Is knowing a mental event?

[Emil]

Originally Posted by ACB

I presume that "they" means the "people who believe that knowledge implies certainty" that you mention in your post #107.

"Knowledge implies certainty" is an anti-realist position, is it not? To a realist, knowledge depends on non-mental facts,

You are right about who I meant by "they".

Not all knowledge though. Knowledge of non-mental facts depend on non-mental facts. Obviously. Likewise, knowledge of mental facts depends on mental facts.

Originally Posted by ACB

...whereas certainty is an entirely mental quality. So a realist could not believe that knowledge implies certainty, as this would be confusing two different types of thing.

Certainty is an entirely mental quality? I don't know. What do you mean by certainty? Epistemic certainty? Psychological certainty? (See earlier link about two different kinds of certainty.) I think that psychological certain is an entirely mental fact (or quality). I think that epistemic certainty is not an entirely mental fact.

Originally Posted by ACB

Or by "knowledge implies certainty" do you only mean knowledge of one's own mental states?

He means this:

KIC. For all x and for all p, if Kx(p), then Cp.

Where x are agents, p are propositions, Kx(p) means x knows that p and Cp means that p is epistemically certain. Lots of people believe that (KIC). They believe that if you know something, then you cannot be wrong. If that is interpreted to mean that what is believed cannot be false, then (KIC) is false. I don't know how else to interpret it.

[ACB]

Regarding the link in Emil's post #106, I think there is an ambiguity in the statement "It [the book] seems red to me". It could mean either "It seems red to my senses" or "Having considered all the evidence, including my memory of my eye problem, it seems to me that the book is red". In the former sense, the book really did seem red to Frank. In the latter sense, it did not (conclusively) seem red to him, and he was not claiming that it did; he was reserving judgement.

Did Frank "believe" that the book was red? I would say he had a tentative belief that it was. Or, to put it another way, a (firm) belief that it probably was. If he claimed to "believe" it in this sense, then his claim was correct. If, however, he claimed to believe unequivocally that the book was red, then he was not reporting his belief correctly. Either way, he was not mistaken in his own mind about his belief; he was directly and infallibly aware of it.

---------- Post added 11-15-2009 at 09:12 PM ----------

Originally Posted by Emil

He means this:

KIC. For all x and for all p, if Kx(p), then Cp.

Where x are agents, p are propositions, Kx(p) means x knows that p and Cp means that p is epistemically certain. Lots of people believe that (KIC). They believe that if you know something, then you cannot be wrong. If that is interpreted to mean that what is believed cannot be false, then (KIC) is false. I don't know how else to interpret it.

If you know something, then by definition what you know is true. But you can never tell whether you know it.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by ACB

I presume that "they" means the "people who believe that knowledge implies certainty" that you mention in your post #107.

"Knowledge implies certainty" is an anti-realist position, is it not? To a realist, knowledge depends on non-mental facts, whereas certainty is an entirely mental quality. So a realist could not believe that knowledge implies certainty, as this would be confusing two different types of thing.

Or by "knowledge implies certainty" do you only mean knowledge of one's own mental states?

By, "certainty", I mean infallibility, or the impossibility of error. That is not especially something mental, so far as I can see. However, it is true, that some have believed that we are infallible about our own mental states, and maybe, only about our own mental states.

[Emil]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

By, "certainty", I mean infallibility, or the impossibility of error. That is not especially something mental, so far as I can see. However, it is true, that some have believed that we are infallible about our own mental states, and maybe, only about our own mental states.

Getting close to the roots of solipsism (IEP) now.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Emil

Getting close to the roots of solipsism (IEP) now.

Maybe epistemological solipsism, but not metaphysical solipsism.

[Emil]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Maybe epistemological solipsism, but not metaphysical solipsism.

Notice the word "roots" in my post. I.e. the causes/reason for believing in metaphysical solipsism, that is, that only oneself exists. Of course metaphysical solipsism is (often, always?) motivated by epistemic solipsism, that is, that only can only have knowledge of oneself.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Emil

Notice the word "roots" in my post. I.e. the causes/reason for believing in metaphysical solipsism, that is, that only oneself exists. Of course metaphysical solipsism is (often, always?) motivated by epistemic solipsism, that is, that only can only have knowledge of oneself.

It doesn't follow from epistemic solipsism. Another case of the epistemic fallacy. A favorite of both Rationalism and Idealism. (Motivation and "roots" don't count. Those are historical/ psychological remarks).

[Emil]

Originally Posted by kennethamy

It doesn't follow from epistemic solipsism. Another case of the epistemic fallacy. A favorite of both Rationalism and Idealism. (Motivation and "roots" don't count. Those are historical/ psychological remarks).

I agree that it isn't logically implied. Neither is it materially implied.

I don't know the name "epistemic fallacy". Can you explain it please? I googled it and found no good results.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by ACB

If you know something, then by definition what you know is true. But you can never tell whether you know it.

Not with absolute certainty. But is infallibility the requirement? If we really could not tell (in any ordinary sense) that we knew it, we probably would not claim that we knew. If we are really worried about our justification, then we can go over it again, or seek more evidence. But you have, I think, something much different in mind. Not that we should be worried about our justification. Your worry is that we have no "direct access" to the truth so we can by-pass evidence. If only we did not have to use our senses at all! In other words, "angelic knowledge". But that's "all" we have, and we are stuck with it. But that lament is not what is ordinarily meant by saying "we cannot tell whether we know". That "metaphysical lament" is the lament of the human condition. Epistemic alienation. And that is something that has no remedy. Remember what happened to Adam and Eve!

[Emil]

Originally Posted by ACB

Regarding the link in Emil's post #106, I think there is an ambiguity in the statement "It [the book] seems red to me". It could mean either "It seems red to my senses" or "Having considered all the evidence, including my memory of my eye problem, it seems to me that the book is red". In the former sense, the book really did seem red to Frank. In the latter sense, it did not (conclusively) seem red to him, and he was not claiming that it did; he was reserving judgement.

Did Frank "believe" that the book was red? I would say he had a tentative belief that it was. Or, to put it another way, a (firm) belief that it probably was. If he claimed to "believe" it in this sense, then his claim was correct. If, however, he claimed to believe unequivocally that the book was red, then he was not reporting his belief correctly. Either way, he was not mistaken in his own mind about his belief; he was directly and infallibly aware of it.

Infallibly aware of it? I'm not too sure about that.

But yes, you are right about the ambiguity of sentences with the phrase "it seems to me (that)" and the verb "to seem" in general.

Did you like the story? I love it.

---------- Post added 11-15-2009 at 09:12 PM ----------

Originally Posted by ACB

If you know something, then by definition what you know is true. But you can never tell whether you know it.

Yes, everything you know is true. But it is not impossible for something you know to be false. (Unless it is a necessary truth.)

You can't know whether you know? Why not? I think that I can tell whether or not I know that Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark. Do you really think that I cannot tell whether I know that or not? It seems to be that I have good reason to believe that Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark. It is true that it is, and I believe it is. Simplifying knowledge to JTB it seems to me that I do indeed know it.

You may want to read this. It's about knowledge and the first person perspective. There are some puzzling things with these two together. Maybe its them that are confusing you. (Or me. )