Is knowing a mental event?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

To continue the building upon of ideas, does one have to know? If I think H2O is what water is composed of, and I use this information, with other information, to create a hydrogen bomb, does it necessarily follow that I know that H2O is the composition of water?

What I'm trying to say is that it's very clear that we've built upon ideas to come to new, and often times more advanced, ideas. However, does any of this have to necessarily do with knowledge, though? Or at least knowledge that has to do with truth?

Could it be that all of our advancements are held together by strings of justifications, rather than knowledge?

Most scientist believe they know that water is H20. I do not know what you are asking when you ask whether someone knows some proposition, p. After all, that is partly what this thread is about. What is it I am claiming when I say that I know this or that, or that you know this or that. So, I don't know how to answer your question. I think that if a person knows that water is H20 then he (at least) believes water is H20, his belief is adequately justified, and it is true that water is H20. What do you think?

---------- Post added 11-10-2009 at 09:24 AM ----------

Originally Posted by Zetherin

Indeed, yes, that is what it would mean.

This is where I become confused: Access to truth.

Actually, I think the term used was, "direct access to true". And that seem to be contrasted with inferential access to truth. In ordinary circumstances that would be the contrast between our evidence that the postman has been because there are letters in the mailbox when there were none before, and actually seeing the postman deliver the letters. The first would be indirect evidence, the latter, direct evidence for the visit of the postman.
But that doesn't seem what is meant, because even seeing the postman deliver the letters is also inferential or indirect evidence according to Paul. The question is what Paul would consider to be direct evidence (access) to the truth (if anything). I suggested that perhaps he would think that my evidence that I am in pain (or some other mental state) would be, for him, a case of direct access to the truth. But could our knowing be such a mental state so that we could have direct access to whether we know? In which case, of course, we could know that we know, or be certain.

---------- Post added 11-10-2009 at 09:39 AM ----------

Originally Posted by Zetherin

It's very clear that from generation to generation we are believing things which have justifications. Those things we do not feel have adequate justifications, we don't call knowledge, and we often don't believe (and we often contest them... which is a good thing!). This, for whatever it's worth, could be dubbed the "body of X"; the collective and temporal culmination of what we believe based on justification we find to be good.

I just don't know if any of this has to do with knowledge, or if even knowledge exists. Is knowledge an idealistic notion? Should we revise this notion - have we matured, and come to grips with uncertainty, as a species? Tentative knowledge seems a bit contradictory. We're still trying to keep the word "knowledge" in the mix, because, I think, it gives us some certainty, and we fear not having it.

If "tentative knowledge" just is knowledge that is revisable since it might not be knowledge at all because it might not be true, then most all knowledge is "tentative knowledge". That is what I call, "fallible knowledge". I think when you talk of knowledge, especially when you talk of it as being "idealistic" or "doubting whether it exists" you are not talking about knowledge at all. You are talking about certainty. But the distinction between knowledge, on the one hand, and certainty on the other hand, is extremely important. As I have said, knowledge implies the inactuality of error, but certainty implies the impossibility of error. We can, and do, know, without being certain. Only confusion can result from the failure to distinguish between knowledge and certainty. Plato committed that confusion, and so did Descartes. And even "that astute man" (Kant) David Hume let some of the confusion seep in. It was only finally the greatest of all American philosophers, Charles S. Pierce who nailed it.

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by ACB

If our present beliefs are justified in the light of current human understanding, we are entitled to call them knowledge. If future discoveries show that they were false, then we (or posterity) should deny that they were really knowledge. But if we or posterity find them still true beyond reasonable doubt, we/they should maintain the claim that they were knowledge.

But how is "truth" part of the criterion here, then? This notion of knowledge is JB, until our justifications are proven unsound. Once they are, we pick up a new JB, and then run with it a while until we are proven incorrect again.

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... as crazy as it may sound, perhaps a refined sense of the JTB model of knowledge is idealistic but at the same time comes to grips with inherent uncertainty ... it is idealistic in that it incorporates "truth" in its definition, the ideal of direct access to truth being beyond us; but at the same time it also tries to come to grips with inherent uncertainty by incorporating "justified belief" ... which leads one to a strange situation: you can be certain that your beliefs are justified (e.g., they are logically coherent), but you cannot be certain that your justified beliefs are knowledge ...

Are we certain our beliefs are justified, or do we just feel justified in believing our beliefs are justified?

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I think that if a person knows that water is H20 then he (at least) believes water is H20, his belief is adequately justified, and it is true that water is H20. What do you think?

In many threads you mention the point that knowing has nothing to do with the possibility of falsity. That is, just because it's possible something could be false, it does not follow that we do not know at any point in time. But, if we find out that that thing is in fact not true, we never knew to begin with - we just thought we knew. This confuses me.

Besides those things which are tautologically true, such as that all bachelors are single, I don't understand how we can claim knowledge. For most things, all we can do is claim that we think we know. And, if in most cases all we can claim is that we think we know, it seems that knowing is something we can approach but never attain - it's an idealistic notion.

But that doesn't seem what is meant, because even seeing the postman deliver the letters is also inferential or indirect evidence according to Paul. The question is what Paul would consider to be direct evidence (access) to the truth (if anything). I suggested that perhaps he would think that my evidence that I am in pain (or some other mental state) would be, for him, a case of direct access to the truth. But could our knowing be such a mental state so that we could have direct access to whether we know? In which case, of course, we could know that we know, or be certain.

I'm not convinced yet that we have direct access to truth for most things. It seems that excluding things that are by definition true, most things we only have inferential access to truth for.

Are you sure direct access exists for most things?

As I have said, knowledge implies the inactuality of error, but certainty implies the impossibility of error.

What is inactuality, and how, exactly, does it differ from impossibility?

Only confusion can result from the failure to distinguish between knowledge and certainty.

If knowledge doesn't have to be certain, then why are we using "truth" as a criterion? Doesn't truth have to be certain? Or... are there certainly true truths and tentatively true truths...

Yes, confusion does arise. Indeed, indeed.

[fast]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

When I claim to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, am I saying that something that is going on in my mind, or that something is going on in Ecuador? Just what am I saying?

You have to remember that you're making a complex statement. It's not a simple claim. You're not merely implying one thing by saying what you do. You are implying many things by saying that you know Quito is the capital of Ecuador.

Knowledge is a complex creature, and not all individual necessary conditions of knowledge are mental events, so knowledge most certainly is not exclusively a mental event, but more intriguingly, it’s not even in part a mental event despite the fact one of its necessary conditions is a mental event, and the reason for that is because we’re no longer talking about the creature itself but rather it’s necessary conditions.

Yes, belief is a necessary condition of knowledge, but knowledge is not a kind of belief. It’s no more a kind of belief than it is a kind of truth or kind of justification. The mistake all too commonly made is to say of knowledge that it is a kind of belief because belief is a necessary condition of knowledge, but what has that to do with it? What kind of a belief is it? The kind that is adequately justified and true? No. That is the mistake! Say of knowledge what it is, not of it that is so of its necessary conditions.

---------- Post added 11-10-2009 at 10:39 AM ----------

Originally Posted by Zetherin

What is inactuality, and how, exactly, does it differ from impossibility?

Every case that must be the case is the case, but not every case that is the case must be the case.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by fast

Yes, belief is a necessary condition of knowledge, but knowledge is not a kind of belief. It’s no more a kind of belief than it is a kind of truth or kind of justification. The mistake all too commonly made is to say of knowledge that it is a kind of belief because belief is a necessary condition of knowledge, but what has that to do with it?

... that's a very Peircian shift in perspective - knowledge is not a justified true belief, but rather (and much like a sign) a triadic process of justification, truth, and belief ... to look at it this way, is truth first, belief second, and justification third? ...

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by fast

Every case that must be the case is the case, but not every case that is the case must be the case.

Who determines what "must be"?

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

But that doesn't seem what is meant, because even seeing the postman deliver the letters is also inferential or indirect evidence according to Paul. The question is what Paul would consider to be direct evidence (access) to the truth (if anything). I suggested that perhaps he would think that my evidence that I am in pain (or some other mental state) would be, for him, a case of direct access to the truth.

... when speaking of the natural world (and not our cultural and personal inventions), it seems to me that the only truth we have direct access to is indeed the qualia of our experience ... the referents of that qualia (when not other instances of qualia), on the other hand, we only have mediated access to via human senses (which can be fooled) and human concepts (which are limited) ...

Originally Posted by kennethamy

It was only finally the greatest of all American philosophers, Charles S. Pierce who nailed it.

... could you elaborate? ...

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... could you elaborate? ...

Especially Pierce's continual attack of Cartesianism in for example his, Some Consequences of Four Incapacities, and his , Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man, are all attempts to separate the ideas of knowledge and certainty, and deny certainty, but affirm the existence of knowledge. And also his criticisms of Cartesian Doubt. "We should not doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts".

---------- Post added 11-10-2009 at 12:56 PM ----------

Originally Posted by Zetherin

But how is "truth" part of the criterion here, then? This notion of knowledge is JB, until our justifications are proven unsound. Once they are, we pick up a new JB, and then run with it a while until we are proven incorrect again.



Are we certain our beliefs are justified, or do we just feel justified in believing our beliefs are justified?



In many threads you mention the point that knowing has nothing to do with the possibility of falsity. That is, just because it's possible something could be false, it does not follow that we do not know at any point in time. But, if we find out that that thing is in fact not true, we never knew to begin with - we just thought we knew. This confuses me.

Besides those things which are tautologically true, such as that all bachelors are single, I don't understand how we can claim knowledge. For most things, all we can do is claim that we think we know. And, if in most cases all we can claim is that we think we know, it seems that knowing is something we can approach but never attain - it's an idealistic notion.



I'm not convinced yet that we have direct access to truth for most things. It seems that excluding things that are by definition true, most things we only have inferential access to truth for.

Are you sure direct access exists for most things?



What is inactuality, and how, exactly, does it differ from impossibility?



If knowledge doesn't have to be certain, then why are we using "truth" as a criterion? Doesn't truth have to be certain? Or... are there certainly true truths and tentatively true truths...

Yes, confusion does arise. Indeed, indeed.

But how is "truth" part of the criterion here, then? This notion of knowledge is JB, until our justifications are proven unsound. Once they are, we pick up a new JB, and then run with it a while until we are proven incorrect again.

Truth is not a criterion of knowledge (in the sense that it is how we discover whether we know). It is a condition of knowledge. A belief cannot be knowledge unless that belief is true, just as nothing can be a triangle unless it has three angles.

Are we certain our beliefs are justified, or do we just feel justified in believing our beliefs are justified?

Sometimes people believe with no justification, or very little justification. That kind of belief is called, "faith". If fallibilism is true we are certain of nothing or very little.


In many threads you mention the point that knowing has nothing to do with the possibility of falsity. That is, just because it's possible something could be false, it does not follow that we do not know at any point in time. But, if we find out that that thing is in fact not true, we never knew to begin with - we just thought we knew. This confuses me.

Just because it is possible that a statement is false does not mean it is false, for it is also possible that it is true. Of course, if I believe I know that p, and if subsequently, I discover that I was wrong, then my belief that I knew that p was false, and I did not know that p in the first place. And we did just think we knew. But I don't see why that is confusing. The same thing happens if we believe that some substance is gold, and we find out later that it was really iron pyrite, then the substance was not gold in the first place. If this case does not confuse you then why should the other case (believing that you know rather that believing that some substance is gold) confuse you. I can believe I know, and find out I didn't know; and I can believe that some substance is gold, and then find out it isn't gold. What is the difference?


But again, just as we can think that something is gold, and it really be gold, so we can think we know and we really know. Thinking something is gold does not exclude its being gold, and thinking we know does not exclude our knowing. You would not say that we can only think something is gold but never claim it is gold, so why would you say that we can only think we know, but never claim we know? Again, what is the difference. And you would not say that gold is an idealistic notion. Why say that knowledge is an idealistic notion?

I'm not convinced yet that we have direct access to truth for most things. It seems that excluding things that are by definition true, most things we only have inferential access to truth for.

Are you sure direct access exists for most things?

Well, we have direct access to the truth of things like, there is a table in front of me. But we don't in the case of there are electrons or protons. We did not used to have direct access to germs, but now we can observe germs directly though a powerful microscope.


What is inactuality, and how, exactly, does it differ from impossibility?

Mermaids are inactual, but mermaids are possible. I use the term "possible" to mean, "logically possible" (for now, anyway). What is logically possible does not imply a contradiction. Four-sided triangles are logically impossible. What is impossible is inactual, but not all inactual things are impossible.


If knowledge doesn't have to be certain, then why are we using "truth" as a criterion? Doesn't truth have to be certain? Or... are there certainly true truths and tentatively true truths.

I don't see why you ask this. P does not have to be certain to be true. Certainty and truth are utterly different concepts. There are truths no one knows of, much less are certain of. Certainty and knowledge are epistemic concepts. Truth is a metaphysical concept. Knowledge implies truth, but truth does not imply knowledge. There have been, and doubtless are, truths no one knows are true.

---------- Post added 11-10-2009 at 01:00 PM ----------

Originally Posted by Zetherin

Who determines what "must be"?

No one I know. It must be true that all bachelors are males, or that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, but no one determined that these truths be true (so far as I know).

[fast]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

Who determines what "must be"?

I don't know that it's a person that determines what must be.

I think the distinction between “is” and “must” is important. A necessary condition of knowledge isn’t that the adequately justified belief must be true. No, not at all. The condition is that it is true—not that it must be true.

She awoke because the alarm sounded. That is true, and that is what actually happened, but things could have turned out differently. The battery, for example, could have been too weak for the alarm to properly function. Many things could have possibly happened, and of all of those, only one thing did actually happen.

We do not live in a world where there are only necessary truths. Contingent truths are plentiful as well.

---------- Post added 11-10-2009 at 02:19 PM ----------

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... that's a very Peircian shift in perspective - knowledge is not a justified true belief, but rather (and much like a sign) a triadic process of justification, truth, and belief ... to look at it this way, is truth first, belief second, and justification third? ...

I don't view the order as particularly important. Either the conditions are met or they are not. If they are met, then what we have before us may (may, I say) be knowledge. If they are not met, then what we have before us is not (not, I say) knowledge.

Also, I wouldn't be too quick to say it's false that knowledge is a justified true belief. In fact, I don't think it's false, so I won't say it at all, let alone quickly.

Consider the following sentence: Knowledge is a justified true belief. The last few words: "justified," "true," and "belief" are three separate words that each denote a separate lexical meaning, but I find it most helpful to think of them as a single three-worded term with a stipulative meaning in its own right, commensurate with being shorthand for the necessary conditions of knowledge as outlined in the JTB analysis of knowledge.

I think there is a difference between the lexical definition of the word, “knowledge” and our analysis of knowledge (the referent to which the term, “knowledge” refers), but the analysis is more insightful, as the definition is just a starting place for understanding knowledge, so I don’t think it’s too fool-hardy to say that knowledge is a justified true belief—at least it’s probably close enough for our purposes.

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Truth is not a criterion of knowledge (in the sense that it is how we discover whether we know). It is a condition of knowledge. A belief cannot be knowledge unless that belief is true, just as nothing can be a triangle unless it has three angles.

I'm sorry, I meant condition.

But again, just as we can think that something is gold, and it really be gold, so we can think we know and we really know. Thinking something is gold does not exclude its being gold, and thinking we know does not exclude our knowing. You would not say that we can only think something is gold but never claim it is gold, so why would you say that we can only think we know, but never claim we know? Again, what is the difference. And you would not say that gold is an idealistic notion. Why say that knowledge is an idealistic notion?

My problem is that I do not know how to interpret "truth" as a conditional for knowledge, when "truth" can not always be perceived.

Well, we have direct access to the truth of things like, there is a table in front of me. But we don't in the case of there are electrons or protons. We did not used to have direct access to germs, but now we can observe germs directly though a powerful microscope.

So, direct access means that we are actively perceiving that thing? The moment we take our eyes, or senses, off of said thing, we now have inferential access, right?

Mermaids are inactual, but mermaids are possible. I use the term "possible" to mean, "logically possible" (for now, anyway). What is logically possible does not imply a contradiction. Four-sided triangles are logically impossible. What is impossible is inactual, but not all inactual things are impossible.

So, when you said:

As I have said, knowledge implies the inactuality of error, but certainty implies the impossibility of error.

you meant that certainty implies that there is no logical possibility of error, and that knowledge...?

I don't see why you ask this. P does not have to be certain to be true. Certainty and truth are utterly different concepts. There are truths no one knows of, much less are certain of. Certainty and knowledge are epistemic concepts. Truth is a metaphysical concept. Knowledge implies truth, but truth does not imply knowledge. There have been, and doubtless are, truths no one knows are true.

I understand this. But, I cannot understand "truth" without viewing through an epistemic lens. That's my problem.

Originally Posted by fast

I don't know that it's a person that determines what must be.

I asked an inappropriate question. I apologize for this. Instead of focusing on that, could you please just rephrase your statement, as I do not understand.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by fast

Also, I wouldn't be too quick to say it's false that knowledge is a justified true belief. In fact, I don't think it's false, so I won't say it at all, let alone quickly.

... now I'm confused - didn't you say earlier that "The mistake all too commonly made is to say of knowledge that it is a kind of belief"?

At any rate, to put JTB into the Peircian framework of firstness, secondness, and thirdness, is more of an analysis of the roles each play in a triadic process than it is an ordering ... so to say that truth is first, belief is second, and justification is third, is to say that truth simply is, belief is with respect to truth, and justification is what brings the two into relation with one another.