Kant's 4th Example from Metaphysics of Morals: How Does It Work?

[Phronimos]

I don't really see how Kant's 4th example of being miserly to the poor creates a contradiction when willed. It looks like its vulnerable to the Bentham/Mill view that Kant only says its immoral because the consequences for following such a maxim wouldn't be pleasant . Can anyone else help me out with this?

I've copied and pasted the example for expediency:

"A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: 'What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as be can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!' Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires."

[Victor Eremita]

It's not a contradiction when willed as Kant even says that it's possible that such a law can be universalized: "it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim"... it really is possible to imagine a world where everyone kept to themselves and no one helped any one else out.

However, it is a contradiction in practice: if you needed help, wouldn't you ask for help? If you needed "love and sympathy of others" (and there definitely has been times when you needed it, don't lie), you're not going to get it if you will this maxim.

[Phronimos]

Right, this sort of contradiction in practice though strikes me as consequential or inclinational (conditional not absolute concerns), two things that Kant appeared to say were essentially irrelevant to morality/rationality (for instance, in his inn keeper e.g.).

It seems to me that this example doesn't fit well (or too consistent) with the rest of the groundwork and its anti-utilitarian bent. That's my reason for bringing up this example, not a curmudgeonly reaction against being charitable or caring to others.

[Victor Eremita]

Well, even Kant understood the need to create maxims that work in practice, or "Practical Maxims", as he called it in the Critique of Practical Reason:

"Supposing that pure reason contains in itself a practical motive, that is, one adequate to determine the will, then there are practical laws; otherwise all practical principles will be mere maxims. ... In practical philosophy, i.e., that which has to do only with the grounds of determination of the will, the principles which a man makes for himself are not laws by which one is inevitably bound; because reason in practical matters has to do with the subject, namely, with the faculty of desire, the special character of which may occasion variety in the rule. The practical rule is always a product of reason, because it prescribes action as a means to the effect."

[Jazzman]

What Kant actually meant is: If anyone used that maxime it would be ineffectual to achieve that end.

[nerdfiles]

Kant has two contradiction types: Contradiction in Conception and Contradiction in the Will

Contradiction in Conception

This is where you cannot conceive a world in which the maxim can be universalized. So concepts implode, the world is messy and confused; it's tantamount, as far as Kant is concerned, to getting "I am wearing a shirt and I am not wearing a shirt". Patent contradictions of this sort are irrational, and you should not act from contradictory maxims for morality, as Kant argues, is grounded in rationality. Acting on contradictions is irrational.

To take a conception of contradiction from Wittgenstein: A contradiction is where nothing is possible. It is not possible for a contradiction to be true. In a way, a world with one contradiction becomes a contradictory world. If the contradiction were part of the world as a logical whole, the whole would cease to be.

That bit you know, I'm sure.

Contradiction in the Will

This is what many of you have been calling "contradiction in practice." It's not the consequences of it that make it immoral. However, what is important is your own moral character. Would your character, picture yourself as a moral actor, act like that consistently? If you conclude with an emphatic No! you have a contradiction in the will. You cannot consistently will such a maxim.

If I will to have a beverage, I grab it any time I will it. But what about something disgusting that is unpleasing to my taste? Well, I could certainly will to taste it on a dare, perhaps, but would I consistently will to taste it--put it in my mouth and chew on it? Even outside of the dare? Clearly the dare is an attempt to force me to do something "contradictory" to my "nature" (the nature of my preferences). A contradiction in the will is where I cannot consistently will the maxim: so picture your future self, if you can, in a similar situation. Would you do the same? And again? Again? Again? Again? Do you see something about this pattern that you do not like? Then don't will it.

Granted, this description looks dangerously close to the contradiction in conception because, well, all those "again"'s seem in principle infinitely enumerable. But hey, you will die some day (fact of your biology), so factor that in too. Perhaps these biological facts prevent this description from just being a "global" or "conceivability" issue.

Types of Duties

Contradictions in conception produces perfect duties: it is your duty to never act on maxims which yield contradictions in conception. You must, as rationality and morality demand, do the opposite.

Contradictions in the will yield imperfect duties. Imperfect duties always yield to perfect duties. There can be no conflicts between them. Imperfect duties do not require that you always act on them. But, at the same time, it is not allowed to consistently ignore them. If you always fail to help others or the poor, you end up willing what you actually don't see as constituting part of your moral character. So you should act from imperfect duties some of the time. It's like moral balancing, I suppose, or similar to Aristotle's "Golden Mean."

[hammersklavier]

1. It's clear (to me at least) what Kant's getting at is the good old Golden Rule, which has been repeated in more or less the same form in Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism (and so on and so forth). Thus Kant's maxim is clearly both a practical maxim and a philosophical one. (The Golden Rule says it better, though, IMO.)

2. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought that Kant's moral system was basically that if I conceived of an action that had positive consequences and its antithesis (i.e., nonaction in that situation) had negative consequences, then the correct course to take would be to engage in that action? That is, Bentham/Mill's criticism is simply a restatement of Kant's morality?