Plato on True Belief and Knowledge

[Arjuna]

In English it doesn't really make much sense to talk about having an opinion about where a place is.

In my opinion Canada is east of Texas. What?

I may believe Canada is east of Texas, but surely there is some basis for this belief... maybe somebody told me that. If I say I believe it, but don't know it, that reflects a lack of confidence in my source.

If we're trying to see a distinction between knowledge and belief by suggesting that one is based on authority and one is not, we're going to flounder.

To base knowledge on authority is equating knowledge to belief: belief in the authority.

[jeeprs]

this would be part of the attempt to differentiate doxa from episteme, might it not? Where doxa is an opinion, and episteme, true knowledge. It seems to me to be much easier to judge the equivalence of the two in a case where the outcome can be settled easily, such as the directions to a town, than in regards to abstruse questions regarding the nature of life.

Anyway - I would like to hear what further Socrates had to add....

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Arjuna

In English it doesn't really make much sense to talk about having an opinion about where a place is.

In my opinion Canada is east of Texas. What?

I may believe Canada is east of Texas, but surely there is some basis for this belief... maybe somebody told me that. If I say I believe it, but don't know it, that reflects a lack of confidence in my source.

If we're trying to see a distinction between knowledge and belief by suggesting that one is based on authority and one is not, we're going to flounder.

To base knowledge on authority is equating knowledge to belief: belief in the authority.

If by "basis" you mean justification, some people believe things without any justification at all. If by "basis" you mean cause, then, of course, all my beliefs are caused in some way or other. But the cause need not be a justification. My belief in God may be caused by my upbringing. But that doesn't justify my belief in God.

The Greek is "doxa" which can be translated either as "opinion" or as "belief". Sometimes my justification for what I know is authority. For instance, I know that the word, "weird" is spelled that way because I looked it up in the dictionary, and the dictionary is the authority on how words are spelled. It is my justification for believing (and also knowing) that "weird" is spelled that way. Belief and knowledge are different, but that does not mean that they exclude one another (although Plato did think they did). In fact, I cannot know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador unless I also know it is. Knowing implies believing; although believing, of course, does not imply knowing.

---------- Post added 11-17-2009 at 08:33 AM ----------

Originally Posted by jeeprs

this would be part of the attempt to differentiate doxa from episteme, might it not? Where doxa is an opinion, and episteme, true knowledge. It seems to me to be much easier to judge the equivalence of the two in a case where the outcome can be settled easily, such as the directions to a town, than in regards to abstruse questions regarding the nature of life.

Anyway - I would like to hear what further Socrates had to add....

There are two important differences between believing and knowing:

1. You can believe what is false, but you cannot know what is false. Believing does not imply truth, but knowing does imply truth.
2. You can believe without any justification, or very little justification. But you cannot know without adequate justification.

What Socrates says is no mystery (although what he means, or whether it is true, may be)

Men. I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion-or why they should ever differ.

Soc. And shall I explain this wonder to you?

Men. Do tell me.

Soc. You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus; but perhaps you have not got them in your country?

Men. What have they to do with the question?

Soc. Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.

Men. Well. what of that?

Soc. I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.

Men. What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.

Soc. I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them.

Men. Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.

Soc. And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?

Men. There again, Socrates, I think you are right.

Soc. Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge?

Men. True.

Soc. And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful?

[Theaetetus]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I
I wonder why you say that when it is still true that if the guide correctly believes where Larisa is, he will guide you to Larisa as well as if he knew where Larisa is. Why should you care as long as you get to Larisa just as efficiently?

By the way, true opinion need not be just a lucky guess as you seem to be assuming. You can have a true opinion, and have good reasons for it, except that those reasons are not enough for knowledge.

I am not saying that right opinion is necessarily a lucky guess, but it can be. I could say that Larisa is somewhere--even though I have no clue that she is there--and still be right about it. That is why there needs to be a distinction between chance right opinion (or true belief if you choose since it can be translated as either), mere right opinion, and stable right opinion. In this case, I can guess right where Larisa is; I can have a general idea where she usually is, thus, there is a good possibility she is there; or have just seen her there, thus knowing in all likelihood that she is there. Sure, all of these possibilities can lead me to being correct, but the latter makes me a more reliable guide. That is why people prefer that people have knowledge, which the latter is in the context of the Meno.

Part of the issue we are having is that many translations use knowledge instead of wisdom. In the context of the Meno, stable right opinion is knowledge in the traditional sense.

[fast]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Soc. Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.

Soc. I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.

Soc. I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them.

Soc. And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?

Soc. Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge?

Soc. And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful?

If I'm interpreting this correctly, then we should prefer knowledge to true belief because knowledge (unlike true belief) is dependable. He suggests that beliefs (like opinions) are fleeting and that we can’t rely on them like we can knowledge. Perhaps Socrates might say something to the effect that only people with knowledge (and not people with mere true beliefs) have earned the position to command our respect—useful as they may be.

He seems to confuse true beliefs with beliefs though. To say back to him as he might talk: True beliefs are forever abiding! No, they are not fastened by the tie of the cause, but no true belief need be, for they are never subject to truancy. Like loyal slaves, they shall always be just where you would expect them to be.

Mere beliefs (or mere opinions) yes; they may go with the wind and do remain unfastened to the tie of the cause, I agree, but no true belief dare need a lock and chain or tie of any kind. They endure.

[jgweed]

For Plato, one can have "pistis" or knowledge sufficient for action, that may be correct, but without knowing the ground for such beliefs. One can also have knowledge through the application of logical reasoning ("dianoia"). But, as we read in the Republic, when he writes of the "divided line" true knowledge ("episteme") not only is "correct belief" but the understanding of why it is correct (giving an account by reference to the Forms).

Thus an individual might chance on a true belief, but it remains a belief unless it can provide the assurance, or ground, for its truth.

[Theaetetus]

Originally Posted by fast

If I'm interpreting this correctly, then we should prefer knowledge to true belief because knowledge (unlike true belief) is dependable. He suggests that beliefs (like opinions) are fleeting and that we can’t rely on them like we can knowledge. Perhaps Socrates might say something to the effect that only people with knowledge (and not people with mere true beliefs) have earned the position to command our respect—useful as they may be.

He seems to confuse true beliefs with beliefs though. To say back to him as he might talk: True beliefs are forever abiding! No, they are not fastened by the tie of the cause, but no true belief need be, for they are never subject to truancy. Like loyal slaves, they shall always be just where you would expect them to be.

Mere beliefs (or mere opinions) yes; they may go with the wind and do remain unfastened to the tie of the cause, I agree, but no true belief dare need a lock and chain or tie of any kind. They endure.

Plato (Socrates) is not confusing true belief with beliefs. There is a language barrier caused by translation. Socrates is making a distinction between mere and stable right opinion (or true belief). The word for belief in Greek can be translated as either belief or opinion and true also means right.

In the Meno, Socrates leads the slave boy to mere right opinion by asking him questions in a way that the boy finds the answers in himself. Then by habituation or repetition the boy can tether his mere true belief causing him to have stable true belief--which in the Meno it is in fact knowledge--although weaker than what Socrates calls knowledge (but may be better understood as understanding or wisdom).

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by jgweed

For Plato, one can have "pistis" or knowledge sufficient for action, that may be correct, but without knowing the ground for such beliefs. One can also have knowledge through the application of logical reasoning ("dianoia"). But, as we read in the Republic, when he writes of the "divided line" true knowledge ("episteme") not only is "correct belief" but the understanding of why it is correct (giving an account by reference to the Forms).

Thus an individual might chance on a true belief, but it remains a belief unless it can provide the assurance, or ground, for its truth.

So, in the metaphor Socrates suggests, true belief becomes knowledge when it is "fastened by the chain" of justification (the account or "logos"). But how, "fastened"? What does "fastened" mean here?

[Theaetetus]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

So, in the metaphor Socrates suggests, true belief becomes knowledge when it is "fastened by the chain" of justification (the account or "logos"). But how, "fastened"? What does "fastened" mean here?

It means that it is not forgotten or better, less likely to be forgotten. The act of "fastening by a chain" is the process of habituation or repetition. This process anchors the information in one's own memory so it can be recalled when needed.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Theaetetus

It means that it is not forgotten or better, less likely to be forgotten. The act of "fastening by a chain" is the process of habituation or repetition. This process anchors the information in one's own memory so it can be recalled when needed.

But I used to know many things I have now forgotten. I used to know the name of a very pretty girl in my third grade class. I have now forgotten it.