Is omniscience compatible with human freedom?

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

That just choosing is not enough for free will if you could not have chosen differently. If someone is under posthypnotic suggestion, he may make choices, but those choices are not up to him.

If we are to confine free will to only the times we know that we had the option to choose differently, I sense this conversation getting very difficult to continue. Do we have to be certain that we know that we had the option to choose differently, or do we simply have to know that we had the option to choose differently? The former seems impossible to ascertain, while the latter seems to be not enough, as one could indeed be mistaken about whether or not they were under the influence (they could easily be unaware).

This concept of having the choice not to is very, very strange. At first glance it appears like something I could easily understand, but after analyzing, it becomes something I don't think I can touch intellectually. It seems as though someone could argue that noone ever has free will - that one is always compelled by something, and noone ever has the choice to not choose what one chooses. We're just under the illusion that we could have chosen differently.

But I don't think that's true.

What do you think?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

If we are to confine free will to only the times we know that we had the option to choose differently, I sense this conversation getting very difficult to continue. Do we have to be certain that we know that we had the option to choose differently, or do we simply have to know that we had the option to choose differently? The former seems impossible to ascertain, while the latter seems to be not enough, as one could indeed be mistaken about whether or not they were under the influence (they could easily be unaware).

This concept of having the choice not to is very, very strange. At first glance it appears like something I could easily understand, but after analyzing, it becomes something I don't think I can touch intellectually. It seems as though someone could argue that noone ever has free will - that one is always compelled by something, and noone ever has the choice to not choose what one chooses. We're just under the illusion that we could have chosen differently.

But I don't think that's true.

What do you think?

But I don't confine free will only to times we know we have the option to choose different. But to when we do have such an option whether or not we know we do. Knowing we have the option is irrelevant. To argue that one is always compelled by something, one would have to use the term "compel" in a peculiar way. Suppose that someone suggests that I try a new restaurant because he liked it, and thought I would too. If I go because of that suggestion, have I been compelled to go?

[fast]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

It seems as though someone could argue that noone ever has free will - that one is always compelled by something, and noone ever has the choice to not choose what one chooses.

Every action has a cause, but not every action is compelled.

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

If I go because of that suggestion, have I been compelled to go?

I think not.

But to when we do have such an option whether or not we know we do

I understand. But I don't see how this helps. How are we to proceed from here? How do we evaluate whether or not we had such an option? And even if we evaluated, as you note, us knowing or not doesn't matter. So, what now?

Originally Posted by fast

Every action has a cause, but every action is compelled.

You mean, but every action is not compelled. I agree.

[fast]

Originally Posted by Emil

Epistemic certainty (and the usual interpretation) and omniscience implies modal collapse.

What is modal collapse?

[Emil]

Originally Posted by fast

What is modal collapse?

This:

Modal collapse. For all propositions, that P logically implies that P is necessary.
(∀P)(P⇒□P)

Modal collapse and some other things imply the (also) counter-intuitive:

(∀P)(◊P⇒P)

See my essay "Infallible knowledge, the modal fallacy and modal collapse".

[Khethil]

I don't see them as incompatible at all.

• Assume that theologically it's known, somewhere by some entity, all decisions I will make throughout my life based on factors that will change.

• Also enter the assumption that such knowledge base also is aware of every decision everyone else and every other entity will make throughout their lifetimes as well.

• Along with this entity's abilities, add ultimate knowledge of the workings of the universe; mechanically, physically, etc., in all ways - throughout all effects proportionately.

Then pose the question: Did I still have the freedom to choose on my own? Sure!

In a mechanical sense as the question's been posed: I don't see them incompatible at all, as long as one's able to enter the assumptions presented above. I've always believed that we act and and react to our world in ways that - were everything known - would be predictable. This hasn't anything to do with Free Will; the choice was still made. That it was made on 'knowable'/'predictable' factors that presented a result borne of causes, doesn't really diminish that - not on its own.

Really Basic Example:

I know my son loves Snickers, I also know that he loves Mars' Bars and Milkyway Bars. I tell him, "Son, pick out the candy you want". Is it conceivable that his father knows which he's going to select? If so, on any level, does that diminish the fact that he made the decision on his own?

In any case, I don't believe there exists any omniscient presence whatsoever, although such a thing isn't beyond all possibility

Just my take, thanks

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by fast

What is modal collapse?

Every truth is a necessary truth. (I think). Spinoza's philosophy illustrates modal collapse.

[fast]

Originally Posted by Khethil

I know my son loves Snickers, I also know that he loves Mars' Bars and Milkyway Bars. I tell him, "Son, pick out the candy you want". Is it conceivable that his father knows which he's going to select? If so, on any level, does that diminish the fact that he made the decision on his own?

You may know what decision your son will make, and supposing God exists and that he's all knowing, then He knows what decision your son will make as well, but the difference between using you as example of knowing and using God as an example of One that knows is that we are supposing that He is omniscient and that you are not. Even though you both know, with you, there is the possibility that you could be mistaken, and with God, we suppose no such possibility, so you have fallible knowledge whereas God has infallible knowledge. I cautiously presume that being all-knowing implies the impossibility of mistake making it so that He has epistemic certainty.

If God knows (and cannot be mistaken) that your son will choose Snickers, and since knowledge implies truth, then it's true that he will choose snickers. Suppose God tells you that next year on February 11th, your son will eat a snickers bar (and suppose you are forced to keep it a secret--not that that, interestingly enough, should matter). Well, we can be mighty confident that your son will do exactly as God says he will do.

Some people upon hearing that will think that because it's true will also make an error in reasoning and think that it must be true, but it's not the case that it must be true--only that it is true. That your son will choose snickers isn't to say that no other contingent possibility exists. It's just that no other possibility will be chosen.

[Khethil]

Originally Posted by fast

You may know what decision your son will make, and supposing God exists and that he's all knowing, then He knows what decision your son will make as well, but the difference...

Aye, though you take my rather rough example a bit too literally, it's used to illustrate the possibility. But you're quite right, and I believe we're on the same page.

Thanks