Is knowing a mental event?

[BrightNoon]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

When I claim to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, am I saying that something that is going on in my mind, or that something is going on in Ecuador? Just what am I saying?

If you say 'Quito is the capital of Ecuador,' while it might be understood that you mean to express something other than the contents of your own mind, all that you can possibly be referring to, all that those words can possibly be symbolic of, are concepts which you are at that moment experiencing. You are not experiencing Quito being the capital of Ecuador, even if you are in Quito, the capital of Ecuador. You are only expierencing your own idea of that.

In the same way, if I say 'the shirt is red,' I am not actually referring to the the shirt if by 'the shirt' we mean something other than the experience in my mind which we have labelled 'shirt.' I cannot be referring to the 'real shirt' beneath that experience, because, as it is beneath experience and not part of experience, I cannot be aware of it - and I cannot refer to something of which I am not aware.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by BrightNoon

If you say 'Quito is the capital of Ecuador,' while it might be understood that you mean to express something other than the contents of your own mind, all that you can possibly be referring to, all that those words can possibly be symbolic of, are concepts which you are at that moment experiencing. You are not experiencing Quito being the capital of Ecuador, even if you are in Quito, the capital of Ecuador. You are only expierencing your own idea of that.

In the same way, if I say 'the shirt is red,' I am not actually referring to the the shirt if by 'the shirt' we mean something other than the experience in my mind which we have labelled 'shirt.' I cannot be referring to the 'real shirt' beneath that experience, because, as it is beneath experience and not part of experience, I cannot be aware of it - and I cannot refer to something of which I am not aware.

But I am aware that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. I know it inferentially, but inferential knowledge is still knowledge. If I lived in Quito I would directly know that Quito was the capital of Ecuador. What makes you think I am trapped inside my own mind? My subjective experience is, of course, mental, but what my subjective experience is about need not be mental. If I kick a tree, it is a tree I kick. It is not a kick that I kick. Your's is a variant on what has been called, "the worst argument in the world".

http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.pdf

[BrightNoon]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

But I am aware that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. I know it inferentially, but inferential knowledge is still knowledge. If I lived in Quito I would directly know that Quito was the capital of Ecuador. What makes you think I am trapped inside my own mind? My subjective experience is, of course, mental, but what my subjective experience is about need not be mental. If I kick a tree, it is a tree I kick. It is not a kick that I kick. Your's is a variant on what has been called, "the worst argument in the world".

'Common sense' statements like 'If I kick a tree, it is a tree I kick' get us nowhere. The question is about the nature of this tree. What do you mean when you say 'tree?' If you mean the the same thing by 'tree' in the phrase 'if I kick a tree' as in the phrase 'it is a tree I kick,' then clearly that statement is logically true, but it doesn't say anything. What is meant by 'tree?'

Try to define 'tree' without reference to anything from within your own subjective experience: i.e. without reference to color, shape, texture, smell, etc. If you cannot define 'tree' without using to those sort of terms, which refer to phenomena within experience, then guess what? The tree doesn't exist except in your subjective experience.

If 'tree' only exists as something within your subjective experience, then by saying, 'I kicked the tree,' you are not referring to anything outside of your subjective experience. In the same way, if 'Quito' and 'Ecuador' are defined only in terms of things within experience, and therefore exist only in your subjective experience, then you are not referring to anything outside of your experience when stating that 'Quito is the capital of Ecuador.'

http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.pdf

This article misunderstands Berkeley's argument. The argument is that, if there exist things external to the mind, i.e. things which exist and have some nature independently of our awareness of them, then by definition it is not possible to be aware of them! Simple logic. Absolutely true. What we believe to be external things (a tree e.g.) are not external things, which is irrefutably demonstatred by the fact that we are aware of those things! Again, simple, clear logic, following from the premises. The author of this article is a fool in my opinion, what I like to call a common-senser.

[ACB]

Originally Posted by BrightNoon

The argument is that, if there exist things external to the mind, i.e. things which exist and have some nature independently of our awareness of them, then by definition it is not possible to be aware of them!

Don't you mean "my" rather than "our" awareness of them? If you push idealism to its logical conclusion, and dispense with Berkeley's idea of God, you end up with solipsism.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by BrightNoon

'Common sense' statements like 'If I kick a tree, it is a tree I kick' get us nowhere. The question is about the nature of this tree. What do you mean when you say 'tree?' If you mean the the same thing by 'tree' in the phrase 'if I kick a tree' as in the phrase 'it is a tree I kick,' then clearly that statement is logically true, but it doesn't say anything. What is meant by 'tree?'

Try to define 'tree' without reference to anything from within your own subjective experience: i.e. without reference to color, shape, texture, smell, etc. If you cannot define 'tree' without using to those sort of terms, which refer to phenomena within experience, then guess what? The tree doesn't exist except in your subjective experience.

If 'tree' only exists as something within your subjective experience, then by saying, 'I kicked the tree,' you are not referring to anything outside of your subjective experience. In the same way, if 'Quito' and 'Ecuador' are defined only in terms of things within experience, and therefore exist only in your subjective experience, then you are not referring to anything outside of your experience when stating that 'Quito is the capital of Ecuador.'



This article misunderstands Berkeley's argument. The argument is that, if there exist things external to the mind, i.e. things which exist and have some nature independently of our awareness of them, then by definition it is not possible to be aware of them! Simple logic. Absolutely true. What we believe to be external things (a tree e.g.) are not external things, which is irrefutably demonstatred by the fact that we are aware of those things! Again, simple, clear logic, following from the premises. The author of this article is a fool in my opinion, what I like to call a common-senser.

We are not directly aware of trees, but so what? We are indirectly aware of trees, because we know there are trees because we have subjective experiences of trees. And, as I already have pointed out, the very best explanation of why we have subjective experiences of trees is that there are trees. I have already asked you whether you have as good an explanation of our subjective experiences of trees than that we observe trees? Why do you think we have experiences of trees?

[Emil]

Oh noes. Not this discussion again...

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Emil

Oh noes. Not this discussion again...

We go wherever the argument leads. Lux et veritas

[Emil]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

We go wherever the argument leads. Lux et veritas

Ok. Let's argue backwards to the interesting part again...

Is knowing a mental event. No. I agree with you. Now what? Is being justified a mental event? I think yes, but I'm more unsure. Externalists think that it is not.

[Zetherin]

Originally Posted by Emil

Ok. Let's argue backwards to the interesting part again...

Is knowing a mental event. No. I agree with you. Now what? Is being justified a mental event? I think yes, but I'm more unsure. Externalists think that it is not.

Why is knowing not a mental event? You're saying that knowing is independent of the mind? That is, you can know without the mind? I don't think that's true. Are you implying we have some kind of "soul" that can be consciously aware independent of all that we consider mental? I hope you're not implying this, as it's a bit too metaphysical for my tastes.

[Emil]

Originally Posted by Zetherin

Why is knowing not a mental event? You're saying that knowing is independent of the mind? That is, you can know without the mind? I don't think that's true. Are you implying we have some kind of "soul" that can be consciously aware independent of all that we consider mental? I hope you're not implying this, as it's a bit too metaphysical for my tastes.

Perhaps you should just read the thread. It will then be clear to you what is meant by the phrase.

And no, I do not believe in souls etc.