at the controls running the show from the middle the so-called Cartesian theater of our brain. Dennett's solution is interesting because he basically says consciousness is a collection of information, memory, and "stances" that come about as parts of the brain vie for prominence. It's the culmination of that activity which produces a decision or act, not some central, observing knower.

I say it's interesting because his model seems to be a perfect match for the Buddha's concept of acquired self. Just as Dennett has us not really in control, but merely following the operations of the brain, the Buddha too taught we are pushed around by our conditioning and desires rather than from being fully conscious. So the only difference between Dennett's ideas of consciousness and the Buddha's (as far as I can see), is that Dennett thinks conditioning and brain is all we are, while the Buddha says there's another element behind the conditioning we can join with.

I explain the difference in their models as what they know. Dennett only knows his incessantly going mind and his conditioning, so his model reflects that. The Buddha knew of a foundational plane behind all the movement, and his model reflects that.

Originally Posted by jeeprs

Furthermore some experiences are entirely subjective, and some are not. For example, my thoughts and sensations are subjective in that they are directly perceptible only to me. However if you and I both witness an event, then we might have subjective views or opinions about the event, but there is also an element or part of the experience which is common to both of us and to any observer who also witnessed it.

As you can see, mixing up the two definitions of "subjective" creates confusion. The way you are using subjective (in your second description) is an informal way we've come to talk about personal bias. But the term subjective experience in discussions about the nature of consciousness almost always refers to the knower aspect of consciousness. If we are talking about subjectivity as sentience, then that is only directly available to you, and thus all experience is subjective.

Originally Posted by jeeprs

If 'everything is subjective' then the word does not add anything or describe anything insofar as it applies to everything equally. It does not qualify anything.

True, but I didn't say everything is subjective, I said all experience is subjective; I hope you can see what I meant by that now.

[jeeprs]

Yes, thanks Les. I think a question of semantics. As you say at the end, I think what we are really discussing is 'sentience' although it also contains the implication of 'self-aware sentience'. Perhaps this is the meaning of the word 'buddhi' which is 'that which knows' and is the underlying word behind the term 'Buddha'.

Dennett and Theravada Buddhism (and also Hume) describe the 'personality' as being a constantly-changing aggregate of impressions, feelings and ideas with no 'abiding self'. However, as you say, the objectivist account concludes that human being is really nothing other than an information processing system which can be descibed objectively. The Buddha, as you say, has realised the state beyond all sorrow and impermanence. There is nothing like that understanding in the materialist account or in modern Western philosophy generally.

I feel I have to oppose the materialist understanding depicted by Dennett on the grounds that it is dehumanising.

Anyway I really am off skiing now - thanks for the explanation.

[KaseiJin]

Originally Posted by LWSleeth

Well, I suppose we better decide on definitions we are each using before we debate any further. . .

Interesting. . . as usual we find little concern about working within the bounds of set definitions without due cause to alter such definitions. Good grief . . . is a relaxed way to express the emotion raised by such discovery.

LWSleeth has said that 'in this discussion we have been talking about sentience,' and in the very next sentence suggests a connection by saying that 'we need to know what exactly defines experience.' In other words, sentience is something that is a matter of experience, or at least has some connection to it. To be honest, I'm not quite so sure that we'd find any informed people ever trying to deny that connection, so what gives? Which direction are we to think of ourselves as being led in?

A possible clue will be found in the next paragraph, where we find, "experience is sensitivity that knows it senses." By this we could take it that the argument is being put forth that sentience is the experience derived knowledge of sensing, but what advantage of explanation would that circle of statement offer us? To say that sentience is an experience derived from working brain is exactly the same thing, and is clearer a statement--so why avoid it?

If, barring any valid further reason to do otherwise, we were to hold the term sentience to its common definition of ' a sentient① state or quality; capacity for feeling or percieving; consciousness,' we would see that we really need not say anything other than that 'consciousness involves the state of knowing that experience has occurred'. Again, this is just as good as saying that living, working brain projects consciousness. If, on the other hand (and barring any valid further reason to do otherwise) we were to hold the term sentience to its other common definition of 'mere awareness or sensation that does not involve thought or perception,' we would see that a self contradiction would be found--in that the absence of thought or perception would surely entail a lack of knowledge and cognitively acknowledging sensory input.

Therefore assuming that self-contradiction is to be avoided, and to have been unintended, we will accept the former common definition (barring any cause to alter that). In that way, a further statement made by LWSleeth will have a robust relation. That statement is, "So by 'subjective' I mean that part of consciousness that knows it feels." While attempts to tag the word 'subjective' to the fact of consciousness at large is a strange thing, we can rest assured that so far, LWSleeth has given a correct, and supported by the evidences at large, understanding; namely that consciousness is defined as that level of conscious brain tissue which projects acknowledged attention to any number of sensory input data, both external and internal (as in the operation of the otolith, or emotional memory recall attached to episodic memory recall, etc.), and works with long-term potentation.

It must not be left behind, we will have to come to face sooner or later, that we ARE (an attempt to add a bit of humour along with the importance of the point . . . hee, hee, hee....) talking about brain here; and for that very reason, to the extent that brain is understood and knowledge on it is secure (notwithstanding the lack that some in certain philosophical circles have in keeping up with it), we must strive to rein in obsolete imaginations.







① Of, having, or capable of feeling (especially sympathy/empathy emotions) or perception (sensory input processing to consciousness); conscious

[LWSleeth]

Originally Posted by KaseiJin

Interesting. . . as usual we find little concern about working within the bounds of set definitions without due cause to alter such definitions. Good grief . . . is a relaxed way to express the emotion raised by such discovery.

LWSleeth has said that 'in this discussion we have been talking about sentience,' and in the very next sentence suggests a connection by saying that 'we need to know what exactly defines experience.' In other words, sentience is something that is a matter of experience, or at least has some connection to it. To be honest, I'm not quite so sure that we'd find any informed people ever trying to deny that connection, so what gives? Which direction are we to think of ourselves as being led in?

A possible clue will be found in the next paragraph, where we find, "experience is sensitivity that knows it senses." By this we could take it that the argument is being put forth that sentience is the experience derived knowledge of sensing, but what advantage of explanation would that circle of statement offer us? To say that sentience is an experience derived from working brain is exactly the same thing, and is clearer a statement--so why avoid it?

If, barring any valid further reason to do otherwise, we were to hold the term sentience to its common definition of ' a sentient① state or quality; capacity for feeling or percieving; consciousness,' we would see that we really need not say anything other than that 'consciousness involves the state of knowing that experience has occurred'. Again, this is just as good as saying that living, working brain projects consciousness. If, on the other hand (and barring any valid further reason to do otherwise) we were to hold the term sentience to its other common definition of 'mere awareness or sensation that does not involve thought or perception,' we would see that a self contradiction would be found--in that the absence of thought or perception would surely entail a lack of knowledge and cognitively acknowledging sensory input.

Therefore assuming that self-contradiction is to be avoided, and to have been unintended, we will accept the former common definition (barring any cause to alter that). In that way, a further statement made by LWSleeth will have a robust relation. That statement is, "So by 'subjective' I mean that part of consciousness that knows it feels." While attempts to tag the word 'subjective' to the fact of consciousness at large is a strange thing, we can rest assured that so far, LWSleeth has given a correct, and supported by the evidences at large, understanding; namely that consciousness is defined as that level of conscious brain tissue which projects acknowledged attention to any number of sensory input data, both external and internal (as in the operation of the otolith, or emotional memory recall attached to episodic memory recall, etc.), and works with long-term potentation.

It must not be left behind, we will have to come to face sooner or later, that we ARE (an attempt to add a bit of humour along with the importance of the point . . . hee, hee, hee....) talking about brain here; and for that very reason, to the extent that brain is understood and knowledge on it is secure (notwithstanding the lack that some in certain philosophical circles have in keeping up with it), we must strive to rein in obsolete imaginations.

① Of, having, or capable of feeling (especially sympathy/empathy emotions) or perception (sensory input processing to consciousness); conscious

That sir is one amazing pile of blather.

[KaseiJin]

I'm not quite sure how you can support that claim, LWsleeth. It is you who has stated that 'experience is sensitivity that knows its senses' and who has then further described 'experience' as being 'consciousness.' Think about that for a second, please. Think about the connection between the terms 'sensitivity' and 'senses.' Think about what might be gained from saying that 'consciousness knows that consciousness senses'--which is what you are saying, logically.

I tell you, LWSleeth, if a brain can not form the synaptic connections needed to project sensory input, there is no sensation to consciousness, no sensory experience--thus brain does not know. If a case of anterograde amnesia occurs at a fairly young age, almost no trace of long-term memory will be formed (and the only traces that can be found will not be projected to consciousness). No permanent experiences will be in the content of consciousness--thus brain would not know--and of course experience would not know..

Have you not been trying to assert that in such cases the consciousness content and state is an external (to brain) reality which is simply unknown to the otherwise possessor of such private consciousness?

The destruction of specific functioning cortical areas leaves no consciousness loss--the brain does not concern itself with what it does not know. If sensory input is not coming to a living module, there is feed-foward information that something is wrong, and there is disturbance in homoestasis.If, however, the module itself is distroyed, and sensory input intact and incoming, even, there is no problem at all--it is simply ignored (because the left-hemisphere does not miss what it does not recieve...and there is nothing coming from that module).

Are you interested in demonstrating how this is not true? Can you refute by demonstration the truthfulness of the understanding that what is otherwise a normal, and perfectly working consciousness for that individual patient, does not admit of the bodily possession of that limb simply because it no longer recieves any data from that limb module; and at the same time demonstrate how we could consider it a true external reality that that individual possesses a state of consciousness that acknowledges the bodily possession of that limb that the patient cannot 'tune into' because of the damaged brain tissue?

Also enough study has been done to know that in most cases, putting out the 'interpreter' function of the left hemisphere, especially tied up in the structures responsible for linguistics to frontal cortical (layers 2 & 3), puts out the singularity projection of consciousness to a very high degree. For this reason, the silent right-hemisphere, while still very much maintaining a level of conscious, does not appear to have consciousness (in the normal sense, because it doesn't work to unify all separate data recieved). Split-brain patients have been known to have hemisphere disputes (played out by their hands).

Can you demonstrate that it is a true external reality that each hemisphere is in possession of a level of hemispheric consciousness that can only be realized by corpus callosum severage; or do you think this is because we are essentially talking about the 'interpreter' and brain, here?

In cases where the vestibular system has major or total irrevocable damage, the patient will have the constant feeling of falling, the room spinning, and an inability to track moving objects visually. This not only alters, but puts a major strain on the state of consciousness--however, there is no brain damage here. The strength of incoming erroneous signals can be tuned out a bit, but the array becomes so strong that the brain cannot shut it out. Are you interested in demonstrating how this is not a matter of brain function alone? And, in the event that you wish to deny that this sensitivity is simply because brain tissue senses, can you demonstrate that there is some true external reality of a consciousness which behaves in such a way?

Dr. Gazzaniga (who had also done much work with Dr. LeDoux) put it humorously in the following way:

We don't usually feel like dispatchers with reports coming in from hundreds or thousands of different sources, deciding what is important or useful or not, or like triage nurses lining up incoming information in order of its importance, but somehow this is happening in our brains. (italics his) Human-The Science Behind What Makes Us Human, p 285; HarpersCollins, (2008)

What Dennett is saying, overall, is basically the case. The premise upon which you have based the question is faulty because of lack of information, that's all. If you were to adjust for that, there'd be no problem--but you might have to update your explanations of 'experience, 'consciousness', and 'mind.'

(And of course, pain is no big deal at all, we all feel it, you see, as do animals too !! . . . just another one of those brain things, you know.)

[LWSleeth]

Originally Posted by KaseiJin

I'm not quite sure how you can support that claim, LWsleeth. It is you who has stated that 'experience is sensitivity that knows its senses' and who has then further described 'experience' as being 'consciousness.' Think about that for a second, please. Think about the connection between the terms 'sensitivity' and 'senses.' Think about what might be gained from saying that 'consciousness knows that consciousness senses'--which is what you are saying, logically.

I tell you, LWSleeth, if a brain can not form the synaptic connections needed to project sensory input, there is no sensation to consciousness, no sensory experience--thus brain does not know. If a case of anterograde amnesia occurs at a fairly young age, almost no trace of long-term memory will be formed (and the only traces that can be found will not be projected to consciousness). No permanent experiences will be in the content of consciousness--thus brain would not know--and of course experience would not know..

Have you not been trying to assert that in such cases the consciousness content and state is an external (to brain) reality which is simply unknown to the otherwise possessor of such private consciousness?

The destruction of specific functioning cortical areas leaves no consciousness loss--the brain does not concern itself with what it does not know. If sensory input is not coming to a living module, there is feed-foward information that something is wrong, and there is disturbance in homoestasis.If, however, the module itself is distroyed, and sensory input intact and incoming, even, there is no problem at all--it is simply ignored (because the left-hemisphere does not miss what it does not recieve...and there is nothing coming from that module).

Are you interested in demonstrating how this is not true? Can you refute by demonstration the truthfulness of the understanding that what is otherwise a normal, and perfectly working consciousness for that individual patient, does not admit of the bodily possession of that limb simply because it no longer recieves any data from that limb module; and at the same time demonstrate how we could consider it a true external reality that that individual possesses a state of consciousness that acknowledges the bodily possession of that limb that the patient cannot 'tune into' because of the damaged brain tissue?

Also enough study has been done to know that in most cases, putting out the 'interpreter' function of the left hemisphere, especially tied up in the structures responsible for linguistics to frontal cortical (layers 2 & 3), puts out the singularity projection of consciousness to a very high degree. For this reason, the silent right-hemisphere, while still very much maintaining a level of conscious, does not appear to have consciousness (in the normal sense, because it doesn't work to unify all separate data recieved). Split-brain patients have been known to have hemisphere disputes (played out by their hands).

Can you demonstrate that it is a true external reality that each hemisphere is in possession of a level of hemispheric consciousness that can only be realized by corpus callosum severage; or do you think this is because we are essentially talking about the 'interpreter' and brain, here?

In cases where the vestibular system has major or total irrevocable damage, the patient will have the constant feeling of falling, the room spinning, and an inability to track moving objects visually. This not only alters, but puts a major strain on the state of consciousness--however, there is no brain damage here. The strength of incoming erroneous signals can be tuned out a bit, but the array becomes so strong that the brain cannot shut it out. Are you interested in demonstrating how this is not a matter of brain function alone? And, in the event that you wish to deny that this sensitivity is simply because brain tissue senses, can you demonstrate that there is some true external reality of a consciousness which behaves in such a way?

Dr. Gazzaniga (who had also done much work with Dr. LeDoux) put it humorously in the following way:

We don't usually feel like dispatchers with reports coming in from hundreds or thousands of different sources, deciding what is important or useful or not, or like triage nurses lining up incoming information in order of its importance, but somehow this is happening in our brains. (italics his) Human-The Science Behind What Makes Us Human, p 285; HarpersCollins, (2008)

What Dennett is saying, overall, is basically the case. The premise upon which you have based the question is faulty because of lack of information, that's all. If you were to adjust for that, there'd be no problem--but you might have to update your explanations of 'experience, 'consciousness', and 'mind.'

(And of course, pain is no big deal at all, we all feel it, you see, as do animals too !! . . . just another one of those brain things, you know.)

You seem to believe regurgitating facts and other people's concepts, theories, and arguments somehow equates to sound reasoning. Add to that how your self-referencing lectures only rely on your beliefs, and never properly give weight to other's points, and we are left with proclamations supported by a narrow collection of self-serving facts. I find that kind of condescending, overbearing attitude so irritating I wish you'd stop talking to me if it is all you can manage.