Is knowing a mental event?

[fast]

Originally Posted by fast

I asked an inappropriate question. I apologize for this. Instead of focusing on that, could you please just rephrase your statement, as I do not understand.

Sure.

If things have to be the way they are, then they are the way they are, but the converse is not true. Hence, just because things are the way they are, that's not to say things have to be the way they are; After all, things could have been different.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

My problem is that I do not know how to interpret "truth" as a conditional for knowledge, when "truth" can not always be perceived.

... and that problem may be exactly why there are anti-realist theories of truth (e.g., the coherence theory and the pragmatic theory) ...

Originally Posted by Zetherin

So, direct access means that we are actively perceiving that thing?

... in my mind, "direct access" means unerring access, which typically implies unmediated access ... yes, it's my old nemesis "certainty" again , but I think direct access to truth implies certainty ... in fact, perhaps another description of "knowledge" is precisely "mediated/inferential access to truth" ...

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by fast

If things have to be the way they are, then they are the way they are, but the converse is not true. Hence, just because things are the way they are, that's not to say things have to be the way they are; After all, things could have been different.

Understood.

Fast, I'm now looking for a 'connector piece'; how does this relate to what we were just discussing? Is there something I said that made you think I didn't know that just because things are the way they are, it is not to say that things have to be the way they are? Or, did you note this tidbit of information to help clarify a relevant, but slightly tangential, issue?

Originally Posted by ACB

... in my mind, "direct access" means unerring access, which typically implies unmediated access ... yes, it's my old nemesis "certainty" again , but I think direct access to truth implies certainty ... in fact, perhaps another description of "knowledge" is precisely "mediated/inferential access to truth" ...

Tautological truths, such as "All bachelors are single", or "1+1=2", I'm comfortable with - these truths I would say I have "direct access" to. Things like my name, I'm comfortable with. Those things I'm actively observing, like this keyboard (I would say I know this keyboard exists and that I am using it), I'm comfortable with.

But how in the world could I have "direct access" to the evaluation that my dog is on my pillow, if I am nowhere near my dog or pillow? I mean, he *could* be on my pillow, even though I think he's in the kitchen eating. This would purely concern inferential knowledge, right? But, if I'm wrong that he's on my pillow (suppose I said he was), how can we call this knowledge at all?

I guess I can't come to grips with this call something knowledge until it's proven otherwise thing, especially for matters dealing with the temporal. It just seems too... convenient, or not well thought out. Eh, it's just me, I think I just have to try to look at this from a new perspective...

[ACB]

Zetherin - Just to avoid any confusion - the comment you attributed to me in your post #73 was actually by paulhanke.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

I guess I can't come to grips with this call something knowledge until it's proven otherwise thing, especially for matters dealing with the temporal. It just seems too... convenient, or not well thought out. Eh, it's just me, I think I just have to try to look at this from a new perspective...

... earlier, Ken said knowledge is like a triangle ... I think a better analogy would be to say that knowledge is like a hypercube (a four-dimensional cube) - both have a dimension that's beyond our perception ...

---------- Post added 11-10-2009 at 04:24 PM ----------

Originally Posted by ACB

Zetherin - Just to avoid any confusion - the comment you attributed to me in your post #73 was actually by paulhanke.

... no, no, no, please - by all means, take credit for what I say, I insist (especially such times as when I'm talking out my rear end!) ...

[fast]

You asked, “What is inactuality, and how, exactly, does it differ from impossibility?” This gave me the distinct impression that (maybe) you were having difficulty making the distinction between what is actual and what is possible; however, I also tailored my response to what I thought was the underlying issue since your question was in response to what Kennethamy said, “As I have said, knowledge implies the inactuality of error, but certainty implies the impossibility of error,” I said what I said in hopes of being helpful. I’ll try again tomorrow.

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by ACB

Zetherin - Just to avoid any confusion - the comment you attributed to me in your post #73 was actually by paulhanke.

My apologies! To you too, paulhanke! Mistake!

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... earlier, Ken said knowledge is like a triangle ... I think a better analogy would be to say that knowledge is like a hypercube (a four-dimensional cube) - both have a dimension that's beyond our perception ...

He said knowledge was like a triangle? What does that analogy mean? JTB (each point of the triangle)?

I like your analogy. As a four dimensional cube rotates, some parts of the cube are visible to the human eye, while some or not. Just like some things we can have (direct) knowledge of, and some things we cannot, due to the passing of time ('rotation').

Originally Posted by fast

You asked, “What is inactuality, and how, exactly, does it differ from impossibility?” This gave me the distinct impression that (maybe) you were having difficulty making the distinction between what is actual and what is possible; however, I also tailored my response to what I thought was the underlying issue since your question was in response to what Kennethamy said, “As I have said, knowledge implies the inactuality of error, but certainty implies the impossibility of error,” I said what I said in hopes of being helpful. I’ll try again tomorrow.

Thanks for trying to help! I just need to think all this stuff through.

[ACB]

This has been a most interesting discussion, but the issues are complex and I have found it difficult to reach a settled view. The basic problem, as I see it, is how to reconcile the idea that what is known cannot be false (which I regard as a non-negotiable part of the definition of "know") with the need to give the word "know" some practical use.

I am trying to separate the question of truth from that of justification, but this is not easy. Of course, we could simply say (from a realist perspective) that some things are true, and that if any such things are justifiably believed, then they are known. This is OK as far as it goes, but it does not get us very far. What is the use of saying that we (perhaps) actually know some things, if we are not aware of the extent (if any) of our knowledge? So we need to ask firstly: Can we be confident that we really know those things that we claim to know? And secondly: if not, should we sacrifice precision in order to salvage some practical use for the word "know"?

Thus we come to the issue of certainty, or the lack of it. Clearly there are some things (logical truths, and sense qualia) that we are certain of. Can we identify a second tier, where we have only "Cartesian" doubt (e.g. that we have a body, or that Ecuador exists), and say that we definitely know such things? I would say yes, because the possibility of error seems negligible; it is inconceivable that the claim of knowledge of such things will ever have to be withdrawn. But then there is a third tier, consisting of things that we "know" in the everyday sense of the word, but where error is a serious possibility. This corresponds to the "mediated/inferential" category mentioned earlier - things such as our "knowledge" that a new house we saw yesterday is still there. Should we include this third tier in the realm of genuine knowledge? If (on practical grounds) we do, we will have to accept some loss of precision in the term "knowledge", and be content to claim knowledge for present purposes while accepting the possibility of future correction. I am not sure whether this is a good idea.

(I have not used the expression "beyond reasonable doubt" in the above, as it is ambiguous as to whether it includes the second tier of knowledge or only the third.)

[fast]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

Thanks for trying to help! I just need to think all this stuff through.

An individually necessary condition of propositional knowledge is that the known proposition is true, so (and in short) knowledge implies truth, but no good analysis of truth implies that all truths are known, so although knowledge implies truth, truth doesn't imply knowledge.

Now, let's concentrate on the bold above and consider the following question: If you are either in Florida or South Carolina, and if you are not in Florida, then is it true that you are in South Carolina? The answer is yes, but let's now ask a different question: If you are either in Florida or South Carolina, and if you are not in Florida, then is it true that you must be in South Carolina? You may be inclined to think yes, but don't be too quick to think that because it is the case that you are where you that you therefore must be where you are. You must be if it's a necessary truth, but if it's a contingent truth, then it's not so that you must be where you are but merely are where you are.

Once we get past the "is" "must" distinction, we can then take a second look at the distinction Kennethamy is making. Yes, knowledge implies that P is true (as the JTB analysis of knowledge would indicate), but no analysis that I'm aware of takes the stance that knowledge implies that P must be true.

Knowledge implies that you are not mistaken in your belief. Certainty implies not only that you are not mistaken, but unlike knowledge, it also implies that you cannot be mistaken.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... earlier, Ken said knowledge is like a triangle ... I think a better analogy would be to say that knowledge is like a hypercube (a four-dimensional cube) - both have a dimension that's beyond our perception ...

---------- Post added 11-10-2009 at 04:24 PM ----------



... no, no, no, please - by all means, take credit for what I say, I insist (especially such times as when I'm talking out my rear end!) ...

I hope I didn't say that knowledge was like a triangle, since I have no idea what that would mean. It sounds like something Yoda would say.

---------- Post added 11-11-2009 at 02:55 AM ----------

Originally Posted by ACB

This has been a most interesting discussion, but the issues are complex and I have found it difficult to reach a settled view. The basic problem, as I see it, is how to reconcile the idea that what is known cannot be false (which I regard as a non-negotiable part of the definition of "know") with the need to give the word "know" some practical use.

I am trying to separate the question of truth from that of justification, but this is not easy. Of course, we could simply say (from a realist perspective) that some things are true, and that if any such things are justifiably believed, then they are known. This is OK as far as it goes, but it does not get us very far. What is the use of saying that we (perhaps) actually know some things, if we are not aware of the extent (if any) of our knowledge? So we need to ask firstly: Can we be confident that we really know those things that we claim to know? And secondly: if not, should we sacrifice precision in order to salvage some practical use for the word "know"?

Thus we come to the issue of certainty, or the lack of it. Clearly there are some things (logical truths, and sense qualia) that we are certain of. Can we identify a second tier, where we have only "Cartesian" doubt (e.g. that we have a body, or that Ecuador exists), and say that we definitely know such things? I would say yes, because the possibility of error seems negligible; it is inconceivable that the claim of knowledge of such things will ever have to be withdrawn. But then there is a third tier, consisting of things that we "know" in the everyday sense of the word, but where error is a serious possibility. This corresponds to the "mediated/inferential" category mentioned earlier - things such as our "knowledge" that a new house we saw yesterday is still there. Should we include this third tier in the realm of genuine knowledge? If (on practical grounds) we do, we will have to accept some loss of precision in the term "knowledge", and be content to claim knowledge for present purposes while accepting the possibility of future correction. I am not sure whether this is a good idea.

(I have not used the expression "beyond reasonable doubt" in the above, as it is ambiguous as to whether it includes the second tier of knowledge or only the third.)

"What is known cannot be false" is ambiguous. It might mean:

1. It cannot be that a proposition that is known is false. Or,

2. If a proposition is known, then it cannot be false.

1. is true. 2 is false.

I think you are confusing 2, which is false, with 1, which is true.

1. simply says that we cannot know false propositions, and that one can know only true propositions. So, for instance, no one can know that Quito is the capital of Bolivia, since Quito is not the capital of Bolivia. I think every one would agree with that.

But, 2. says that not only can only true propositions be known, but that any proposition that is known could not be false, and must be true. And, of course, that is simply false. For example, I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. But the proposition that Quito is the capital of Ecuador could be false. Another city in Ecuador could be the capital. But, for various reasons, Quito happens to be the capital. There is no necessity about Quito being the capital.

It is what is called a "modal fallacy" to infer from the true premise that it cannot be that if some proposition, p, is known, then p is not false, to false conclusion that if some proposition, p is known, then p cannot be false. Notice the position of the term "cannot" in both propositions. In 1. the "scope" of "cannot" ranges over the entire statement. But in 2. the "scope" of "cannot" ranges only over the last half of the whole statement. And that makes the meanings of 1. and 2. very different. 1 is true, but for 2 to be true, only one particular kind of statement could be known, namely a statement that must be true, or what is called a necessary statement. And, as you see, that would mean that we could not know most statement we do know, namely statement that are not necessary statements, and that use of the term know would not have a practical use, as you have seen. So we have to see the ambiguity of the statement "What we know cannot be false", and then see that in one of its meanings it is true, and in one of its meanings it is false. And also, that in the meaning in which it is true, "know" does retain its "practical use".