Plato on True Belief and Knowledge

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

So perhaps the point of the dialog is to differentiate that knowledge (episteme) is of a different kind to what many of us (cave dwellers, I presume) what regard as 'knowledge', which would at best be 'correct opinions or beliefs' (doxa).

It is hard to ascertain the truth of this statement, insofar as it assumes a distinction which cannot really be proven propositionally. No amount of propositional analysis could establish whether there is such a thing as 'true knowledge remembered by the soul' could it?

Never mind the "remembered by the soul" part. If Plato were right, and if knowledge had to be absolutely certain without the possibility of error, then what we call scientific knowledge would be impossible. And, we would not know that the world is round, nor that Mars is the fourth planet. And, further, we would not know more today than we did 100 years ago, since most of what we have learned in the last century is scientific knowledge. Do you think we don't know more today than 100 years ago? I surely don't. So, it seems to me that Plato must be wrong.

[jeeprs]

I don't know. I don't think you can discard the idea of 'anamnesis' without eviscerating Platonic philosophy altogether. Certainly it makes interpretation of this dialog impossible. I think the whole point is that Socrates is making a distinction between 'knowledge of an ultimate kind' and 'ordinary knowledge'. There are similar distinctions made in many traditional schools of philosophy (Arabic, Hindu, Buddhist, Medieval). However, there remains scope for 'conventional' knowledge (which includes science) to be perfectly sound, within its frame of reference. But that frame of reference is understood not to be absolute.

Socrates is talking about a 'higher knowledge'.

Of course, we know more facts today than we did 100 years ago. But there can well be a sense in which we know more and more, about less and less. Maybe there is a really important perspective which Plato and Socrates shared, which we don't have, and which might not be gained by the accumulation of facts. But of course the modern outlook will generally reject this idea so I don't expect that it will be accepted. This is, however, what is at issue in this dialog.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

I don't know. I don't think you can discard the idea of 'anamnesis' without eviscerating Platonic philosophy altogether. Certainly it makes interpretation of this dialog impossible. I think the whole point is that Socrates is making a distinction between 'knowledge of an ultimate kind' and 'ordinary knowledge'. There are similar distinctions made in many traditional schools of philosophy (Arabic, Hindu, Buddhist, Medieval). However, there remains scope for 'conventional' knowledge (which includes science) to be perfectly sound, within its frame of reference. But that frame of reference is understood not to be absolute.

Socrates is talking about a 'higher knowledge'.

Of course, we know more facts today than we did 100 years ago. But there can well be a sense in which we know more and more, about less and less. Maybe there is a really important perspective which Plato and Socrates shared, which we don't have, and which might not be gained by the accumulation of facts. But of course the modern outlook will generally reject this idea so I don't expect that it will be accepted. This is, however, what is at issue in this dialog.

On the other hand, Plato lived and wrote nearly 2,000 years before the rise of science. His paradigm of knowledge was mathematics (geometry, actually). There was what is called a "paradigm shift" in the 16th and 17th centuries from mathematics to what Robert Boyle called, "the experimental sciences". And what we have learned about nature dwarfs what we knew in the previous two thousand years. We have learned, too, that knowledge is fallible, and not certain. Whatever we know is, of course, true, else it would not be knowledge. But that does not mean that what we know must be true. It is true that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. But it is not the case that it must be true. A different city might have been the capital of Ecuador. For instance, Guayaquil. (Indeed, there was some dispute before Quito was designated the capital. And it might have gone the other way).

[jeeprs]

that is true in a way, but it is rather beside the point. Besides it assumes that in all respects, modernity is superior to the ancient world. I think this is 'cultural chauvinism'. It might be the case that the modern outlook on life is better in some ways than ancient one. But there might have been some ways in which their's was better than ours. Experimental science is of course very useful, and reveals the details of nature very well. But at the end of the day we live in a human reality, and reality is a lived experience. Science is but one facet of that lived experience. Certainly it provides many powerful tools and other benefits, but does it make me any wiser? Does having access to all of this knowledge make me a better person? It is quite possible that the ancients understood other facets about which modern science has no knowledge or interest.

I seem to recall that Plato took a dim view of the hoi polloi. They were the great majority who dwelt in the realm of doxa. Of course these aristocratic tendencies were why Popper saw Plato as an enemy of the 'open society'. But on the other hand, what we call modern science might be just the way that the hoi polloi have organised things for their own convenience. And it certainly seems to be more convenient in some respects, but then on the other hand, we seem to permanently hovering on the edge of global catastophe as well, so maybe the 'jury is still out' as the saying goes.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

that is true in a way, but it is rather beside the point. Besides it assumes that in all respects, modernity is superior to the ancient world. I think this is 'cultural chauvinism'. It might be the case that the modern outlook on life is better in some ways than ancient one. But there might have been some ways in which their's was better than ours. Experimental science is of course very useful, and reveals the details of nature very well. But at the end of the day we live in a human reality, and reality is a lived experience. Science is but one facet of that lived experience. Certainly it provides many powerful tools and other benefits, but does it make me any wiser? Does having access to all of this knowledge make me a better person? It is quite possible that the ancients understood other facets about which modern science has no knowledge or interest.

I seem to recall that Plato took a dim view of the hoi polloi. They were the great majority who dwelt in the realm of doxa. Of course these aristocratic tendencies were why Popper saw Plato as an enemy of the 'open society'. But on the other hand, what we call modern science might be just the way that the hoi polloi have organised things for their own convenience. And it certainly seems to be more convenient in some respects, but then on the other hand, we seem to permanently hovering on the edge of global catastophe as well, so maybe the 'jury is still out' as the saying goes.

I am assuming only that science, and the scientific outlook has revolutionized the world we live in, and that any view that implies there is no scientific knowledge must be false. So, if the choice is between whether knowledge must be infallibly certain, or science affords us knowledge, the evidence comes down in completely in favor of science. Why we have science and its origins, or the value of science, are rather beside the point. (Although I am awed by the belief that human life is not better for the discovery of anesthesia and antibiotics). It is preposterous to believe that we do not know more about the world now than we did a century ago. Do we not know that water is H20, or that Mars is the fourth planet? Certainly we do, for if we do not know things like that, we know nothing at all. And, if we have not learned that we are fallible creatures in the last two thousand years, we have learned nothing at all.

[jeeprs]

But learning that we are fallible creatures does not require science. Some people would have known it 10,000 years ago.

I did not imply, or say, that there is 'no scientific knowledge', rather that scientific knowledge is perfectly valid within its frame of reference. Actually this is not even a particularly controversial claim. This is in accordance with what Kuhn and Polanyi say about scientific knowledge. I don't accept Bertrand Russell's idea that 'all can be known, can be known by means of science'. there are other types of knowledge, intuitive and spiritual understandings, which are not in the province of empirical science, because they require our participation as subjects.

And I don't make a religion out of science. I don't think 'the scientific worldview' amounts to a philosophy of life, nor that evolutionary biology accounts for the nature of human beings. I am not a scientific ideologue, although I will defer on scientific questions to scientists.

And Socrates is talking about a higher knowledge.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

But learning that we are fallible creatures does not require science. Some people would have known it 10,000 years ago.

I did not imply, or say, that there is 'no scientific knowledge', rather that scientific knowledge is perfectly valid within its frame of reference. Actually this is not even a particularly controversial claim. This is in accordance with what Kuhn and Polanyi say about scientific knowledge. I don't accept Bertrand Russell's idea that 'all can be known, can be known by means of science'. there are other types of knowledge, intuitive and spiritual understandings, which are not in the province of empirical science, because they require our participation as subjects.

And I don't make a religion out of science. I don't think 'the scientific worldview' amounts to a philosophy of life, nor that evolutionary biology accounts for the nature of human beings. I am not a scientific ideologue, although I will defer on scientific questions to scientists.

And Socrates is talking about a higher knowledge.

I should have explained that what I mean by saying that we are fallible is that we know nothing for certain, and not, as you had a right to think, that we sometimes err. It is true that we sometimes (often?) believe we know something, and it turns out that we do not know what we thought we knew. And that is what people have "known 10,000 years ago". But, as we have been discussing, Plato, and Descartes, and others have also held a different thesis, namely that there are some things we can know for certain, and, also, that only certain and infallible knowledge is really knowledge (with a capital 'K'). Everyone knows, of course, that we often think we know, and find out later that we don't know what we thought we know. Plato knew that too. I call that "weak fallibilism". But the view that there is no certainty, and that knowledge does not imply certainty, I call, "strong fallibilism". And it is strong fallibilism I mean when I say that we are all fallible. And, clearly, Plato did not accept strong fallibilism.

If Plato were right, and if only certain knowledge is knowledge, then there is no scientific knowledge. And that, as I have already said, seems to me to be preposterous. For, if we know anything about empirical science, we know that it is strongly fallible. That is, scientific knowledge is not certain knowledge. So it does not seem to be that this notion that it is "valid" within its own frame of reference is much help, even if I were clear about what that means, which I must admit, I am not. What is science's "frame of reference"? If science tells us that the Earth is many billions of years old, is it within its own frame of reference? How do we know whether it is or it is not? If science tells us the Shroud of Turin is a fraud, is it within its own frame of reference. How do we tell? (What is "higher" knowledge? Did Socrates know "highly" that he lived in Athens, or did he not?).

[jeeprs]

I agree, it is a difficult perspective. There is a saying in literature that 'the past is another country' and this is especially applicable to the thought of the ancient Greeks which is of course extremely foreign to the contemporary outlook. So it is very difficult to get into the 'mindset' of such a time, especially one so culturally and temporally removed.

You will recall that Plato used to talk of 'recollecting the knowledge of the soul'. But what if he actually meant it? Maybe in so doing, his very conception of who he was, and what life is actually about, was completely changed. 'Previously, I thought that I was such and such - now, I have a completely different understanding of who I am'. (I don't know if there is an equivalent quote from Plato, but I am sure that there must be one like it.) Now this might be knowledge of quite a different order to the knowledge of facts-about-the-world. (And, let us recall, the Delphic injunction Man, Know Thyself.)

However I do understand why one would reject that. We live in a scientific age. No-one believes these kinds of things any more: 'soul', 'forms', 'higher knowledge' and the like. But leaving aside, or bracketing, whether you or I actually believe that, I think it is essential in the understanding of the nature of the dialog, because I think this is what the dialog is about.

So really there is a religious dimension to this whole discussion. However, that too should be interpreted carefully, because again it may not mean 'religious' in the sense that moderns will understand. But it is a fact that Plato was in some respects, as illustrated by such passages as the famous allegory of the Cave, a mystic. And mystics believe, or declare, that there is a kind of knowledge specific to mystical experience or realisation which is not available to the - how shall we say - 'mundane' intelligence.

Now you would not at all be the first person to react against this aspect of Plato's personality. In fact, Aristotle did likewise, and as he grew older, became more and more antagonistic to the mystical elements in Plato's teaching. He thought the the Theory of Forms was 'fatal to science'. And accordingly, he devised a much more realistic ontology which became instrumental in the formation of Western thought.

However the Platonic lineage, or stream, call it what you will - which arguably started with Pythagoras and other predecessors - nevertheless continued down through the generations, and remained a major component of Western philosophy up until the beginning of the modern age. (I was reading a book recently where a professor declared that everyone is 'either an Aristotlean or a Platonist'. I think I have decided the latter.)

But be that as it may, none of it changes the fact that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, and that water is made from hydrogen and oxygen, and that if you put enough of it on a wood fire, it will go out. But there is a side of philosophy that deals with a different level of explanation, one where the types of questions we deal with are much less clear cut. Is the universe evolving towards an outcome, or is everything just a result of chance and necessity? Does human life have any particular significance in the scheme of things, or are we just acidental tourists? And so on.

Many in the modern world look to science to give us an account of the nature of the world we live in and the kind of people we are. This is not an unreasonable belief, but I do agree with Plato, and disagree with Russell, in that I too think there are kinds of knowledge in addition to the scientific. This does not mean I deny science or even doubt it. But there are questions it won't ask, and answers that it won't receive, and I think, again, this is what the Socrates dialog is about.

I hope that clarifies what I am getting at.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jeeprs

I agree, it is a difficult perspective. There is a saying in literature that 'the past is another country' and this is especially applicable to the thought of the ancient Greeks which is of course extremely foreign to the contemporary outlook. So it is very difficult to get into the 'mindset' of such a time, especially one so culturally and temporally removed.

You will recall that Plato used to talk of 'recollecting the knowledge of the soul'. But what if he actually meant it? Maybe in so doing, his very conception of who he was, and what life is actually about, was completely changed. 'Previously, I thought that I was such and such - now, I have a completely different understanding of who I am'. (I don't know if there is an equivalent quote from Plato, but I am sure that there must be one like it.) Now this might be knowledge of quite a different order to the knowledge of facts-about-the-world. (And, let us recall, the Delphic injunction Man, Know Thyself.)

However I do understand why one would reject that. We live in a scientific age. No-one believes these kinds of things any more: 'soul', 'forms', 'higher knowledge' and the like. But leaving aside, or bracketing, whether you or I actually believe that, I think it is essential in the understanding of the nature of the dialog, because I think this is what the dialog is about.

So really there is a religious dimension to this whole discussion. However, that too should be interpreted carefully, because again it may not mean 'religious' in the sense that moderns will understand. But it is a fact that Plato was in some respects, as illustrated by such passages as the famous allegory of the Cave, a mystic. And mystics believe, or declare, that there is a kind of knowledge specific to mystical experience or realisation which is not available to the - how shall we say - 'mundane' intelligence.

Now you would not at all be the first person to react against this aspect of Plato's personality. In fact, Aristotle did likewise, and as he grew older, became more and more antagonistic to the mystical elements in Plato's teaching. He thought the the Theory of Forms was 'fatal to science'. And accordingly, he devised a much more realistic ontology which became instrumental in the formation of Western thought.

However the Platonic lineage, or stream, call it what you will - which arguably started with Pythagoras and other predecessors - nevertheless continued down through the generations, and remained a major component of Western philosophy up until the beginning of the modern age. (I was reading a book recently where a professor declared that everyone is 'either an Aristotlean or a Platonist'. I think I have decided the latter.)

But be that as it may, none of it changes the fact that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, and that water is made from hydrogen and oxygen, and that if you put enough of it on a wood fire, it will go out. But there is a side of philosophy that deals with a different level of explanation, one where the types of questions we deal with are much less clear cut. Is the universe evolving towards an outcome, or is everything just a result of chance and necessity? Does human life have any particular significance in the scheme of things, or are we just acidental tourists? And so on.

Many in the modern world look to science to give us an account of the nature of the world we live in and the kind of people we are. This is not an unreasonable belief, but I do agree with Plato, and disagree with Russell, in that I too think there are kinds of knowledge in addition to the scientific. This does not mean I deny science or even doubt it. But there are questions it won't ask, and answers that it won't receive, and I think, again, this is what the Socrates dialog is about.

I hope that clarifies what I am getting at.

"The past is another country. They do things differently there". I agree. But I agree that the world before the scientific revolution was a very different world from the world after it. In fact, I insisted on it. But one important thing we have learned from the revolution is that empirical science is a source, and a primary source, of knowledge about the world, but that, nevertheless, or rather just because it is empirical knowledge, it cannot be known with certainty. Now, Plato, and Descartes argued insistently that just because empirical knowledge was not known with certainty, it could not (really) be knowledge. They begin with the premise that knowledge must be certain, and conclude that empirical knowledge is not real knowledge. I think that must be wrong. I think we must begin with the premise that empirical knowledge is knowledge, and that, therefore, knowledge need not be (and is not) certain. The question is, of course, which premise one thinks is more likely to be true.

---------- Post added 11-18-2009 at 08:48 AM ----------

Originally Posted by jeeprs

I agree, it is a difficult perspective. There is a saying in literature that 'the past is another country' and this is especially applicable to the thought of the ancient Greeks which is of course extremely foreign to the contemporary outlook. So it is very difficult to get into the 'mindset' of such a time, especially one so culturally and temporally removed.

You will recall that Plato used to talk of 'recollecting the knowledge of the soul'. But what if he actually meant it? Maybe in so doing, his very conception of who he was, and what life is actually about, was completely changed. 'Previously, I thought that I was such and such - now, I have a completely different understanding of who I am'. (I don't know if there is an equivalent quote from Plato, but I am sure that there must be one like it.) Now this might be knowledge of quite a different order to the knowledge of facts-about-the-world. (And, let us recall, the Delphic injunction Man, Know Thyself.)

However I do understand why one would reject that. We live in a scientific age. No-one believes these kinds of things any more: 'soul', 'forms', 'higher knowledge' and the like. But leaving aside, or bracketing, whether you or I actually believe that, I think it is essential in the understanding of the nature of the dialog, because I think this is what the dialog is about.

So really there is a religious dimension to this whole discussion. However, that too should be interpreted carefully, because again it may not mean 'religious' in the sense that moderns will understand. But it is a fact that Plato was in some respects, as illustrated by such passages as the famous allegory of the Cave, a mystic. And mystics believe, or declare, that there is a kind of knowledge specific to mystical experience or realisation which is not available to the - how shall we say - 'mundane' intelligence.

Now you would not at all be the first person to react against this aspect of Plato's personality. In fact, Aristotle did likewise, and as he grew older, became more and more antagonistic to the mystical elements in Plato's teaching. He thought the the Theory of Forms was 'fatal to science'. And accordingly, he devised a much more realistic ontology which became instrumental in the formation of Western thought.

However the Platonic lineage, or stream, call it what you will - which arguably started with Pythagoras and other predecessors - nevertheless continued down through the generations, and remained a major component of Western philosophy up until the beginning of the modern age. (I was reading a book recently where a professor declared that everyone is 'either an Aristotlean or a Platonist'. I think I have decided the latter.)

But be that as it may, none of it changes the fact that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, and that water is made from hydrogen and oxygen, and that if you put enough of it on a wood fire, it will go out. But there is a side of philosophy that deals with a different level of explanation, one where the types of questions we deal with are much less clear cut. Is the universe evolving towards an outcome, or is everything just a result of chance and necessity? Does human life have any particular significance in the scheme of things, or are we just acidental tourists? And so on.

Many in the modern world look to science to give us an account of the nature of the world we live in and the kind of people we are. This is not an unreasonable belief, but I do agree with Plato, and disagree with Russell, in that I too think there are kinds of knowledge in addition to the scientific. This does not mean I deny science or even doubt it. But there are questions it won't ask, and answers that it won't receive, and I think, again, this is what the Socrates dialog is about.

I hope that clarifies what I am getting at.

"The past is another country. They do things differently there".* I agree. But I agree that the world before the scientific revolution was a very different world from the world after it. In fact, I insisted on it. But one important thing we have learned from the revolution is that empirical science is a source, and a primary source, of knowledge about the world, but that, nevertheless, or rather just because it is empirical knowledge, it cannot be known with certainty. Now, Plato, and Descartes argued insistently that just because empirical knowledge was not known with certainty, it could not (really) be knowledge. They begin with the premise that knowledge must be certain, and conclude that empirical knowledge is not real knowledge. I think that must be wrong. I think we must begin with the premise that empirical knowledge is knowledge, and that, therefore, knowledge need not be (and is not) certain. The question is, of course, which premise one thinks is more likely to be true.


*L. P. Hartley, not one of Tory Historian’s favourite writers, started his best-known book (mostly because of the film with Julie Christie and Alan Bates) with the words: “The past is another country; they do things differently there”.

[jeeprs]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Now, Plato, and Descartes argued insistently that just because empirical knowledge was not known with certainty, it could not (really) be knowledge. They begin with the premise that knowledge must be certain, and conclude that empirical knowledge is not real knowledge. I think that must be wrong. I think we must begin with the premise that empirical knowledge is knowledge, and that, therefore, knowledge need not be (and is not) certain. The question is, of course, which premise one thinks is more likely to be true.

Do you think 'certainty' is another word for 'absolute' in this context? Are they saying, knowledge is not worthy of the name unless it is absolute? I suppose the corollary is that if knowledge is not certain, but it is all we have, is there anything certain? Archimedes said 'give me a lever and I will move the world'. Do we have such a point in modern thought?