Is knowing a mental event?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... thanks for the clarification ..



... given that you're following the traditional definition of knowledge as a belief that is both justified and true, this probably depends to a great deal upon which theory of truth you subscribe to - correspondence, coherence, or pragmatist (the latter two of which essentially cause knowledge to be simply justified belief ) ...



... assuming you're into the correspondence theory of truth (which I imagine Ken is), then you can actually use coherence (a belief fits into a coherent system of beliefs) and/or pragmatist (the deployment of a belief results in positive action) theories of truth as means for justification ...



... if a belief can only be shown to be unjustified in the presence of new evidence, and that evidence can only be accessed through new means (whether instrumental or ideological), then I don't think it can be said that those who did not have access to that evidence nor means were unjustified in their belief ...

... given that you're following the traditional definition of knowledge as a belief that is both justified and true, this probably depends to a great deal upon which theory of truth you subscribe to - correspondence, coherence, or pragmatist (the latter two of which essentially cause knowledge to be simply justified belief

I don't think that is true. You can have coherence theory of justification and a correspondence theory of truth. W.V. Quine did. And, if a pragmatist theory of truth is that truth is what works (whatever that means) then it has to be true that it "works". And that cannot mean that "it works that it works". Since that would lead to a vicious infinite regress.

... assuming you're into the correspondence theory of truth (which I imagine Ken is), then you can actually use coherence (a belief fits into a coherent system of beliefs) and/or pragmatist (the deployment of a belief results in positive action) theories of truth as means for justification ...

Isn't this inconsistent with what you just wrote in your previous comment?

... if a belief can only be shown to be unjustified in the presence of new evidence, and that evidence can only be accessed through new means (whether instrumental or ideological), then I don't think it can be said that those who did not have access to that evidence nor means were unjustified in their belief ..

But why not? Couldn't that former evidence been gathered by illegitimate methods. For example thinking that what is dreamed is evidence, or what is "seen" in the entrails of a bat?

[ACB]

My view is as follows:

1. In the correspondence theory of truth, knowledge is justified true belief. I think this theory is right.

2. In the coherence and pragmatist theories of truth, knowledge is simply justified belief. I think these theories are wrong.

3. The coherence or pragmatist theories of justification can be combined with the correspondence theory of truth. And I think they should.

4. Incidentally, are coherence and pragmatism two sides of the same coin? If a belief "works", must it cohere with other beliefs, and vice versa?

5. The reason I think coherence and pragmatist theories of truth are wrong is that, given a finite amount of evidence, there will always be more than one possible state of affairs that (a) coheres with the existing evidence, and (b) works. (All theories are 'underdetermined'.) This would result in the co-existence of contradictory truths. Only the correspondence theory can avoid this.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by ACB

My view is as follows:

1. In the correspondence theory of truth, knowledge is justified true belief. I think this theory is right.

2. In the coherence and pragmatist theories of truth, knowledge is simply justified belief. I think these theories are wrong.

3. The coherence or pragmatist theories of justification can be combined with the correspondence theory of truth. And I think they should.

4. Incidentally, are coherence and pragmatism two sides of the same coin? If a belief "works", must it cohere with other beliefs, and vice versa?

5. The reason I think coherence and pragmatist theories of truth are wrong is that, given a finite amount of evidence, there will always be more than one possible state of affairs that (a) coheres with the existing evidence, and (b) works. (All theories are 'underdetermined'.) This would result in the co-existence of contradictory truths. Only the correspondence theory can avoid this.

As I said, I don't see why you think that 2 is true. And in 3. you agree with me. So the views you express in 2 and 3 seem to me to be inconsistent with each other.

I really do not have a clear idea of what it means for a belief to "work". But, as I pointed out, for a belief to "work" it has to be true that belief "works", and what does that mean? That it works that the belief works? And if that is true, then does that mean that it works, that the belief works, that the belief works? A vicious infinite regress.

I think you are not distinguishing between coherence theories of justification, and coherence theories of truth. Are you mixing them? up.They are quite different. And they could both go under the rubric of "coherence theories of knowledge".

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I don't think that is true. You can have coherence theory of justification and a correspondence theory of truth.

... I'm not sure that simply because there are (broadly speaking) three theories of truth means that it is coherent to try to combine them into a single theory of truth - as I showed before, that can quickly lead to an incoherent theory ...

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Isn't this inconsistent with what you just wrote in your previous comment?

... nope - here, I'm talking about selecting the correspondence theory of truth as the "correct" theory ... in which case, the other two theories are "incorrect" theories, but can still be applied as justification in the JTB model of knowledge ...

Originally Posted by kennethamy

But why not? Couldn't that former evidence been gathered by illegitimate methods. For example thinking that what is dreamed is evidence, or what is "seen" in the entrails of a bat?

... illegitimate according to whom? ...

---------- Post added 11-09-2009 at 09:13 AM ----------

Originally Posted by ACB

4. Incidentally, are coherence and pragmatism two sides of the same coin? If a belief "works", must it cohere with other beliefs, and vice versa?

... that the deployment of two independent beliefs both result in positive action does not imply that the two beliefs are coherent ... I think that if it were practically possible to examine all of our individual beliefs for coherency with one another, we would find that many of our beliefs are not coherent with one another (and are thus merely pragmatic) ...

Originally Posted by ACB

5. The reason I think coherence and pragmatist theories of truth are wrong is that, given a finite amount of evidence, there will always be more than one possible state of affairs that (a) coheres with the existing evidence, and (b) works. (All theories are 'underdetermined'.) This would result in the co-existence of contradictory truths. Only the correspondence theory can avoid this.

... but if we are to adhere to the correspondence theory of truth, then we also need to accept the consequences:

a. You cannot know what you know.
b. Through advances in our belief systems regarding the nature of the world, we have demonstrated that no belief systems before ours count as knowledge (i.e., our ancestors knew nothing about the natural world).
c. Through future advances in belief systems regarding the nature of the world, it will be demonstrated that our current belief systems do not count as knowledge (i.e., we know nothing about the natural world).
d. That cultural and personal truths are always changing means that our past and current cultural and personal belief systems do not count as knowledge (i.e., we know nothing about ourselves).

... so in effect, it would appear that the only thing that the JTB model of knowledge (as grounded in the correspondence theory of truth) shows us is that nobody knows anything ... the only way I can see to try to salvage anything out of this is to add a temporal dimension to the model - that is, knowledge is a justified belief that is held at the same time that the belief is also true ... but this leads to the non-intuitive situation where one and the same justified belief can be at once both knowledge (the belief was true yesterday) and not knowledge (the belief is false today) ... also note that this only salvages things for truths that are subject to change ...

[hue-man]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

When I claim to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, am I saying that something that is going on in my mind, or that something is going on in Ecuador?

I suppose that the awareness of the fact is a mental event, but the fact itself is not.

[ACB]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I think you are not distinguishing between coherence theories of justification, and coherence theories of truth. Are you mixing them? up.They are quite different. And they could both go under the rubric of "coherence theories of knowledge".

I am distinguishing between them. I disagree with coherence theories of truth, but agree with coherence theories of justification.

---------- Post added 11-09-2009 at 05:20 PM ----------

Originally Posted by paulhanke

here, I'm talking about selecting the correspondence theory of truth as the "correct" theory ... in which case, the other two theories are "incorrect" theories, but can still be applied as justification in the JTB model of knowledge ...

Yes, this is exactly what I mean.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... I'm not sure that simply because there are (broadly speaking) three theories of truth means that it is coherent to try to combine them into a single theory of truth - as I showed before, that can quickly lead to an incoherent theory ...



... nope - here, I'm talking about selecting the correspondence theory of truth as the "correct" theory ... in which case, the other two theories are "incorrect" theories, but can still be applied as justification in the JTB model of knowledge ...



... illegitimate according to whom? ...

---------- Post added 11-09-2009 at 09:13 AM ----------



... that the deployment of two independent beliefs both result in positive action does not imply that the two beliefs are coherent ... I think that if it were practically possible to examine all of our individual beliefs for coherency with one another, we would find that many of our beliefs are not coherent with one another (and are thus merely pragmatic) ...



... but if we are to adhere to the correspondence theory of truth, then we also need to accept the consequences:

a. You cannot know what you know.
b. Through advances in our belief systems regarding the nature of the world, we have demonstrated that no belief systems before ours count as knowledge (i.e., our ancestors knew nothing about the natural world).
c. Through future advances in belief systems regarding the nature of the world, it will be demonstrated that our current belief systems do not count as knowledge (i.e., we know nothing about the natural world).
d. That cultural and personal truths are always changing means that our past and current cultural and personal belief systems do not count as knowledge (i.e., we know nothing about ourselves).

... so in effect, it would appear that the only thing that the JTB model of knowledge (as grounded in the correspondence theory of truth) shows us is that nobody knows anything ... the only way I can see to try to salvage anything out of this is to add a temporal dimension to the model - that is, knowledge is a justified belief that is held at the same time that the belief is also true ... but this leads to the non-intuitive situation where one and the same justified belief can be at once both knowledge (the belief was true yesterday) and not knowledge (the belief is false today) ... also note that this only salvages things for truths that are subject to change ...

I didn't say we could combine the theories of truth. I said that the coherence and pragmatic theory are wrong. I don't understand what you mean by "can still be applied as justification". Justification is not truth.

Dreams, astrology, necromancy, witchcraft, are not legitimate kinds of justification for our beliefs. According to the scientific view of justification I thought we were assuming. If you think they are, then we are on a different track. But given they are not, people who thought they had justification by necromancy or astrology were wrong. I don't really want to discuss this issue which would really be a derail.

We always know what we know. You must mean that we do not know that we know. And we do know that we knew. If I believe I know that Lincoln was assassinated, and then look it up and discover that he was assassinated, then I know that I knew he was assassinated.

How far back do ancestors go? My ancestors knew the world was round going back 100 years, and my ancient ancestors certainly knew that there was a Sun in the sky, and that water was wet. It may be that our beliefs are revised in the future, but it also may be that they are not revised in the future. We still believe the world is round, just as we did 100 years ago. So what we know now may still be known in the future, because it is true. There is no good reason to think that everything we believe we now know we do not know now. That we might be wrong is no reason to think that we are wrong. So, it seems to me that we know more now than we did 100 years ago, and it is highly probable that we'll know more a hundred years from now. Knowledge is cumulative.

That cultural and personal truths are always changing means that our past and current cultural and personal belief systems do not count as knowledge

That seems to me clearly wrong, since we may be right now. (And perhaps wrong in the future). Don't you think we know that water is H20? I do. The likelihood that we will turn out to be wrong about that is so minimal as to be discounted.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I didn't say we could combine the theories of truth. I said that the coherence and pragmatic theory are wrong. I don't understand what you mean by "can still be applied as justification". Justification is not truth.

... the JTB model has three parts: justification, belief, and truth ... that you cannot use the coherency of a set of beliefs to establish truth does not mean that you cannot use the coherency of a set of beliefs to establish justification ... that's all we're saying ...

Originally Posted by kennethamy

We always know what we know. You must mean that we do not know that we know. And we do know that we knew. If I believe I know that Lincoln was assassinated, and then look it up and discover that he was assassinated, then I know that I knew he was assassinated.

... in the JTB model, that you looked it up and read that Lincoln was assassinated is simply justification for believing that Lincoln was assassinated ... that only covers the JB part of the model - to know what you know, you still need to establish the truth ... and to establish the truth you need to have direct access to it - you would have had to have been there and witnessed the event (and even then, can you trust your senses to deliver the truth undistorted? can you trust that you weren't hallucinating?) ... so since you do not have direct access to historical events, you cannot establish their truth ... therefore, under the JTB model of knowledge, for all things historical (and a whole lot more), you cannot know what you know ...

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... in the JTB model, that you looked it up and read that Lincoln was assassinated is simply justification for believing that Lincoln was assassinated ... that only covers the JB part of the model - to know what you know, you still need to establish the truth ... and to establish the truth you need to have direct access to it - you would have had to have been there and witnessed the event (and even then, can you trust your senses to deliver the truth undistorted? can you trust that you weren't hallucinating?) ... so since you do not have direct access to historical events, you cannot establish their truth ... therefore, under the JTB model of knowledge, for all things historical (and a whole lot more), you cannot know what you know ...

Kennethamy may be referring to the distinction between knowing beyond a reasonable doubt and knowing beyond all doubt.

Even without having been there, we can know beyond a reasonable doubt that Lincoln was assassinated (of course, the 'reason' here would be based on the justification, I think). And, so, when we say "I know Lincoln was assassinated", this is implied. It should never be assumed that we are speaking of absolute certainty.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

Kennethamy may be referring to the distinction between knowing beyond a reasonable doubt and knowing beyond all doubt.

Even without having been there, we can know beyond a reasonable doubt that Lincoln was assassinated (of course, the 'reason' here would be based on the justification, I think). And, so, when we say "I know Lincoln was assassinated", this is implied. It should never be assumed that we are speaking of absolute certainty.

... and if "beyond a reasonable doubt" is the criteria for knowledge, isn't that exactly the same as saying that knowledge is simply justified belief? ...