Plato on True Belief and Knowledge

[jeeprs]

I don't think there is a resolution available within your terms of reference.

Speaking on behalf of analytical philosophy, Russell said "We refuse to believe that there some 'higher' way of knowing, by which we can discover truths hidden from science and the intellect." (History of Western Philosophy, Unwin, 1979, p789)

I am sure Plato's whole outlook was based on an understanding that there was just such a higher way of knowledge. If you reject that, then indeed much of what is in platonism, and neoplatonism, makes no sense whatever. So why bring it up?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

I don't think there is a resolution available within your terms of reference.

Speaking on behalf of analytical philosophy, Russell said "We refuse to believe that there some 'higher' way of knowing, by which we can discover truths hidden from science and the intellect." (History of Western Philosophy, Unwin, 1979, p789)

I am sure Plato's whole outlook was based on an understanding that there was just such a higher way of knowledge. If you reject that, then indeed much of what is in platonism, and neoplatonism, makes no sense whatever. So why bring it up?

The notion of a "higher way of knowledge" is not, it seems to me just to be posited, but needs to be examined. Your question seems to imply that the idea of a "higher way of knowing" is something to be either accepted or rejected, but not a subject for discussion or analysis, but is above criticism. I see no good reason for thinking this way. It seems to me that in philosophy, everything can be discussed, and subject to criticism.

[jeeprs]

Well I don't think it is above criticism, but I do think that it is a controversial idea in the modern world and will generally be rejected.

I am reading The Shape of Ancient Thought by Thomas McEvilly. His basic thesis is that there are much greater correspondences between Ancient Greek and Classical Indian philosophy than has been commonly accepted in the past. The contact came about partially through trade and commerce and also through the conquests of Alexander.

He draws quite a few parallels between Platonism and Indian philosophy, especially the Upanisads, which are the esoteric spiritual texts of the latter, and portrays Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato very much as 'spiritual sages' in the same sense as the Upanisadic seers.

In support of this he says as follows:

"In certain passages (e.g. Meno 81cd; Phadoe 75cd-79c; Syposium 211-121; Republic 479, 490a-b, 500b-d, 508d, 514 ff; Phaedrus 249e - 250c, 247d;Timaeus 41d) it requires special pleading to deny that Plato speaks of a mystical knowledge..... Here [is one] example:

When returning into itself, the soul reflects, then it passes into the other world, the region of purity and eternity and immortality and unchangeableness which are its kindred and with them ever it lives, when it is by itself and is not let or hindered; then it ceases from its erring ways being in communion with the unchanging, is unchanging. And this is the state of the soul called knowledge. (Phaedrus 79c - emphasis added.)

Plato presents this special knowledge as the crux of his philosophy. it is the culimating topic of the Phaedo, the Symposium, the Republic, The Phaedrus, and the Meno, and is assumed as background in most of the other major dialogs. If such ecstatic verbiage is only an elevated way of talking about logical thought or academic investigation, then Plato seems a bit simplistically amazed by it all. Does he mean a truth only on the level of concepts and their interactions? He denies this emphatically in several places.

The usual view of modern western scholars is that Plato is merely distiniguishing between sense consciousness on the one hand and intelligible cogitations such as those of math and deductive logic on the other. In the Philebus, Plato distinguishes them like this:

"Knowledge differs from knowledge - one having regard to the things that come into being and perish, the other to those that do not come into being nor perish, but are always unchanging and unaltered. revising them on the score of truth, we concluded that the latter was truer than the former" ( Philebus 61d-e) MacEvilly, p 187

The text at this point presents a number of comparisons between Platonic and Hindu thought on the topic of the 'true object of knowledge' and 'real nature of being'.

Hence, I still say the difficulty you are having with Plato's idea of knowledge is that he is not talking about where in the world is Quito. He is talking about something else altogether and it is quite probable that none of us really has much of an idea as to what it might be.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

Well I don't think it is above criticism, but I do think that it is a controversial idea in the modern world and will generally be rejected.

I am reading The Shape of Ancient Thought by Thomas McEvilly. His basic thesis is that there are much greater correspondences between Ancient Greek and Classical Indian philosophy than has been commonly accepted in the past. The contact came about partially through trade and commerce and also through the conquests of Alexander.

He draws quite a few parallels between Platonism and Indian philosophy, especially the Upanisads, which are the esoteric spiritual texts of the latter, and portrays Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato very much as 'spiritual sages' in the same sense as the Upanisadic seers.

In support of this he says as follows:



The text at this point presents a number of comparisons between Platonic and Hindu thought on the topic of the 'true object of knowledge' and 'real nature of being'.

Hence, I still say the difficulty you are having with Plato's idea of knowledge is that he is not talking about where in the world is Quito. He is talking about something else altogether and it is quite probable that none of us really has much of an idea as to what it might be.

Whether it is a controversial idea is not, I think, to the point. But what is to the point is that anyone (including Plato) who proposes the idea is obligated to argue for it. He may not be talking about knowing ordinary truths, but then, so what? If by "higher knowledge" he only means knowledge of "higher truths" and not just ordinary truth like that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, then he ought to say that. But that has nothing to do with different kinds of knowledge. It has to do with knowledge of different kinds of truths. And, that distinction is obviously important.

If none of us knows what Plato is talking about, what makes you assume that Plato knows what he is talking about? It may be that Plato is confused. Not we.

[jeeprs]

OK correction, I won't say 'none of us knows what Plato is talking about'. But I will say that what he is talking about is not well understood and there are major cultural impediments to understanding him. I don't think Plato is confused. Do you really think he would have been remembered as one of the founders of Western culture if he was simply 'confused'? It is more likely that we no longer understand or meet his standards.

[Theaetetus]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I am not so much interested in what he is actually saying in Greek as I am what he is translated as saying in English.

The problem is that many scholars have translated the Meno, which are available to the general public, and they tend to vary on what Plato is saying. Jowett's translation is easily one of the worst since he was not even a philosopher, and thus, is not going to understand the philosophic subtleties employed by a philosopher. Both of the translations I usually consult differ from each other, but they are far more consistent and clear than the woefully murky Jowett translation. Just the difference between Jowett's use of true belief, and most other translations use of right opinion already throws off the whole conversation. And after looking at the Greek text, I can say that right opinion is a much better translation.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

OK correction, I won't say 'none of us knows what Plato is talking about'. But I will say that what he is talking about is not well understood and there are major cultural impediments to understanding him. I don't think Plato is confused. Do you really think he would have been remembered as one of the founders of Western culture if he was simply 'confused'? It is more likely that we no longer understand or meet his standards.

Sure. He might be confused about this or that. He certainly confused the "is" of identity with the "is" of predication in his theory of Forms.* In fact, it might be that part of why he was so influential is that he made mistakes. In fact (like Descartes) it is only the greatest of philosophers who make the greatest of mistakes. It it is just because of their mistakes that we learn so much from them; largely from unraveling their mistakes and understanding them. Plato makes a very wonderful mistake in the passage we have been discussing.

*That confusion is epitomized in the Platonic Keat's famous line about how beauty is truth, and truth beauty

[jeeprs]

Ha! Don't know if I concur, but I love the idea of 'wonderful mistakes'. Wish my mistakes were wonderful....

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

Ha! Don't know if I concur, but I love the idea of 'wonderful mistakes'. Wish my mistakes were wonderful....

Don't we all? I would even settle for doing something wonderfully right. But wonderfully right things are even rarer than wonderfully wrong things.

---------- Post added 11-21-2009 at 08:42 AM ----------

Originally Posted by Theaetetus

The problem is that many scholars have translated the Meno, which are available to the general public, and they tend to vary on what Plato is saying. Jowett's translation is easily one of the worst since he was not even a philosopher, and thus, is not going to understand the philosophic subtleties employed by a philosopher. Both of the translations I usually consult differ from each other, but they are far more consistent and clear than the woefully murky Jowett translation. Just the difference between Jowett's use of true belief, and most other translations use of right opinion already throws off the whole conversation. And after looking at the Greek text, I can say that right opinion is a much better translation.

But Jowett does, in fact, use "right opinion". So I don't know why you say that. I used, "true belief". At Oxford (in those days) those who took "Greats" were steeped in Greek philosophy. And, Balliol, Jowett's college, was especially famous for that. In any case, I would have thought there was an advantage in having a philosophically neutral view when translating.

[Theaetetus]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

But Jowett does, in fact, use "right opinion". So I don't know why you say that. I used, "true belief". At Oxford (in those days) those who took "Greats" were steeped in Greek philosophy. And, Balliol, Jowett's college, was especially famous for that. In any case, I would have thought there was an advantage in having a philosophically neutral view when translating.

Sorry my bad. I was assuming that since you used it, he did too. I have been consulting my other translations and ignoring the Jowett.