Is omniscience compatible with human freedom?

[ACB]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Omniscience= knowing everything, especially what will happen in the future. (God has this power).

This would mean that:

1. Information about the future already exists in God's mind

which would logically imply that:

2. Information about the future already exists.

But (2) may in fact be false. If it is, then God cannot know what will happen in the future, because there is not yet anything to know about the future. There do not yet exist any facts about it; it is devoid of content. In that case, God could still be omniscient (i.e. he could know all there is to know) without knowing anything about the future. The future would not form part of the totality of all possible knowledge.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by ACB

This would mean that:

1. Information about the future already exists in God's mind

which would logically imply that:

2. Information about the future already exists.

But (2) may in fact be false. If it is, then God cannot know what will happen in the future, because there is not yet anything to know about the future. There do not yet exist any facts about it; it is devoid of content. In that case, God could still be omniscient (i.e. he could know all there is to know) without knowing anything about the future. The future would not form part of the totality of all possible knowledge.

That seems to me a different issue. Whether there is such a thing as knowledge of the future. But, supposing there is, is knowledge of what a person will do incompatible with his doing it freely?

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

That seems to me a different issue. Whether there is such a thing as knowledge of the future. But, supposing there is, is knowledge of what a person will do incompatible with his doing it freely?

Do you mean knowledge with certainty, or just knowledge? Remember, as we keep discussing, knowledge does not imply certainty. If I see two boxers enter a boxing ring, I would say I know they are going to punch each other. And whether I'm certain or not, has nothing to do with my knowing, does it?

If someone had knowledge of the future, but wasn't certain, then of course free will is compatible with knowing the future. My knowing that my mom is going to be in the kitchen at six tomorrow morning, has no influence on whether or not my mom has the choice to go in the kitchen tomorrow, does it?

If someone had knowledge of the future, and was certain, I would still say free will is compatible. We still have to make the choices that cause the future to actually happen - and we make these choices. How else would the future come that is determined if we did not make the choices that led to the determination?

Determinism and free will are not incompatible, as far as I can see.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

Do you mean knowledge with certainty, or just knowledge? Remember, as we keep discussing, knowledge does not imply certainty. If I see two boxers enter a boxing ring, I would say I know they are going to punch each other. And whether I'm certain or not, has nothing to do with my knowing, does it?

If someone had knowledge of the future, but wasn't certain, then of course free will is compatible with knowing the future. My knowing that my mom is going to be in the kitchen at six tomorrow morning, has no influence on whether or not my mom has the choice to go in the kitchen tomorrow, does it?

If someone had knowledge of the future, and was certain, I would still say free will is compatible. We still have to make the choices that cause the future to actually happen - and we make these choices. How else would the future come that is determined if we did not make the choices that led to the determination?

Determinism and free will are not incompatible, as far as I can see.

Yes. I agree. But you are right to distinguish between knowledge and certainty here. Some have argued that free will is compatible with knowledge, but not with certainty (which, presumably God has).

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Yes. I agree. But you are right to distinguish between knowledge and certainty here. Some have argued that free will is compatible with knowledge, but not with certainty (which, presumably God has).

But whether God has absolute certainty of everything, has nothing to do with my choices leading to the determination that only he knows.

What is the argument that my having a choice is incompatible with someone being certain about my choice?

[ACB]

Is there a difference between "will" and "free will"? Is there such a thing as unfree will (i.e. I do something because I will it, but my willing has an external cause, e.g. God)?

[prothero]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

That seems to me a different issue. Whether there is such a thing as knowledge of the future. But, supposing there is, is knowledge of what a person will do incompatible with his doing it freely?

Why do you say that? It seems directly relevant to the notion of divine omniscience (gods knowledge of the future). The future does not yet exist to be known even by god.

You perhaps wish to confine the thread to the assumption of divine omnipotence? We are just to assume it true? This a problem in analytic logic not a question about notions of the real world?

---------- Post added 11-30-2009 at 06:49 PM ----------

To those not engaging in religious apologetics (trying hard to maintain divine omnipotence) or those engaging in an exercise in analytic philosophy, the answer seems clear, foreknowledge of every action denies not only human freedom but also moral responsibility (both as commonly understood). Such a conclusion would seriously undermine our most fundamental notions of freedom, of justice and the presuppositions of our society and our law.

I maintain the future does not yet exist to be known.
If the future already exists and can be known (by god or by Laplace’s demon) then free will (as commonly understood) is an illusion (albeit a persistent one).
There is a matter of scope here. For instance it is virtually certain and true that the sun will run out fuel, become a red giant and engulf the earth so there are some certain determined things in the world but modern physics does not imply determinism at all levels of reality.

When I wake up tomorrow morning, I will probably eat breakfast, I may have raisin bread, shredded wheat or toast. I do not know which. I maintain no one (not even god) knows which. It may even occur that I do not get breakfast, I may wake up late, there may be a family emergency, etc. Although I think the universe is highly ordered and highly predictable, I also think there are degrees of unpredictability (stochastic probability) and freedom. At the level of human decision making I see no evidence and no reason to presume “free will” does not exist.

It is clear that there are always constraints on our freedom. We are constrained by the laws of physics and often by our conditioned behaviors. The question is whether there is any freedom at all. The difference between a little freedom and no freedom at all is all the difference in the world.

The notion of free will (the ability to do otherwise) is one of what I would call hard core common sense assumptions about the nature of reality which everyone presupposes in practice (in living) even while denying it in theory (analytic philosophy). The denial of free will often stems from more deep seated metaphysical assumption about reality (materialism and determinism). Neither of these philosophical speculations (materialism or determinism) can be demonstrated to be “true”. I think the burden of proof for both the assumption of divine omnipotence and for the denial of “free will” lies with those who make the assertion. It is an assumption which has no value in a pragmatic worldview.

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by ACB

Is there a difference between "will" and "free will"? Is there such a thing as unfree will (i.e. I do something because I will it, but my willing has an external cause, e.g. God)?

If you willed it, then you've exercised control over your choice, and you therefore have free will (as far as I understand "free will").

The cause of your will matters not. Someone licking an icecream cone could cause me to will the choice to go buy an icecream cone, but this doesn't mean I didn't have the choice not to buy an icecream cone.

I use "will" here as a synonym for desire, choose, and have deliberate intention.

[fast]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

Do you mean knowledge with certainty, or just knowledge?

In this case, it doesn't matter. Knowledge doesn't imply certainty, but certainty implies knowledge. The primary difference between the two is fallibility. To have knowledge is to be fallible, and to be certain is to be infallible.

If God is infallible, then God is certain, but since certainty implies knowledge, it's also true that God knows--in this case: all knowing.

---------- Post added 11-30-2009 at 10:09 PM ----------

Originally Posted by Zetherin

But whether God has absolute certainty of everything, has nothing to do with my choices leading to the determination that only he knows.

What is the argument that my having a choice is incompatible with someone being certain about my choice?

He's not making the argument. He said, "some have argued."

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by fast

In this case, it doesn't matter. Knowledge doesn't imply certainty, but certainty implies knowledge. The primary difference between the two is fallibility. To have knowledge is to be fallible, and to be certain is to be infallible.

If God is infallible, then God is certain, but since certainty implies knowledge, it's also true that God knows--in this case: all knowing.

---------- Post added 11-30-2009 at 10:09 PM ----------



He's not making the argument. He said, "some have argued."

Yes, but I wasn't sure if he was speaking of God and his infallibility. Because a human could say he has knowledge of the future and not mean that he or she was certain.

He's not making the argument. He said, "some have argued."

I didn't say he was making the argument. I asked for an argument.