Sufficient conditions of knowledge

[fast]

That a justification is adequate enough to form a belief isn’t to say that a justification is adequate enough to form a true belief since whether or not a belief is true is independent of justification.

According to the JTB Analysis of Knowledge, there are three necessary conditions of knowledge, and one objection to the analysis is that it fails to give us the sufficient conditions of knowledge—and I’m trying to find a way to defeat that objection; yes, unintuitive as it may be, I’m trying to make an argument that says the JTB Analysis of knowledge does give us the sufficient conditions of knowledge despite Gettier-type counterexamples.

In pursuit of doing so, I’d like to make a distinction that I’m having trouble putting into words, and that is the distinction between 1) an adequately justified belief that is true and 2) and adequately justified true belief; more specifically, I’m trying to make a distinction between A) a belief that is true and B) a true belief. At first glance, they seem to be the same, and after going over this time and again, I think things are in fact just the way they seem, and that brings me to my dilemma: putting the distinction I want to make into words.

To do that, I’m going to momentarily change the topic and talk about what I believe is called the fallacy of composition—I might be mistaken on that point. At any rate, to give a running example of what I’m talking about: a car is more than the sum of its parts. If we take a door off a car, then we still have a car. If we take off the tires, then we still have a car. If, however, we go to the extreme and completely dismantle the car and lay out all the individual parts, then we no longer have a car, for a car is more than merely the sum of its parts, as a car also includes the assemblage of many of its parts.

I am fiddling with the idea that the very nature of analyzing knowledge by looking at each condition separately somehow loses something that wouldn’t be lost had the conditions also been analyzed collectively. In other words, knowledge is more than the individual conditions being met, yet I do not mean to imply either a fourth necessary condition or the tweaking of any of the three necessary conditions. Again, knowledge is more than the individual conditions being met much the same way a car is more than the sum of its parts. We can no more ensure that we have knowledge by making sure all necessary conditions are met no more than we can ensure that we have a car simply by having all of its parts before us.

We need to look at JTB as if it’s a single entity (to use the word, “entity” loosely); more specifically, we need to look at TB as if it’s a single entity. We don’t (or at least we shouldn’t) look at the definition of “free” and “will” and think that we therefore know what free will is, for free will is something in its own right beyond that of what those terms individually refer to. Likewise, as I look for what seems to be the elusive fourth condition of knowledge (which I’m not), I’m fiddling with the idea that the JTB Analysis of Knowledge does give us the sufficient conditions of knowledge, but to see that, you need to see the distinction that I’m trying to make.

So, what then is the distinction between A) a belief that is true and B) a true belief? Well, like I said, there is none, but the distinction I’m trying to make can be characterized by viewing “A” as two separate conditions and by viewing “B” as a single condition that includes more than its two constituent parts—much the same way a car is more than the sum of its parts.

So, whatever could I have in mind! When we look at whether or not our justification is adequate enough to form a belief in Gettier-type examples, the answer is often yes, and when SEPERATELY determining whether or not the belief is true, the answer is often yes as well, yet we nevertheless don’t know what we think we know usually because of something unbeknownst to us, and herein lies the issue of the fact that the justification isn’t sufficient enough to imply a ‘true belief’—adequate as it is to form a belief that so happens to be true: yes (again), the justification is adequate enough to form the belief, but it is insufficient, for it fails to form a true belief.

That’s what I speculate is the so-called broken link (or disconnect) that allows for the possibility that we may not know what we think we do despite having a JB that is T, but when we J a TB (and not merely have a JB that is T), the link is not unbroken.

In a way, this reminds me of the modal fallacy. We need to increase the scope of justification (or what it applies to) beyond that of mere belief formation and include along with it what is true (or the truth condition). In analogy, the assemblage of the car parts is the missing link, and the disconnection between the justification for our belief that is true and the truth condition itself is the missing link.

The more I read what I wrote, the more I want to scrap it, but as it was sung in Fall Guy, “what the hey!”

[Reconstructo]

Logic is the bluff of Rhetoric.



With respect,
R

[Fido]

Originally Posted by Reconstructo

Logic is the bluff of Rhetoric.



With respect,
R

Logic is the stuff of physical knowledge... Of moral reality, what can be supposed is the best anyone can do...

[Reconstructo]

I'm a huge fan of critical thinking. In fact, I applied this critical thinking to the concept of logic, and what did I find?? Is logic the least bit superior to the rhetoric of the sophists? Was Plato "right" to claim superiority to the sophists? Or is logic related to the pseudo-religious bluff of rationalism in general?

Does logic transcend persuasion? Or is logic an investigation into the structure of persuasion? Does the word "logic" serve, for some, as a pseudo-religious idol, a claim to trans-subjective knowledge?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Reconstructo

I'm a huge fan of critical thinking. In fact, I applied this critical thinking to the concept of logic, and what did I find?? Is logic the least bit superior to the rhetoric of the sophists? Was Plato "right" to claim superiority to the sophists? Or is logic related to the pseudo-religious bluff of rationalism in general?

Does logic transcend persuasion? Or is logic an investigation into the structure of persuasion? Does the word "logic" serve, for some, as a pseudo-religious idol, a claim to trans-subjective knowledge?

But critical thinking is simply applied logic. To try to undermine logic with critical thinking would be like trying to undermine pure mathematics with applied mathematics. Like chopping off the branch you are sitting on.

[Reconstructo]

If all you mean by "logic" is "critical thinking," you make a good point. Is that really all you mean by "logic"?

And truly critical thinking must attempt to undermine itself. But that is my personal opinion.

My goal is to point out that one man's "logic" is another man's "BS."

Note: I suppose I identify with the neo-pragmatism of a Rorty. I think we live largely by means of "animal faith."

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Reconstructo

If all you mean by "logic" is "critical thinking," you make a good point. Is that really all you mean by "logic"?

And truly critical thinking must attempt to undermine itself. But that is my personal opinion.

My goal is to point out that one man's "logic" is another man's "BS."

Note: I suppose I identify with the neo-pragmatism of a Rorty. I think we live largely by means of "animal faith."

I did not say that logic was critical thinking. I said that critical thinking is applied logic.

What one man thinks is logic may be what another man thinks is B.S. . But that doesn't make one man's logic another's B.S..

[Reconstructo]

True, I was sloppy on that paraphrase. My apologies. When you say that "critical thinking is applied logic," I find this sentence acceptable. Would you now elaborate on what you mean by "applied logic." Do you mean something that transcends persuasion? Or do you just mean persuasive persuasion?

When I say that one man's logic is another man's BS, I do of course mean what one man thinks is logic....etc. But in the name of good prose style, I left that out. From my point of view, what a man thinks is what is "true" for that man.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Reconstructo

True, I was sloppy on that paraphrase. My apologies. When you say that "critical thinking is applied logic," I find this sentence acceptable. Would you now elaborate on what you mean by "applied logic." Do you mean something that transcends persuasion? Or do you just mean persuasive persuasion?

When I say that one man's logic is another man's BS, I do of course mean what one man thinks is logic....etc. But in the name of good prose style, I left that out. From my point of view, what a man thinks is what is "true" for that man.

Critical thinking is the application of logical theory to issues in ordinary contexts like conversation, magazines, and so on. I don't mean anything about persuasion.

"What a man thinks is (true) is what is true for that man" is a trivial tautology. Since, "what is true for X" and "what X thinks is true" mean the same thing. But, of course, what X thinks is true (or what is true for X) need not be true. So, of course, what one man thinks is true, may very well be what another thinks is false. But if something is true, then it cannot be false. Whatever anyone happens to think.

[Reconstructo]

You assume there is some objective standard by which to judge the trans-subjective truth of a statement. I assert that there is no objective standard. I suggest that such a standard is a pseudo-religious superstition.

To speak in the name of such standard ....is this not priest-like? Is "logic" that claims a status higher than persuasion any less superstitious than the reading of entrails for auguries?