Plato on True Belief and Knowledge

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Theaetetus

Sorry my bad. I was assuming that since you used it, he did too. I have been consulting my other translations and ignoring the Jowett.

In any case, I don't think it makes any difference to the issue at hand whether it is "true belief" or "right opinion". It still does not follow that because a belief is true that is cannot be false, as Socrates claims. Contingent truths are true, but they can be false. (And it doesn't matter whether we substitute "right opinion" for "true belief". The point is the same). The problem is what matters, not the translation.

[jeeprs]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

But what is to the point is that anyone (including Plato) who proposes the idea is obligated to argue for it. He may not be talking about knowing ordinary truths, but then, so what? If by "higher knowledge" he only means knowledge of "higher truths" and not just ordinary truth like that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, then he ought to say that. But that has nothing to do with different kinds of knowledge. It has to do with knowledge of different kinds of truths. And, that distinction is obviously important.

So you think there are different kinds of truths? If so, what are some examples?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

So you think there are different kinds of truths? If so, what are some examples?

That's a good question. There are analytic truth (I think) that are true in virtue of the meanings of their terms. For instance, all bachelors are unmarried men. And there are synthetic truths. like all dogs are mammals, which are not true in virtue of the meanings of their terms.

[jeeprs]

It doesn't really address the issue though. We were discussing whether Plato is tallking of 'higher truths', so I suppose the question really is, are there such kinds of truth, and if so, what might the substance of those be?

I think in the ancient world, there was a distinction between 'the philosopher' and 'the ordinary man'. This was not unique to Plato but was one of the key distinctions in Greek philosophy generally. Philosophic wisdom was something that had to be attained - hence the Curriculum of the Academy, and all of the many conversations about 'the good man' and how he is able to perceive important principles and truths which 'the ordinary man', because of his lack of wisdom, was not able to grasp.

Now of course this distinction might have been lost in modern philosophy. But perhaps it is intrinsic to the dialog we are considering?

[ACB]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

It still does not follow that because a belief is true that is cannot be false, as Socrates claims. Contingent truths are true, but they can be false.

If someone says "contingent truths cannot be false", what precisely do they mean? Is it a metaphysical claim, i.e. that there is only one logically possible universe? But then the truths wouldn't be contingent, would they? The idea that contingent truths cannot be false sounds like a contradiction (= contingent truths are necessary).

[Theaetetus]

Originally Posted by ACB

If someone says "contingent truths cannot be false", what precisely do they mean? Is it a metaphysical claim, i.e. that there is only one logically possible universe? But then the truths wouldn't be contingent, would they? The idea that contingent truths cannot be false sounds like a contradiction (= contingent truths are necessary).

But doesn't a truth presuppose that it is true? Whether it is contingent or not is irrelevant because it must be true to be a truth.

Originally Posted by kennethamy

In any case, I don't think it makes any difference to the issue at hand whether it is "true belief" or "right opinion". It still does not follow that because a belief is true that is cannot be false, as Socrates claims. Contingent truths are true, but they can be false. (And it doesn't matter whether we substitute "right opinion" for "true belief". The point is the same). The problem is what matters, not the translation.

I think you hit on something that is interesting to say the least--especially considering my response to ACB. There are many different ways to classify thinks as true. There are those things that are true to the individual and whether they are actually true or not is irrelevant. Then there are those things that are true according to a group of people. But then there are those things that are true independent of people. For example, the earth exists is independent of any human or group of humans. The universe exists is another. What this means is that as far as we know, nearly all truths are contingent truths that require individuals or groups of individuals to declare them true through their acceptance.

Looking at the Meno, and the other related dialogues, it is obvious that Plato was trying to transcend this and find a way to make contingent truths something that was grounded beyond the yea-sayers. Thus, the forms.

[jeeprs]

a.k.a, 'higher truths'

[jgweed]

Friedlander points out that in the Meno, Plato is attempting to bridge the gap between true knowledge and ignorance (un-knowledge); for many people "know" true things without understanding the principles and grounds for it. One can, for example, know many true matters of fact by rote or memorization without being able to "give an account" of them.

There seems to be a parallel between learning ( and teaching) knowledge on the one hand, and true belief [outside of the Platonic doctrine of Remembrance] on the other. For example, it is quite possible to have true belief about much of history, but someone acquainted with the principles of historiography and historical tradition would be able to provide a discursive foundation over and above someone holding a true belief.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

a.k.a, 'higher truths'

If a higher truth is a truth which is independent of whether it is believed or not, then it is hard to think of any truth that is not a higher truth. But, in that case, the term "higher" doesn't do much work.

[jeeprs]

I can't put my hands on a quote from the Dialogs, but I think about it this way (perhaps more Buddhist than Platonic but I am sure there are parallels). One of the hallmarks of sagacity or the philosophic temperament is disinterestedness - absence of self-interest. Ordinary people are driven by passions, likes and dislikes. So their every act and perception is coloured by 'what I want' or 'what I believe'. In the absence of the passions, the sage is much more able to discern what is truly the case by not acting from self-interest. Consider the last speech of Socrates - I think this was a good example. He was looking at the whole situation from the viewpoint of the State, not from his own viewpoint, and was able to be completely unaffected by his own imminent demise.

This sense of detachment from self is, I am sure, a prerequisite for what the traditional cultures understood as the higher knowledge. This is very much at odds with our own culture which puts so much emphasis on the self and individual perogative.