Is knowing a mental event?

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... and if "beyond a reasonable doubt" is the criteria for knowledge, isn't that exactly the same as saying that knowledge is simply justified belief? ...

Indeed, yes, that is what it would mean.

This is where I become confused: Access to truth.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... the JTB model has three parts: justification, belief, and truth ... that you cannot use the coherency of a set of beliefs to establish truth does not mean that you cannot use the coherency of a set of beliefs to establish justification ... that's all we're saying ...



... in the JTB model, that you looked it up and read that Lincoln was assassinated is simply justification for believing that Lincoln was assassinated ... that only covers the JB part of the model - to know what you know, you still need to establish the truth ... and to establish the truth you need to have direct access to it - you would have had to have been there and witnessed the event (and even then, can you trust your senses to deliver the truth undistorted? can you trust that you weren't hallucinating?) ... so since you do not have direct access to historical events, you cannot establish their truth ... therefore, under the JTB model of knowledge, for all things historical (and a whole lot more), you cannot know what you know ...

What is "direct access to the truth"? Here is where we return to the question of whether knowing is a mental event. Allegedly I have direct access to my own mental events. For example, my sensation of pain, or my beliefs. But, as I think we agree, knowing is not like that since I cannot have direct access to my knowledge that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, for the reason that whether I know that depends on what goes on in Ecuador, and not just on what goes on in my head, as it does in the case of the sensation of pain. So, it is impossible that I should have direct access to the truth in the case of my knowing that Quito is the capital. Quito is in Ecuador. So, necessarily, I can know that Quito is the capital only indirectly, and not directly. Apparently, in your view, I can, at best know the contents of my own mind, since only that would constitute direct access to the truth. But is it right to argue (as you seem to be doing) that:

1. I can know only if I have direct access to the truth.
2. I can have direct access to the truth only if the truth concerns the contents of my own mind.
3. But knowing does not concern only the contents of my own mind.
4. Thus I cannot know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador (or that Lincoln was assassinated". ?

Why cannot we have inferential knowledge as well as direct knowledge? Or, inferential access to the truth as well as direct access to the truth?

I think part of the problem may be that in the case of direct knowledge of our mental states like the sensation of pain, our knowledge seems to be incorrigible. We cannot be mistaken (whether that is true is a different question). So that we think that only if we cannot be mistaken, can we "really" know what we claim to know. But that means that absolute certainty, the impossibility of error, is a necessary criterion of knowledge. And, is that true? As I pointed out earlier, for truth to be a necessary condition of knowing, we know only if we are not mistaken. But that does not mean that we know only if it is impossible for us to be mistaken. And that is an important distinction between the actuality of mistake, and the impossibility of mistaken. If only the inactuality of mistake is required for knowledge, then we do not require direct access to the truth. But if the impossibility of mistake is required, then, of course, direct access is required to the truth. But what is the argument for the view that certainty, or the impossibility of error is required for knowledge? There is no such good argument that I know of.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

This is where I become confused: Access to truth.

... and I think this has always been a problem ... think about it: if we had direct access to truth, what would be the point of a JTB model in the first place? ... that is, if we had direct access to truth, then knowledge would simply be truth ... that we do not have direct access to truth is precisely why we rely instead on justified belief ... so if we then turn around and define knowledge in terms of something we do not have access to - justified true belief - then by definition we cannot know what we know ...

---------- Post added 11-09-2009 at 12:10 PM ----------

Originally Posted by kennethamy

But is it right to argue (as you seem to be doing) that:

1. I can know only if I have direct access to the truth.
2. I can have direct access to the truth only if the truth concerns the contents of my own mind.
3. But knowing does not concern only the contents of my own mind.
4. Thus I cannot know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador (or that Lincoln was assassinated". ?

Why cannot we have inferential knowledge as well as direct knowledge? Or, inferential access to the truth as well as direct access to the truth?

I think part of the problem may be that in the case of direct knowledge of our mental states like the sensation of pain, our knowledge seems to be incorrigible. We cannot be mistaken (whether that is true is a different question). So that we think that only if we cannot be mistaken, can we "really" know what we claim to know. But that means that absolute certainty, the impossibility of error, is a necessary criterion of knowledge. And, is that true? As I pointed out earlier, for truth to be a necessary condition of knowing, we know only if we are not mistaken. But that does not mean that we know only if it is impossible for us to be mistaken. And that is an important distinction between the actuality of mistake, and the impossibility of mistaken. If only the inactuality of mistake is required for knowledge, then we do not require direct access to the truth. But if the impossibility of mistake is required, then, of course, direct access is required to the truth. But what is the argument for the view that certainty, or the impossibility of error is required for knowledge? There is no such good argument that I know of.

... and that is a nice criticism of the definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" ... also, note that I am not arguing for a definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" - I am simply following the definition to its logical conclusions, as you have just done, and found it wanting ...

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

...
---------- Post added 11-09-2009 at 12:10 PM ----------



... and that is a nice criticism of the definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" ... also, note that I am not arguing for a definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" - I am simply following the definition to its logical conclusions, as you have just done, and found it wanting ...

I don't think I found it wanting. What I found is that there is no good argument for certainty being a necessary condition of knowledge, nor that our knowledge of our own mental states need be a model of all knowledge. I know that you are not arguing for the JTB model. But I am, and I see no good objection to it. And, I am not clear just what your objection is. But consider this: suppose that certainty were a necessary condition of knowledge, and suppose "direct access" to truth were a necessary condition of knowledge as you seem to be arguing. Then there could be no scientific knowledge, We, then, would not know, as we believe we do know that water is H20, nor that Mars is the fourth planet. And we would not know more today than we did 100 years ago, since most of what we know today is the result of science. Have you an answer to that objection?

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I don't think I found it wanting. What I found is that there is no good argument for certainty being a necessary condition of knowledge, nor that our knowledge of our own mental states need be a model of all knowledge. I know that you are not arguing for the JTB model. But I am, and I see no good objection to it. And, I am not clear just what your objection is. But consider this: suppose that certainty were a necessary condition of knowledge, and suppose "direct access" to truth were a necessary condition of knowledge as you seem to be arguing. Then there could be no scientific knowledge, We, then, would not know, as we believe we do know that water is H20, nor that Mars is the fourth planet. And we would not know more today than we did 100 years ago, since most of what we know today is the result of science. Have you an answer to that objection?

To continue the building upon of ideas, does one have to know? If I think H2O is what water is composed of, and I use this information, with other information, to create a hydrogen bomb, does it necessarily follow that I know that H2O is the composition of water?

What I'm trying to say is that it's very clear that we've built upon ideas to come to new, and often times more advanced, ideas. However, does any of this have to necessarily do with knowledge, though? Or at least knowledge that has to do with truth?

Could it be that all of our advancements are held together by strings of justifications, rather than knowledge?

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

But consider this: suppose that certainty were a necessary condition of knowledge, and suppose "direct access" to truth were a necessary condition of knowledge as you seem to be arguing.

... actually, what I was saying was that you need direct access to truth in order to know what you know - that is, in order to know that your knowledge is in fact knowledge you need access to the truth state of your knowledge ... but I'm beginning to see that I've fallen into the same trap of using the same term in different capacities in the same sentence ... I was thinking that you needed to establish that a belief was both justified and true in order to know what you knew it ... in other words, what I was intending when I said "know what you know" was really "establish the knowledge status of your justified true beliefs" ... but if you instead expand "know what you know" with the JTB equivalent it quickly becomes evident that this is not the case: to "have a justified true belief that you have a justified true belief" simply means that all you have to have is a justified true belief that your beliefs are both justified and true ... oops! - sorry! ... thanks for setting me straight ...

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Then there could be no scientific knowledge, We, then, would not know, as we believe we do know that water is H20, nor that Mars is the fourth planet. And we would not know more today than we did 100 years ago, since most of what we know today is the result of science. Have you an answer to that objection?

... what here seems to be hanging me up here is the idea that if I hold a justified belief that this justified belief could count as knowledge yesterday (i.e., it was true yesterday) and not knowledge today (i.e., it is not true today) ... so is the problem that I am looking at things from a personal perspective when epistemology is actually about a cultural phenomenon? ... that is, is epistemology really about how a body of knowledge evolves over time independent of individuals, and not about how an individual comes to develop justified beliefs? ...

---------- Post added 11-09-2009 at 02:16 PM ----------

Originally Posted by Zetherin

Could it be that all of our advancements are held together by strings of justifications, rather than knowledge?

... that's an interesting question: can there really be such a thing as a "body of knowledge", or just a "body of tentative knowledge"? ...

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... that's an interesting question: can there really be such a thing as a "body of knowledge", or just a "body of tentative knowledge"? ...

It's very clear that from generation to generation we are believing things which have justifications. Those things we do not feel have adequate justifications, we don't call knowledge, and we often don't believe (and we often contest them... which is a good thing!). This, for whatever it's worth, could be dubbed the "body of X"; the collective and temporal culmination of what we believe based on justification we find to be good.

I just don't know if any of this has to do with knowledge, or if even knowledge exists. Is knowledge an idealistic notion? Should we revise this notion - have we matured, and come to grips with uncertainty, as a species? Tentative knowledge seems a bit contradictory. We're still trying to keep the word "knowledge" in the mix, because, I think, it gives us some certainty, and we fear not having it.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

I just don't know if any of this has to do with knowledge, or if even knowledge exists. Is knowledge an idealistic notion? Should we revise this notion - have we matured, and come to grips with uncertainty, as a species? Tentative knowledge seems a bit contradictory. We're still trying to keep the word "knowledge" in the mix, because, I think, it gives us some certainty, and we fear not having it.

... as crazy as it may sound, perhaps a refined sense of the JTB model of knowledge is idealistic but at the same time comes to grips with inherent uncertainty ... it is idealistic in that it incorporates "truth" in its definition, the ideal of direct access to truth being beyond us; but at the same time it also tries to come to grips with inherent uncertainty by incorporating "justified belief" ... which leads one to a strange situation: you can be certain that your beliefs are justified (e.g., they are logically coherent), but you cannot be certain that your justified beliefs are knowledge ...

[ACB]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... and if "beyond a reasonable doubt" is the criteria for knowledge, isn't that exactly the same as saying that knowledge is simply justified belief? ...

I don't think so. Even if we adopt (as I think we should) the "loose" criterion of truth (i.e. "beyond a reasonable doubt"), truth is still a necessary element of knowledge. Even with the loose criterion, a justified belief (e.g. the belief of the ancients that the Sun went round the Earth) can still turn out to be untrue. If we define knowledge simply as justified belief, we have to say that they knew that the Sun went round the Earth, since they were justified (by the totality of human knowledge in their day) in believing that it did. This is a conclusion that I think we should try to avoid at all costs, since it conflicts with the commonly accepted idea of knowledge. If we allow that something false can be known, we are in effect redefining knowledge.

To sum up, therefore:

1. By definition, knowledge implies truth. A well justified belief may turn out to be false. Therefore, justification is not enough to constitute knowledge; we need truth also.

2. "Beyond all doubt" is too stringent a criterion for truth, as it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that we know nothing outside our own mind. We should therefore adopt the criterion of "beyond a reasonable doubt".

3. If our present beliefs are justified in the light of current human understanding, we are entitled to call them knowledge. If future discoveries show that they were false, then we (or posterity) should deny that they were really knowledge. But if we or posterity find them still true beyond reasonable doubt, we/they should maintain the claim that they were knowledge.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by ACB

3. If our present beliefs are justified in the light of current human understanding, we are entitled to call them knowledge. If future discoveries show that they were false, then we (or posterity) should deny that they were really knowledge. But if we or posterity find them still true beyond reasonable doubt, we/they should maintain the claim that they were knowledge.

... so it sounds like the correct way to view epistemology is as a theory of how knowledge works within cultures (e.g., one culture affirming/denying the status of knowledge to what an earlier/other culture counts as knowledge), and not necessarily as a theory of how knowledge works within individuals ... and if that is the case, is knowing then a cultural event (and not a mental event)? ...