I know that I know

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Emil

Haha. LoungeHead is anti-philosophical, so he probably wouldn't use the term, except perhaps as in an attempt to discredit philosophy. But in doing so he would probably fail at using it the way other people are using it anyway. Nothing good has ever come out of him, at least of what I have seen.

But then again there are many people here just like him in that respect, think of Fido or the religious crowd. Though Fido is not condescending, he is completely un-understandable.

No need to mention names. It is dangerous.

[Emil]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

No need to mention names. It is dangerous.

The mods don't seem to be paying much attention around here. Not in this thread. Except Z. of course.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Emil

The mods don't seem to be paying much attention around here. Not in this thread. Except Z. of course.

Well, he is interested in philosophy.

[ACB]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I did not say you don't have to be certain in order to claim to know (in fact, I think you should be pretty sure if you claim to know, otherwise you would be misleading). I said that you don't have to be certain in order to know. Quite a different thing.

(Claiming to know is one thing, but knowing is a very different thing, and they are independent of one another. A major problem is that they are often confused. As above).

So, to be clear, there are:

1. Things you are certain of, and thus claim to know, and do in fact know, because they are true.
2. Things you are certain of, and thus claim to know, but do not in fact know, because they are false.
3. Things you justifiably believe but are not certain of, and thus do not claim to know, but which you do in fact know, because they are true.
4. Things you justifiably believe but are not certain of, and thus do not claim to know, and which you do not in fact know, because they are false.

Is that correct? (I assume you don't have any unjustified beliefs.)

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by ACB

So, to be clear, there are:

1. Things you are certain of, and thus claim to know, and do in fact know, because they are true.
2. Things you are certain of, and thus claim to know, but do not in fact know, because they are false.
3. Things you justifiably believe but are not certain of, and thus do not claim to know, but which you do in fact know, because they are true.
4. Things you justifiably believe but are not certain of, and thus do not claim to know, and which you do not in fact know, because they are false.

Is that correct? (I assume you don't have any unjustified beliefs.)

I don't think that I am certain of anything*, since I count myself a fallibilist, and therefore think that I might (and may) always be mistaken. Like Hume, I have a believe with a "tincture of skepticism". Of course, like everyone, I feel certain about many things.

If my belief is not justified, then I cannot know, since a necessary condition of knowing is that my belief be justified.

I don't claim to be certain of anything (with the possible exception of my own existence). But despite that, I do know (and claim to know) many things, like that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Or, the Nile is the longest river in Africa. Or Mars is the fourth planet.

I would be a unique person if I had no unjustified beliefs. Of course, I don't believe that any particular belief is unjustified, since, in that case I probably would not hold that belief. Wait, I even take that back. I probably do hold some unjustified beliefs which I am pretty sure are unjustified. Only human, you know.

[ACB]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I don't claim to be certain of anything (with the possible exception of my own existence). But despite that, I do know (and claim to know) many things, like that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Or, the Nile is the longest river in Africa. Or Mars is the fourth planet.

If any belief of yours may be mistaken, how can you say without qualification that you "do know many things"? It would be a contradiction to say: "Quito is the capital of Ecuador, but it is epistemically possible that it is not".

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I probably do hold some unjustified beliefs which I am pretty sure are unjustified.

Not philosophical ones, I hope.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by ACB

If any belief of yours may be mistaken, how can you say without qualification that you "do know many things"? It would be a contradiction to say: "Quito is the capital of Ecuador, but it is epistemically possible that it is not".



Not philosophical ones, I hope.

Because although any belief might be mistaken (not "may" since that refers to our evidence for it, and we often have a lot of reason to think that it is not true that a particular belief may be mistaken) it might also not be mistaken. So, although, Quito might not be the capital of Ecuador, I know that it is, since it is the capital of Ecuador. Justification for that proposition is overwhelming.

No, that is not a contradiction. It is epistemically possible that Quito is the not the capital of Ecuador, since my evidence that it is is inductive and not deductive. So it does not follow necessarily from its evidence. (Of course, there is another sense of "epistenically possible". ~P is epistemically possible= for all I know, P is false. In that sense, to say I know that P, but ~P is epistemically possible would be a contradiction). The negations or all contingent propositions are also epistemically possible in the sense that they are supported non-deductively.

[fast]

Originally Posted by ACB

So, to be clear, there are:

Originally Posted by ACB

1. Things you are certain of, and thus claim to know, and do in fact know, because they are true.
2. Things you are certain of, and thus claim to know, but do not in fact know, because they are false.
3. Things you justifiably believe but are not certain of, and thus do not claim to know, but which you do in fact know, because they are true.
4. Things you justifiably believe but are not certain of, and thus do not claim to know, and which you do not in fact know, because they are false.

Is that correct? (I assume you don't have any unjustified beliefs.)

Step 1: Distinguish between two kinds of certainty. There is the kind of certainty we are all too familiar with: the kind of certainty that is similar to confidence. For example, "I am certain that I know many things" can translate to "I am confident that I know many things."

There is also another kind of certainty that is far different than the one just discussed. It's a kind of certainty that in philosophy goes by different names--one of which is Cartesian certainty. This kind of certainty has nothing much to do with the previous kind of certainty. To have this kind of certainty requires not merely that you're not mistaken about what you believe, but it requires that it's impossible (logically impossible, in fact) that you can be mistaken. In other words, it's the kind of certainty that we fallible humans cannot have. There might be rare exceptions (who's to say?), but they are far and few between.

So, based on this, I will tell you that Kennethamy is certain about many things, but he is certain about practically nothing. Notice the possible confusion (and the appearance of a contradiction) when we fail to clarify which sense is used. What I just said is that Kennethamy is confident about many things, but he is not so certain about anything that it's logically impossible for him to be mistaken.

Step 2: Distinguish between Cartesian certainty and knowledge. People seem to have a hard time making a distinction between the two. They often confuse them. Some believe (unfortunately) that people really don't know what they think they know because they might be mistaken; however, it's a mistake to think that the fact we might be mistaken is good cause to think we don't know what we think we do. This mistake is sometimes caused by yet another confusion: the difference between possibility and actuality.

Based on this, I will tell you that Kennethamy has knowledge, but it's not impossible for him to be mistaken.

Step 3: Distinguish between possibility and actuality. The latter implies the former, but the former doesn't imply the latter. If something is actually the case, then clearly, it's possible for it to be the case, but just because it's possible for something to be the case, that doesn't imply that it's the case.

How is this important? Consider that you have a justified belief that P is true. Whether you know P would then depend not on whether you are possibly mistaken but whether you are actually mistaken. This brings us full circle back to the mistake people often make when they think in error that we don't know what we think we do because it's possible that we might be mistaken.

Step 4: Determine when it's okay to claim knowledge. If you believe P, and if your belief is justified, then it's okay to claim that P is true. If you later discover that P is false, then you did not know when you thought you did, but the fact your belief was justified mitigates (if not flat out exculpates) any responsibility you may have.

[ACB]

Thank you. I will consider this matter further, but I would just like to make clear that I was talking about epistemic, not logical, possibility/certainty. I realise that it is logically possible for Quito not to be the (current) capital of Ecuador.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by ACB

Thank you. I will consider this matter further, but I would just like to make clear that I was talking about epistemic, not logical, possibility/certainty. I realise that it is logically possible for Quito not to be the (current) capital of Ecuador.

Right. There is an important distinction.