Is knowing a mental event?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by ACB

As I see it, the situation is as follows:

1. We only know something if our belief in it is both justified and true.

2. We can never be certain that any empirical belief is true; hence we can never be certain that we know something.

3. For a realist, there are truths independent of our minds. If any of these truths actually accord with our beliefs, then the beliefs in question (if justified) constitute knowledge. This is so by definition: truth + justification = knowledge. Certainty, or lack of it, is a separate issue. (Similarly, I may not be certain that X is a male sibling, but if he is, then he is definitely a brother, because male + sibling = brother.)

4. So we can never have any guarantee of knowledge, but we can still (as a matter of fact, from an outside perspective) actually have knowledge.

5. Arguably, although we cannot be certain, we can in some cases 'know that we know' beyond reasonable doubt.

With a few minor qualifications, I would accept what you write here. Many seem to set too high a standard for knowing. We do not have to be certain in order to know, nor need we know we know in order to know. This is the fallibilist idea of knowledge which accords with science and with commonsense. If we had to be absolutely certain in order to know, then we could have no empirical (scientific knowledge). And that is absurd.

---------- Post added 11-08-2009 at 03:38 PM ----------

Originally Posted by prothero

That "knowing" must be a "mental event"?

But why? That conclusion would not follow from those premises.

---------- Post added 11-08-2009 at 03:42 PM ----------

Originally Posted by longknowledge

When this thread started I thought I believed that knowing is a mental event, but now I don't know anymore.

The idea that knowing is a mental event is what leads some into thinking that when we know, we are certain that we know, because they believe that when we have mental events, we are certain that we have them.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by ACB

1. We only know something if our belief in it is both justified and true.

5. Arguably, although we cannot be certain, we can in some cases 'know that we know' beyond reasonable doubt.

... there are two definitions of "know" here ... #1. knowledge is justified belief that corresponds to truth, and #5. knowledge is simply justified belief (aka "beyond a reasonable doubt") ... does it make sense for a theory of knowledge to allow two distinct definitions of knowledge? ...

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... there are two definitions of "know" here ... #1. knowledge is justified belief that corresponds to truth, and #5. knowledge is simply justified belief (aka "beyond a reasonable doubt") ... does it make sense for a theory of knowledge to allow two distinct definitions of knowledge? ...

Not if they are incompatible. If knowledge were only JB then atheists and theists would both be right, since theists would know God existed, and atheists would know that God did not exist. And, so it would be known both that God exists, and that God does not exist. And that is a contradiction.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Not if they are incompatible.

... I think you meant to say "Not if they are not incompatible." ...

Originally Posted by kennethamy

If knowledge were only JB then atheists and theists would both be right, since theists would know God existed, and atheists would know that God did not exist. And, so it would be known both that God exists, and that God does not exist. And that is a contradiction.

... but is a theory of knowing simply a theory of being right, or should it rather be a theory of how people come to develop and justify beliefs, right or wrong? ... at any rate, here's how the two definitions are incompatible:

An atheist and a theist both have their justifications for knowing what they know - so by #5, both know what they know ... however, by #1, only one of them can be right about the existence/nonexistence of God, and so only one of them really knows what it is that they know that they know ... as this is logically incoherent, the two definitions are incompatible.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... I think you meant to say "Not if they are not incompatible." ...



... but is a theory of knowing simply a theory of being right, or should it rather be a theory of how people come to develop and justify beliefs, right or wrong? ... at any rate, here's how the two definitions are incompatible:

An atheist and a theist both have their justifications for knowing what they know - so by #5, both know what they know ... however, by #1, only one of them can be right about the existence/nonexistence of God, and so only one of them really knows what it is that they know that they know ... as this is logically incoherent, the two definitions are incompatible.

No. The same theory of knowledge cannot allow incompatible definitions of "knowledge" or incompatible definitions of any kind.

Why should the fact that both sides have justification for what they claim to know (to say that they know what they claim to know is to beg the question) mean that they know they know? Obviously they cannot both known they know when they claim to know incompatible propositions.

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Why should the fact that both sides have justification for what they claim to know (to say that they know what they claim to know is to beg the question) mean that they know they know? Obviously they cannot both known they know when they claim to know incompatible propositions.

... that is simply a result of trying to fit two definitions of knowledge into one theory of knowledge ...

[ACB]

Originally Posted by paulhanke

... there are two definitions of "know" here ... #1. knowledge is justified belief that corresponds to truth, and #5. knowledge is simply justified belief (aka "beyond a reasonable doubt") ... does it make sense for a theory of knowledge to allow two distinct definitions of knowledge? ...

I maintain that knowledge is justified true belief. My points #1 and #5 concern two distinct matters. Point #1 relates to whether, as an objective fact, we actually know some particular thing, e.g. that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Point #5 relates to whether we should be confident that we know anything at all. Whether something is actually true is a separate matter from whether we can be certain (or almost certain) that it is true.

Perhaps I should have said in #5 "be confident that we know" rather than "know that we know". (I did put the latter in quotes!)

However, I would like to explore further the question of justification. When we say that a belief is justified, are we simply talking about basic empirical data? (E.g. I have good reason to believe that Quito is the capital, because I have read and heard so on many occasions.) Or must we cast our net wider, and question our whole belief system? Must we consider the possibility that some future scientific or philosophical development will completely alter our worldview?

So I have the following questions:

1. What exactly does it mean to say that a belief is justified?

2. Can we ever say, in the light of new evidence, that a past belief was not really justified although we thought it was at the time?

[awest]

Knowing Comes from our Sub-Conscious

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by ACB

I maintain that knowledge is justified true belief. My points #1 and #5 concern two distinct matters. Point #1 relates to whether, as an objective fact, we actually know some particular thing, e.g. that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Point #5 relates to whether we should be confident that we know anything at all. Whether something is actually true is a separate matter from whether we can be certain (or almost certain) that it is true.

Perhaps I should have said in #5 "be confident that we know" rather than "know that we know". (I did put the latter in quotes!)

However, I would like to explore further the question of justification. When we say that a belief is justified, are we simply talking about basic empirical data? (E.g. I have good reason to believe that Quito is the capital, because I have read and heard so on many occasions.) Or must we cast our net wider, and question our whole belief system? Must we consider the possibility that some future scientific or philosophical development will completely alter our worldview?

So I have the following questions:

1. What exactly does it mean to say that a belief is justified?

2. Can we ever say, in the light of new evidence, that a past belief was not really justified although we thought it was at the time?

1. That is a subject all to itself, and can hardly be answered in a sentence, a paragraph, or a book. It is a central issue in epistemology. But since there is inductive justification, it cannot meant that p is justified by J only if J entails p. So that p can be justified by J, and ~p. And interesting book on justification and knowledge is, Knowledge and Practical Interests by Jason Stanley where the author takes a contextualist view of justification.

2. I don't know exactly what you mean by "new evidence", but clearly it is possible for someone to think his assertion that he knows that p is justified, but be mistaken. It cannot be that if you think you are justified, then you are. And it is possible that upon reflection, you decide that you were not justified although you believed you were.

By the way, Edmund Gettier in 1960 raised some important doubts about whether JTB constituted sufficient conditions for knowledge, although he allowed that they were necessary conditions for knowledge.

Gettier problem - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

[paulhanke]

Originally Posted by ACB

Perhaps I should have said in #5 "be confident that we know" rather than "know that we know". (I did put the latter in quotes!)

... thanks for the clarification ...

Originally Posted by ACB

However, I would like to explore further the question of justification. When we say that a belief is justified, are we simply talking about basic empirical data? (E.g. I have good reason to believe that Quito is the capital, because I have read and heard so on many occasions.) Or must we cast our net wider, and question our whole belief system? Must we consider the possibility that some future scientific or philosophical development will completely alter our worldview?

... given that you're following the traditional definition of knowledge as a belief that is both justified and true, this probably depends to a great deal upon which theory of truth you subscribe to - correspondence, coherence, or pragmatist (the latter two of which essentially cause knowledge to be simply justified belief ) ...

Originally Posted by ACB

1. What exactly does it mean to say that a belief is justified?

... assuming you're into the correspondence theory of truth (which I imagine Ken is), then you can actually use coherence (a belief fits into a coherent system of beliefs) and/or pragmatist (the deployment of a belief results in positive action) theories of truth as means for justification ...

Originally Posted by ACB

2. Can we ever say, in the light of new evidence, that a past belief was not really justified although we thought it was at the time?

... if a belief can only be shown to be unjustified in the presence of new evidence, and that evidence can only be accessed through new means (whether instrumental or ideological), then I don't think it can be said that those who did not have access to that evidence nor means were unjustified in their belief ...