Plato on True Belief and Knowledge

[Theaetetus]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

But I used to know many things I have now forgotten. I used to know the name of a very pretty girl in my third grade class. I have now forgotten it.

Well, so have I. This could start a discussion on what knowledge is, and whether you actually knew the girls name since you have forgotten it.

As I said, "chaining" mere right opinion turns it into stable right opinion. That does not mean that it can't be forgotten over time. Much like someone could forget where their boat is anchored after much time,they can also forget thing committed to memory. It is likely still in memory but can no longer be recalled because the "location" in memory is forgotten.

[Zetherin]

Wasn't it knowledge the guide actually had but he just didn't know it was knowledge, until he found out his belief was true?

Isn't true belief just knowledge waiting to be justified, discovered?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

Wasn't it knowledge the guide actually had but he just didn't know it was knowledge, until he found out his belief was true?

Isn't true belief just knowledge waiting to be justified, discovered?

No. I can guess a horse will win a race, and then, later, the horse does win the race. But that doesn't mean I knew the horse would win the race, A lucky guess remains a guess even when you find out that you were lucky.

No. Unless it is justified, it isn't knowledge. It is a true belief.

---------- Post added 11-17-2009 at 01:46 PM ----------

Originally Posted by Theaetetus

Well, so have I. This could start a discussion on what knowledge is, and whether you actually knew the girls name since you have forgotten it.

As I said, "chaining" mere right opinion turns it into stable right opinion. That does not mean that it can't be forgotten over time. Much like someone could forget where their boat is anchored after much time,they can also forget thing committed to memory. It is likely still in memory but can no longer be recalled because the "location" in memory is forgotten.

You can discuss what you like, but why would you think I did not know the girl's name, and then forgot it?

Is "stable right opinion" knowledge? If it is, then I can know something and forget it, as you say here. If it isn't knowledge, then it is irrelevant. I can be reminded of what I used to know, or I can suddenly remember what I used to know. But that doesn't mean I both know it, and forgot it.

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

No. I can guess a horse will win a race, and then, later, the horse does win the race. But that doesn't mean I knew the horse would win the race, A lucky guess remains a guess even when you find out that you were lucky.

No. Unless it is justified, it isn't knowledge. It is a true belief.

In that case, I'm stuck here in the dialogue:

Men. The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.

<Soc. What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?>

Men. I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion-or why they should ever differ.

What does Soc. mean by this? My thought process follows the same as "Men" did. What cogent argument is he saying Soc. has?

[Theaetetus]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

In that case, I'm stuck here in the dialogue:

Men. The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.

<Soc. What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?>

Men. I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion-or why they should ever differ.

What does Soc. mean by this? My thought process follows the same as "Men" did. What cogent argument is he saying Soc. has?

Plato is trying to make a distinction in the different types of "getting it right" that I have been referring to in this discussion. When Meno says "he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not" he is referring to the idea that someone can have chance right opinion by being lucky or accidentally stumbling on right opinion. Socrates makes the point to say that the person still is right regardless of how they came to the right opinion. After Socrates comment, Meno's statement is bringing up the idea that there are different degrees of right opinion.

Remember that much of what Plato says is written between the lines of the dialogues. He knows that he cannot just hand off his knowledge by merely stating it, but rather makes his readers dig for it and do the dirty work.

[Zetherin]

Thanks, but I'm not still not clear on this.

True belief and knowledge at different. I got that. If there is any justification, though, true belief isn't just true belief anymore, is it? It becomes knowledge when justification comes into the mix.

It's hard for me to believe why the guide would believe where somewhere is, without having any justificiation for having that belief. One wouldn't just randomly point in a direction and believe it, would one? If one did, I could see how this would just be true belief, but this is usually not how things happen. I think in the case of giving directions, one would have justification for their belief, whether or not their belief was true or not.

So, if one had justification for believing that Larisa was in a certain location, and one believed that Larisa was in that certain location, and it was true that Larisa was in that certain location, how is that not knowledge? Why would it not be the guide just not knowing they knew, until they found their belief to be true?

[ACB]

Originally Posted by Theaetetus

When Meno says "he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not" he is referring to the idea that someone can have chance right opinion by being lucky or accidentally stumbling on right opinion. Socrates makes the point to say that the person still is right regardless of how they came to the right opinion.

I still don't get this. The underlined statement is a mere truism (if a person is right, he is right, however he came to be right), which is so obvious as to be not worth saying. Meno surely already knew that "if p, then p". Socrates's remark does not address Meno's point. The question is not whether the guide is right this time if he is right this time (of course he is ) but whether he is likely to be right next time.

[jeeprs]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Soc. You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus; but perhaps you have not got them in your country?

Men. What have they to do with the question?

Soc. Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.

Men. Well. what of that?

Soc. I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.

Some questions about this passage.

First - what are 'images of Daedulus' and what is it about them that makes them able to 'go truant' if they are not fastened? (This might have been explained elsewhere, or at least the reader might be assumed to know this, but it is a bit mystifying. They seem to be possessed of a mind of their own, rather than being 'images'.)

Second this 'fastening' of 'opinions' by 'recollection'. I presume the reference is to the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis. The Wikipedia article on same puts it (rather crudely) as:

The soul is trapped in the body. The soul once lived in "Reality", but got trapped in the body. It once knew everything, but forgot it. The goal of Recollection is to get back to true Knowledge. To do this, one must overcome the body. This doctrine implies that nothing is ever learned, it is simply recalled or remembered. In short it says that all that we know already comes pre-loaded on birth and our senses enable us to identify and recognize the stratified information in our mind.

Do you think this is what the passage is referring to? Because in this passage, the nature of 'the chain' seems of central significance. It is hard to conjecture what this might be, in contemporary terms.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

In that case, I'm stuck here in the dialogue:

Men. The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.

<Soc. What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?>

Men. I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion-or why they should ever differ.

What does Soc. mean by this? My thought process follows the same as "Men" did. What cogent argument is he saying Soc. has?

Yes. This is difficult. Meno says that if someone has a true belief he can be wrong. And then, Socrates replies that if someone has a true belief he cannot be wrong (while he has that true belief). I think that Meno is right. A person who can a true belief can be wrong. Suppose the guide has a true belief about the road to Larisa. Can he be wrong? Of course. It is possible for him to be mistaken. But of course, since he has a true belief, he is not mistaken. But that he is not mistaken does not mean he cannot be mistaken. What Socrates points out that as long as the guide has a true belief he is not mistaken. And that is true. But it does not show that the guide cannot be mistaken.

I mentioned earlier in this thread that there is a modal problem in this thread. And this is what I meant.

---------- Post added 11-17-2009 at 06:12 PM ----------

Originally Posted by jeeprs

Some questions about this passage.

First - what are 'images of Daedulus' and what is it about them that makes them able to 'go truant' if they are not fastened? (This might have been explained elsewhere, or at least the reader might be assumed to know this, but it is a bit mystifying. They seem to be possessed of a mind of their own, rather than being 'images'.)

Second this 'fastening' of 'opinions' by 'recollection'. I presume the reference is to the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis. The Wikipedia article on same puts it (rather crudely) as:



Do you think this is what the passage is referring to? Because in this passage, the nature of 'the chain' seems of central significance. It is hard to conjecture what this might be, in contemporary terms.

1. Daedulus was a famous Greek sculptor who, it was said, created statues which were so life-like that the looked as if they were alive, and could move. Thus, the "go truant".

2. What I have to say now is more speculative. Yes, I am fairly sure the doctrine of "recollection" is being referred to. In the Meno earlier, Socrates expounds on the doctrine that knowledge is actually recollection of what was learned in a previous life. It is presented as a myth, but I think that Plato took it seriously to explain the nature of a priori knowledge, which was the only kind of knowledge he thought worthy of the name. Plato would have held that what I call my knowledge that Quito is the capital of Ecuador was really (at best) right opinion (or true belief), and not knowledge. Knowledge had to be absolutely certain for Plato. So, knowledge cannot be mistaken. There is the same modal difficulty here. There is a difference between:

1. If X knows that p, then it is impossible for p to be false. And.

2. It is impossible for X to know that p, and p to be false.

1. is false, and 2. is true. It looks as if Plato (or Socrates) does not distinguish between 1. and 2. Or, alternatively thinks that because 2 is true, that 1 is true. This is a modal fallacy.

Emil is an expert on this fallacy, and fast knows about it too.

[jeeprs]

So perhaps the point of the dialog is to differentiate that knowledge (episteme) is of a different kind to what many of us (cave dwellers, I presume) what regard as 'knowledge', which would at best be 'correct opinions or beliefs' (doxa).

It is hard to ascertain the truth of this statement, insofar as it assumes a distinction which cannot really be proven propositionally. No amount of propositional analysis could establish whether there is such a thing as 'true knowledge remembered by the soul' could it?