Is knowing a mental event?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by BrightNoon

I think the logic holds. Let me present it again ultra-simply for discussion.

If the 'external world' is defined as that which exists beyond individual experience, then the external world cannot be a part of or include anything from individual experience.

If an individual is aware only of what is within his experience, and per the above logc no part of the external world exists within experience, then nothing of which he is aware can possibly be something in the external world.

Therefore it is not possible for a individual to be aware of the external world, or any part thereof, in any way. Anything of which he is aware cannot belong to the external world. You seem to think that we experience only our experiences. Experiences are not what we experience, they are how we experience what we experience.

So, unless you doubt the premises of the argument (1. the external world is that which exists beyond experience, or 2. an individual is aware only of what exists within his experience), you must accept the conclusion (an individual cannot be aware of the external world in any way).

Does this not follow?



What is experienced? Is the set of phenomena labelled computer, which one has experienced, 'what is experienced?' I say yes. The 'real computer,' the thing in the external world that is presumably the cause of those experienced phenomena, is not experienced. If it is part of the external world, it cannot, by definition, be experienced.

The fact we habitually refer to 'the computer' as something other than just the set of experienced phenomena (white, square, buzzing sound etc.), does not mean that we experience the 'real computer' as it exists outside of experience. Again, how would that be possible, for us to experience something which, by definition, is not experienced? Rather, we have in mind the idea, along with the set of phenomena, of 'physical thing' or 'real thing.' This idea is no more than the understanding that the set of phenomena refers to something constant, something 'real' which is the cause of that phenomena, which ensures that, having looked away from the computer and then back again, it will still be there. In other words, we are aware of the 'real computer' only to the extent that 'real computer' is the very idea in experience that it is; we are definately not aware of whatever that idea is supposed to refer to, and we can't say what it is supposed to refer to exactly, except in these general terms (i.e. 'that external thing which is the cause of the experiences called 'computer').
If we say that the 'real thing' is white, has keys, makes a buzzing sound, etc., then we are not any longer talking about the 'real thing' but rather about the set of phenomena.

How could anyone have computer experience (experience with computers) unless there are computers to experience? (To have experience with?). The computer is not the experience; it is what we experience (just as the stone is not our kick, it is what we kick) the cause of our experience. If it is not the cause of our computer experience, then what is? I have asked you this several times. We have experience, and that is how we know about external objects. The external objects are not the experiences we have. We do not experience our experiences. The experiences are how we experience what we experience. The experiences are not what we experience. We have experiences. We do not experience them.

[BrightNoon]

Originally Posted by Emil

In a sense. (If you remove the unnecessary modality at your conclusion. It does not follow from the premises.)

It is equivocation on the word "aware". Technically the argument type (i.e. of propositions) is d-invalid but the argument appears d-valid because of its sentence structure.

The solution is to distinguish between immediately aware and inferentially aware. No one is immediately aware of anything but sensations, but people are inferentially aware of lots of things.

If you want people to be sure what you're arguing, then feel free to present it in formal logic.

I prefer words.

words dissemble, words be quick
words resemble walking sticks,
plant them they will grow,
watch them waver so;
I'll always be a word man,
better than a bird man

I disgress...anyway, I disagree with your analysis.

To be 'inferentially aware' is to have an experience of that inference and the experienced phenomena from which it is drawn; to be 'aware immediately' is to have the experienced phenomena only. In either case, the awareness is of experience and not of anything outside experience; that in the former case the inference (as an experience: i.e. thought) is supposed to refer to something outside of experience does not mean that this other thing is actually experienced. Again, only the idea of it as such is experienced. The 'external thing' by definition remains external to experience, and cannot be experienced, though the idea that it exists is experienced (the inference).

[Emil]

Originally Posted by BrightNoon

I prefer words.

words dissemble, words be quick
words resemble walking sticks,
plant them they will grow,
watch them waver so;
I'll always be a word man,
better than a bird man

I disgress...anyway, I disagree with your analysis.

To be 'inferentially aware' is to have an experience of that inference and the experienced phenomena from which it is drawn; to be 'aware immediately' is to have the experienced phenomena only. In either case, the awareness is of experience and not of anything outside experience; that in the former case the inference (as an experience: i.e. thought) is supposed to refer to something outside of experience does not mean that this other thing is actually experienced. Again, only the idea of it as such is experienced. The 'external thing' by definition remains external to experience, and cannot be experienced, though the idea that it exists is experienced (the inference).

People do not generally recall the inferences that they have drawn in the past but they recall and are i-aware of the conclusions. I think that your 'definition' of "inferentially aware" is wrong:

"To be 'inferentially aware' is to have an experience of that inference and the experienced phenomena from which it is drawn"

As I have pointed out people are often i-aware without being aware of their inferences.

Often they not even by d-aware of the direct (switching words to "direct" instead of "immediate" since it is shorter and starts with "d" so I can use shorthands.) experience that led them to make the inference to some mind-independent thing.

Yes, people are only d-aware of their d-experiences. Nothing about the existence of the external world follows from that.

---------- Post added 11-20-2009 at 07:46 PM ----------

Originally Posted by kennethamy

How could anyone have computer experience (experience with computers) unless there are computers to experience? (To have experience with?). The computer is not the experience; it is what we experience (just as the stone is not our kick, it is what we kick) the cause of our experience. If it is not the cause of our computer experience, then what is? I have asked you this several times. We have experience, and that is how we know about external objects. The external objects are not the experiences we have. We do not experience our experiences. The experiences are how we experience what we experience. The experiences are not what we experience. We have experiences. We do not experience them.

Are there any alternative explanations of why we have the d-experiences that we have? The only explanation I can come up with is realism. How does the solipsist (try to) explain why we have d-experiences?

[BrightNoon]

Originally Posted by Emil

People do not generally recall the inferences that they have drawn in the past but they recall and are i-aware of the conclusions. I think that your 'definition' of "inferentially aware" is wrong:

"To be 'inferentially aware' is to have an experience of that inference and the experienced phenomena from which it is drawn"

As I have pointed out people are often i-aware without being aware of their inferences.

Very well. I didn't mean by 'aware of the inference' that they were neccessarily aware of the act of inferring, the 'logic' of the inference, though they may be. I meant rather that they are aware of what you calling the conclusion of the inference. E.g. If I am i-aware that the sun will rise tommorow, I am aware of at least the concept that the sun will rise tommorow, if not the phenomena of the sun rising on previous days or the logic that led from those phenomena to the above concept. Regardless, to be i-aware is to be aware of experienced phenomena of some kind, and to be d-aware is also to be aware of experienced phenomena of some kind. I would consider both to be sub-sets of what I first called more generally 'awareness.' And the distinction between them doesn't effect my argument because, though being i-aware and d-aware might ential awareness of different sorts of experience (concept or raw sensation), they are both awarenesses of experience, not of the external world beyond experience.

Yes, people are only d-aware of their d-experiences. Nothing about the existence of the external world follows from that.

Agreed, and nothing constituting i-awareness is of the external world, though it may 'point' to it.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Emil

Are there any alternative explanations of why we have the d-experiences that we have? The only explanation I can come up with is realism. How does the solipsist (try to) explain why we have d-experiences?

I know of no other plausible explanations. The only plausible explanation of what explains the experiences we have is that they are caused by external objects. That is why I keep asking my question.

[Emil]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

I know of no other plausible explanations. The only plausible explanation of what explains the experiences we have is that they are caused by external objects. That is why I keep asking my question.

I can't even think of a not extremely implausible alternative theory.

[Dasein]

kennethamy;

I contend that knowing is not a mental event. When you learned how to tie your shoes it was a mental event up to the point of knowing. At the point of knowing your mental participation was no longer needed. You became transparent.

You know how to breathe. You didn't have to learn so no mental activity is required.

I wrote this little diddy. You might find some humor in it.

When you know, you know, don't you?
You know you know and there's nuthin' you can do about it.
Even if you forget for a moment, you can only forget because you know what you know.
Ain't life amazing?!!!

Dasein

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Emil

I can't even think of a not extremely implausible alternative theory.

There is phenomenalism, which was taken up by the logical positivists for a while.

Phenomenalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

[Emil]

Originally Posted by BrightNoon

Very well. I didn't mean by 'aware of the inference' that they were neccessarily aware of the act of inferring, the 'logic' of the inference, though they may be. I meant rather that they are aware of what you calling the conclusion of the inference. E.g. If I am i-aware that the sun will rise tommorow, I am aware of at least the concept that the sun will rise tommorow, if not the phenomena of the sun rising on previous days or the logic that led from those phenomena to the above concept. Regardless, to be i-aware is to be aware of experienced phenomena of some kind, and to be d-aware is also to be aware of experienced phenomena of some kind. I would consider both to be sub-sets of what I first called more generally 'awareness.' And the distinction between them doesn't effect my argument because, though being i-aware and d-aware might ential awareness of different sorts of experience (concept or raw sensation), they are both awarenesses of experience, not of the external world beyond experience.



Agreed, and nothing constituting i-awareness is of the external world, though it may 'point' to it.

I see that you did not take my invitation to present your argument in formal logic. Why not?

---------- Post added 11-21-2009 at 03:50 AM ----------

Originally Posted by ACB

Thanks for your reply. I would say that if you can recite the alphabet quickly and without hesitation, so that you have no time to "work out" anything, you must be relying on your prior beliefs about the individual sequences of adjacent letters. (I can recite the alphabet in less than 4 seconds, so surely I must have these beliefs in my memory all the time.) But it is perfectly possible for someone to recite the alphabet rapidly without immediately having any belief (let alone a justified one) about the order-number of any given letter.

But I don't know all the individual sequences of adjacent letters and yet I can recite the alphabet. Do you think that I am a counter-example to your proposition? I think so. If you asked me what the letters after "g" was I probably couldn't answer you without having to go over some local part of the alphabet. In any case, it is not clear to me that if I can recite the alphabet, then I have beliefs about which letters comes after which letters. (Try reciting the alphabet backwards. That's much harder!)

It seems to me that the alphabet is some special case (in relation to beliefs) because it is a case of grouped information storage in the brain. Scientists have long discovered that people remember things better in patters and especially if some melody can be made out of it (or it rhymes). In the case of the alphabet, many people learn some song with the alphabet in it. In fact I learned it that way. In the song I learned certain letters are repeated. I have to really concentrate to avoid repeating them even when I go over the alphabet in my head!

Originally Posted by ACB

Another example:
I can be justified in believing the following:
1 + 2 = 3
3 + 4 = 7
5 + 6 = 11
7 + 8 = 15
9 + 10 = 19
without justifiably believing that
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 10 = 55
because I can carry the two-number sums in my memory without necessarily carrying the ten-number sum. I could give the answers to the two-number sums immediately, but might still (a) fail to believe the ten-number sum, or (b) believe it for a wrong reason (e.g. an incompetent teacher told me it).

This counter-example is actually better than the other one. Even if you did not intend it to be or know why it is! Consider the fact that mathematical truths are non-contingent. That means that any mathematical truth logically implies any other mathematical truth. (Follows from the definition of "logical implication".) But obviously, it is not the case that if someone is e-justified in his belief about any mathematical (any non-contingent true) proposition, then he is e-justified in believing any other mathematical proposition (any non-contingent and true proposition). This seems to me to be a fatal counter-example to the principle under scrutiny.

I think, however, that the principle may be saved with some relevance logic interpretation of "logical implication". I'm not very knowledgeable about that though and it would further derail this thread. The moderators are not doing a good job of separating different information threads (i.e. conversations) in a forum thread.

But let's return to the Gettier case. We now know that the principle underlying his inference in the paper is false. However that does not mean that some instance of the principle is not true. Indeed I think it is true in his case. So his counter-example(s) still work.

Do you think that it is false that:

"if Smith is e-justified in believing (1) and (2), then he is e-justified in believing (3)" (almost a direct quote, but I changed it a bit)

In the case you do, why do you do that?

----

I blogged about this here.

[Emil]

Originally Posted by ACB

I have been considering the Gettier problem further, and I would like to approach it from a slightly different angle. I have been arguing up to now that Smith is not justified in believing that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, on the grounds that justification is not transitive. However, I have a further objection to Gettier's argument.

Consider the underlined statement above. It could mean (inter alia) either of the following things:

1. The man who will get the job, Jones, has ten coins in his pocket.

2. The man who will get the job, Smith, has ten coins in his pocket.

The first is justified but not true; the second is true but not justified. So there is no single belief that is both justified and true; hence the JTB condition is not met. The underlined statement above is really a catch-all formula for (at least) two different beliefs. Smith is not justified in believing the underlined statement simpliciter, as its scope is too wide. He is only justified in believing (1) above - and (1) is false.

But it is neither of your two propositions is that which Smith believes in the example. He merely believes:

The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

If you formalize the three propositions you can see that no two of them are identical:

0. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Hm

1. The man who will get the job, Jones, has ten coins in his pocket.
Hm∧Jm

2. The man who will get the job, Smith, has ten coins in his pocket.
Hm∧Sm

The first proposition contains no information about whether the man ("m") is Jones ("Jx") or is Smith ("Sx"). While you are right that (1) is e-justified for Smith and false, and (2) is true but not e-justified for Smith.

And Smith is e-justified in believing (0). I don't understand why you think that he is not. Recall that Gettier stipulated:

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:

1. Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:

1. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.

It seems clear to me that Smith is e-justified in believing (0).