Is omniscience compatible with human freedom?

[fast]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

I didn't say he was making the argument. I asked for an argument.

I noticed. I just wanted to make sure we were on the same page.

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by fast

I noticed. I just wanted to make sure we were on the same page.

Do you happen to know the argument he was referring to when he said "some have argued"?

[fast]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

If you willed it, then you've exercised control over your choice, and you therefore have free will (as far as I understand "free will").

Originally Posted by Zetherin

The cause of your will matters not. Someone licking an icecream cone could cause me to will the choice to go buy an icecream cone, but this doesn't mean I didn't have the choice not to buy an icecream cone.

I use "will" here as a synonym for desire, choose, and have deliberate intention.

I think it's helpful to 1) view the term, "free will" as a term in its own right and 2) not limit the analysis of the term by analyzing the words that compose the term. I say this because I think it's a mistake to think of free will as if it's a kind of will.

We do have free will, but we do not always have free will. When we speak of free will, it would not be unwise to speak about compulsion. To know whether an action is an action of our own free will, we look to see if the action is a compelled action. A compelled action is an action which the agent does not want to do, but is constrained to do, or restrained from doing.

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by fast

I think it's helpful to 1) view the term, "free will" as a term in its own right and 2) not limit the analysis of the term by analyzing the words that compose the term. I say this because I think it's a mistake to think of free will as if it's a kind of will.

Then please describe how you would like to use "free will".

We do have free will, but we do not always have free will.

I need to know what you mean by "free will" in each part of this sentence.

To know whether an action is an action of our own free will, we look to see if the action is a compelled action. A compelled action is an action which the agent does not want to do, but is constrained to do, or restrained from doing.

I would agree with this. I would also add that involuntary actions (such as hearts beating) also have nothing to do with free will, but I'm not sure I would label them as "compelled". Would you?

[fast]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

I would agree with this. I would also add that involuntary actions (such as hearts beating) also have nothing to do with free will, but I'm not sure I would label them as "compelled". Would you?

I would not. Beating hearts are caused, not compelled.

One of the main conflicts in discussions about determinism and free will stem from the confusion between causation and compulsion, but I don't want to steer the conversation in that direction. I only touched on free will since I think it's important (and relevant) to the conversation about the compatibility of human freedom and omniscience.

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by fast

I would not. Beating hearts are caused, not compelled.

One of the main conflicts in discussions about determinism and free will stem from the confusion between causation and compulsion, but I don't want to steer the conversation in that direction. I only touched on free will since I think it's important (and relevant) to the conversation about the compatibility of human freedom and omniscience.

Not only is it relevant, I think kennethamy meant "free will" in using "human freedom".

I think what we're discussing here is central to the conversation, actually. It was what kennethamy and I were touching on right before you came, so I don't think he'd have any qualms about us proceeding.

[Reconstructo]

Man, this sort of question used to chew me up when I was a believer. Been a long time since then. Free will is a strange strange concept, really.

Unless a human could choose his motives to begin with, he's not really free, except to act on these un-chosen motives.

And if he could choose his own motives, what motives would he have to choose them in relation to?

[Emil]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Yes. I agree. But you are right to distinguish between knowledge and certainty here. Some have argued that free will is compatible with knowledge, but not with certainty (which, presumably God has).

Epistemic certainty (and the usual interpretation) and omniscience implies modal collapse. And modal collapse implies that the usual accounts of free will are false.

[xris]

Having an experience that foretold the future, i had to reevaluate my position on free will and destiny. It was uncomfortable journey, that i had to make. Its not important that you believe me but my conclusions need to be considered.

Previous to this experience I believed we had the ability to make certain choices that where influenced by our life's journey. We wrote our own destiny and the future was not written.

I think we do write our own story and although life influences our decisions we have a degree of free will. The point of life is to learn and various experiences make us understand the complexities of life. My life is near written and it is recorded. If it is possible to observe that life before it was lived, without influence, then i cant see a problem with the logic of predetermined destiny and free will being compatible.


Do you influence the ending of film by observing the film, you cant rewrite the script.The point is, if there is a god like figure he has to observe the tragedies before they happen and is powerless to intervene. I dont see god but i see spirit world that can comprehend our destiny.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

But whether God has absolute certainty of everything, has nothing to do with my choices leading to the determination that only he knows.

What is the argument that my having a choice is incompatible with someone being certain about my choice?

That just choosing is not enough for free will if you could not have chosen differently. If someone is under posthypnotic suggestion, he may make choices, but those choices are not up to him.