Is knowing a mental event?

[fast]

Originally Posted by Emil

Also, in case you don't know. JTB is not the correct analysis of knowledge. See Gettier's famous essay.

The JTB Analysis of Knowledge is the best analysis of knowledge that I know of, and it often remains reliable despite it's occasional (seldom) failing, for it informs us of the necessary conditions of knowledge, and though it's not always sufficient, it often is.

[Emil]

Originally Posted by fast

The JTB Analysis of Knowledge is the best analysis of knowledge that I know of, and it often remains reliable despite it's occasional (seldom) failing, for it informs us of the necessary conditions of knowledge, and though it's not always sufficient, it often is.

Right. JTB+ is win.

[fast]

Originally Posted by Emil

Right. JTB+ is win.

But there is no JTB+ Analysis of Knowledge.

The + simply tells us that knowledge either has at least a fourth necessary condition or that the justification condition needs to be tweaked.

Conveying to us that the JTB Analysis of Knowledge fails to give us the jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge isn’t an analysis of knowledge in itself, so the JTB Analysis of Knowledge is still the best analysis of knowledge that we have.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by fast

But there is no JTB+ Analysis of Knowledge.

The + simply tells us that knowledge either has at least a fourth necessary condition or that the justification condition needs to be tweaked.

Conveying to us that the JTB Analysis of Knowledge fails to give us the jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge isn’t an analysis of knowledge in itself, so the JTB Analysis of Knowledge is still the best analysis of knowledge that we have.

It is what I would call an "analysis sketch" since it would need to be filled in. But it is possible that JTB are sufficient conditions under some unknown analysis of J. I doubt it, though. There have been too many unsuccessful attempts at it. (Including one by me).

[Emil]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

It is what I would call an "analysis sketch" since it would need to be filled in. But it is possible that JTB are sufficient conditions under some unknown analysis of J. I doubt it, though. There have been too many unsuccessful attempts at it. (Including one by me).

How did yours go? I recall that you said that you defended the "was not inferred from a falsity" at sometime.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Emil

How did yours go? I recall that you said that you defended the "was not inferred from a falsity" at sometime.

That's substantially it. But, there are counterexamples to that, too.

[Emil]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

That's substantially it. But, there are counterexamples to that, too.

Yes, non-inferential justification. That's not inferred from a falsehood. Not inferred at all. Perhaps not just a single additional necessary condition is needed but multiple. In that case this condition for inferential justification and some other condition for non-inferential justification.

Did you invent that one or did you just defend it?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Emil

Yes, non-inferential justification. That's not inferred from a falsehood. Not inferred at all. Perhaps not just a single additional necessary condition is needed but multiple. In that case this condition for inferential justification and some other condition for non-inferential justification.

Did you invent that one or did you just defend it?

I thought I invented it, but lots of others had the same idea, of course. It's not very hard to come up with.

[ACB]

Here are my thoughts on the Gettier essay.

If (1) the man who will get the job is Jones, and
(2) Jones has ten coins in his pocket,
then
(3) the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

But does it logically follow that if Smith is justified in believing (1) and (2), then he is justified in believing (3)? Consider the following case:

Being familiar with the alphabet, I am justified in believing that the letter A is followed by B, B by C, C by D etc, up to "T is followed by U". Now, if all these relationships between adjacent letters are correct, it necessarily follows that U comes 20 letters after A. But if I am justified in believing that A is followed by B, B by C etc, it does not follow that I am justified in believing purely on that basis (without keeping a count of the letters) that U comes 20 letters after A. So justification is not transitive.

If this is correct, then Gettier's argument fails, because Smith's belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is not justified.

[Emil]

Originally Posted by ACB

Here are my thoughts on the Gettier essay.

If (1) the man who will get the job is Jones, and
(2) Jones has ten coins in his pocket,
then
(3) the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

But does it logically follow that if Smith is justified in believing (1) and (2), then he is justified in believing (3)? Consider the following case:

Being familiar with the alphabet, I am justified in believing that the letter A is followed by B, B by C, C by D etc, up to "T is followed by U". Now, if all these relationships between adjacent letters are correct, it necessarily follows that U comes 20 letters after A. But if I am justified in believing that A is followed by B, B by C etc, it does not follow that I am justified in believing purely on that basis (without keeping a count of the letters) that U comes 20 letters after A. So justification is not transitive.

If this is correct, then Gettier's argument fails, because Smith's belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is not justified.

I'm pretty sure this analogy is confused but I can't quite put my finger on it. How about:

You talk of "following" as if it is some kind of property that letters in the alphabet can have. But it isn't. That something follows from something else is just a way of talking about logical implication. Logical implication is a truth-functional concept and it does not make sense with mere letters "following" (in a complete non-related sense) each other. Of course in the everyday sense of "following" letters can follow each other. But that's not the kind of following that Gettier is talking about.

You say that "justification is not transitive". That's right. But Gettier does not claim in the paper that it is. I imagine that you think that he does because you think that he argues that: If (2) follows from (1) and (3) follows from (2), then (3) follows from (1). (This interpretation makes sense with your alphabet analogy.) But he doesn't.

Basically, the premise that you ought to question in the Gettier essay is this:

For all persons, a person is justified in believing that P and justified in believing that Q, and P and Q logically implies S, logically implies that that person is justified in believing that S.

(∀x)(Jx(P)∧Jx(Q)∧((P∧Q)⇒S))⇒Jx(S)

("Jx(P)" means x is justified in believing that P.)

I'm not terribly read on the matter but I'm pretty sure this principle has a name. Kennethamy properly knows.
Does it not seem true to you? It definitely seems true to me.