Plato on True Belief and Knowledge

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

Do you think 'certainty' is another word for 'absolute' in this context? Are they saying, knowledge is not worthy of the name unless it is absolute? I suppose the corollary is that if knowledge is not certain, but it is all we have, is there anything certain? Archimedes said 'give me a lever and I will move the world'. Do we have such a point in modern thought?

I am not really an expert on the term, "absolute". It is one of those terms tossed around in philosophy like confetti at a parade. I'll stick with "certainty". And what I mean by "certainty" is the impossibility of error, so that when someone is certain of some proposition, it is impossible for him to be mistaken. And I think that knowledge is plentiful, but that certainty is rare. We know much we are not certain of. Certainty, as I have said, excludes the possibility of error; but knowledge excludes only the actuality of error. If I might be wrong, I am not certain; but if I am wrong, I do not know. Thus, we know that Mars is the fourth planet, but we are not certain of it.

[Theaetetus]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

Do you think 'certainty' is another word for 'absolute' in this context? Are they saying, knowledge is not worthy of the name unless it is absolute? I suppose the corollary is that if knowledge is not certain, but it is all we have, is there anything certain? Archimedes said 'give me a lever and I will move the world'. Do we have such a point in modern thought?

I wish I had a Greek text of the Meno, because I would be able to see what is actually meant by "absolute" in the context of the original language. There are so many subtleties in the ancient Greek language that are not carried through the translation to English. The forms, which are not discussed in the Meno but are in the Phaedo, are things that are absolute, so if someone has knowledge of them, that knowledge would be absolute.

I suggest, though, that all that Plato is doing is distinguishing between strong and weak knowledge or wisdom/understanding and stable right opinion. Wisdom seems to be a form of knowledge that could be considered absolute, because if it wasn't, is the wise man truly wise?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Theaetetus

I wish I had a Greek text of the Meno, because I would be able to see what is actually meant by "absolute" in the context of the original language. There are so many subtleties in the ancient Greek language that are not carried through the translation to English. The forms, which are not discussed in the Meno but are in the Phaedo, are things that are absolute, so if someone has knowledge of them, that knowledge would be absolute.

I suggest, though, that all that Plato is doing is distinguishing between strong and weak knowledge or wisdom/understanding and stable right knowledge. Wisdom seems to be a form of knowledge that could be considered absolute, because if it wasn't, is the wise man truly wise?

But how does the adjective, "absolute" qualify the noun, "knowledge". How does absolute knowledge differ from just, knowledge? It doesn't help much to say that Plato is distinguishing between strong and weak knowledge unless you inform me of that is supposed to be the difference between those. (I don't understand your point about wisdom). I, myself, think that all that is meant by "absolute knowledge" is certainty. The impossibility of error. And, as I have already pointed out, although it is (A) true that it is impossible that if you know then you are mistaken; that is not the same thing as saying that (B) if you know, it is impossible that you are mistaken, which, it seems to me is false. (B) confuses knowledge with certainty. (A) does not. I think that the failure to distinguish between (A) and (B) is a great cause of the confusion between knowledge and certainty. And, I daresay that Plato (Socrates) made this confusion (as did many after them). It is pretty clear that Socrates makes this confusion in this passage:

SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?
MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.
SOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?
MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion—or why they should ever differ.


And Meno, who was right the first time, relents (of course). He should have replied to Socrates, "Yes, Socrates. A person can, indeed, be wrong even though he has right opinion". "For example" Meno might have continued, "I believe Larisa is a city in Greece, and I am right to believe that. But it is possible for me to be wrong. I could have been mistaken about Larisa being a city in Greece. But I am not". Could not have Meno replied that way to Socrates?

[Theaetetus]

Plato distinguished between wisdom and stable right opinion (strong and weak knowledge) in the Republic, but this discussion is supposed to be dealing with the Meno so I am leaving it at that.

You are missing the point that words that we use have different meanings and subtleties in the ancient Greek language than we are accustomed to. Not to mention, the word meaning wisdom in Greek is often mistranslated as knowledge (which happens in Jowett's translation of the Meno). This is also the reason why many have made the same confusion since Plato's days.

All I have to say is that if you want to know what Plato is truly saying you must consult with the Greek text. I have been lucky enough to have a professor who has done that for me to save me much time and effort.

[jgweed]

The Greek text can be found here:

Plato, Meno, section 70a

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Theaetetus

Plato distinguished between wisdom and stable right opinion (strong and weak knowledge) in the Republic, but this discussion is supposed to be dealing with the Meno so I am leaving it at that.

You are missing the point that words that we use have different meanings and subtleties in the ancient Greek language than we are accustomed to. Not to mention, the word meaning wisdom in Greek is often mistranslated as knowledge (which happens in Jowett's translation of the Meno). This is also the reason why many have made the same confusion since Plato's days.

All I have to say is that if you want to know what Plato is truly saying you must consult with the Greek text. I have been lucky enough to have a professor who has done that for me to save me much time and effort.

I am afraid that many people are not conversant with ancient Greek, and so, I am afraid that if you are right, they will never know what Plato is truly saying. But some of them (I for instance) would still like to discuss the problem raised in Meno about true belief and knowledge. Are we barred from doing that? It seems to me that we can discuss the philosophical problems raised in Meno although we do not know ancient Greek. For example, whether Socrates makes the mistake I accuse him of. Certainly, we can ask this question: If Socrates does say what Jowett says he said, did Socrates make a mistake? You do not object to that, do you?

[Theaetetus]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

And Meno, who was right the first time, relents (of course). He should have replied to Socrates, "Yes, Socrates. A person can, indeed, be wrong even though he has right opinion". "For example" Meno might have continued, "I believe Larisa is a city in Greece, and I am right to believe that. But it is possible for me to be wrong. I could have been mistaken about Larisa being a city in Greece. But I am not". Could not have Meno replied that way to Socrates?

He could have, but he didn't. What Socrates explains afterward does that, although it is done so in a confusing way talking about the statues being bound. Right opinion is not bound so it is possible to be mistaken, but as Socrates says "they are beautiful possessions" when they are correct. What you are looking for is there in the text, although Plato hides it very well.

---------- Post added 11-20-2009 at 10:31 AM ----------

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I am afraid that many people are not conversant with ancient Greek, and so, I am afraid that if you are right, they will never know what Plato is truly saying. But some of them (I for instance) would still like to discuss the problem raised in Meno about true belief and knowledge. Are we barred from doing that? It seems to me that we can discuss the philosophical problems raised in Meno although we do not know ancient Greek. For example, whether Socrates makes the mistake I accuse him of. Certainly, we can ask this question: If Socrates does say what Jowett says he said, did Socrates make a mistake? You do not object to that, do you?

I agree with you totally. We can discuss the difference between true belief and knowledge, and we pretty much have beaten Plato dead in the discussion. Maybe it is time to move away from the Meno and either look at other instances in the dialogues where Plato makes the distinction or just focus on our understanding of the differences since we are not getting anywhere trying to find the answer in Plato. Plato is going to move on to the theory of the forms to further expand on what he presents in the Meno, and from there it gets rather ridiculous.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Theaetetus

He could have, but he didn't. What Socrates explains afterward does that, although it is done so in a confusing way talking about the statues being bound. Right opinion is not bound so it is possible to be mistaken, but as Socrates says "they are beautiful possessions" when they are correct. What you are looking for is there in the text, although Plato hides it very well.

---------- Post added 11-20-2009 at 10:31 AM ----------



I agree with you totally. We can discuss the difference between true belief and knowledge, and we pretty much have beaten Plato dead in the discussion. Maybe it is time to move away from the Meno and either look at other instances in the dialogues where Plato makes the distinction or just focus on our understanding of the differences since we are not getting anywhere trying to find the answer in Plato. Plato is going to move on to the theory of the forms to further expand on what he presents in the Meno, and from there it gets rather ridiculous.

Saying that right opinion is not bound is not something I find particularly helpful. But what Socrates says in reply to Meno about whether true belief can be false is simply wrong. Since I can belief true contingent propositions, and true contingent propositions can be wrong. Indeed, that is what it mean for them to be contingent. Until that is pointed out, Plato is not beaten dead. My interest here is not in an explication of the text, but in discussing the problems of epistemology raised by the text.

[jeeprs]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I am afraid that many people are not conversant with ancient Greek, and so, I am afraid that if you are right, they will never know what Plato is truly saying. But some of them (I for instance) would still like to discuss the problem raised in Meno about true belief and knowledge. Are we barred from doing that? It seems to me that we can discuss the philosophical problems raised in Meno although we do not know ancient Greek. For example, whether Socrates makes the mistake I accuse him of. Certainly, we can ask this question: If Socrates does say what Jowett says he said, did Socrates make a mistake? You do not object to that, do you?

But isn't it at least possible that the grounds for the difficulty are that we are not actually understanding what Plato is saying? I certainly do not read Greek, and am no scholar of Plato either. However it seems to me (purely on intutuition) that to believe that Socrates is wrong about this issue, and also to 'leave aside' all of what Plato has to say about 'anamnesis' and 'the soul', may mean you never will know what Plato is saying, because you are not prepared to accept his major premisses, or 'where he is coming from'. It might be necessary to be more sympathetic to his perspective. What if, for example, there is a type of knowledge which is completely certain, which we (culturally) don't have? Is it not at least possible?

Also I wonder what the Meno says about Justice? (if anything). I have a feeling this will help illuminate something about knowledge as well.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

But isn't it at least possible that the grounds for the difficulty are that we are not actually understanding what Plato is saying? I certainly do not read Greek, and am no scholar of Plato either. However it seems to me (purely on intutuition) that to believe that Socrates is wrong about this issue, and also to 'leave aside' all of what Plato has to say about 'anamnesis' and 'the soul', may mean you never will know what Plato is saying, because you are not prepared to accept his major premisses, or 'where he is coming from'. It might be necessary to be more sympathetic to his perspective. What if, for example, there is a type of knowledge which is completely certain, which we (culturally) don't have? Is it not at least possible?

Also I wonder what the Meno says about Justice? (if anything). I have a feeling this will help illuminate something about knowledge as well.

But let's suppose he is saying what he is translated as saying. I am not so much interested in what he is actually saying in Greek as I am what he is translated as saying in English. Suppose that two individuals were arguing in that way in whatever language. Who would be right? It really doesn't matter, philosophically speaking, that they happen to be Socrates and Meno. After all, this is not an issue of the history of philosophy. It is an issue of a problem in philosophy. Can a person have a true belief and yet it be possible that he is wrong? Does it really matter who it is who is discussing the question? Of course there can be a type of knowledge which is certain. That is just certainty. But the question is whether I can know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador in the ordinary sense of "know" but it be possible that I am mistaken? The answer seems to me to be, yes. For it is a logical error to think that knowledge implies certainty.