Scientific Arrogance

[Resha Caner]

I'm not a fan of Bertrand Russell, but in my recent read through "Religion and Science" I came across the following intriguing comment.

"The scientific temper of mind is cautious, tentative, and piecemeal; it does not imagine that it knows the whole truth, or that even its best knowledge is wholly true.... But out of theoretical science a scientific technique has developed, and the scientific technique has none of the tentativeness of the theory. Physics has ... acquire[d] a quite different temper from that of the men of science: a temper full of a sense of limitless power, of arrogant certainty, and of pleasure in manipulation even of human material."

The book was written in the mid 1930's, and he is obviously concerned about the growth of facism in Europe, but I wonder if his concern still applies today.

What do you think?

[Aedes]

I am a fan of Bertrand Russell, though I haven't read this quote before.

It is a very prescient quote for the 1930s. It reminds me of the greatest cynic of all in the 1930s, namely Freud. You can sense throughout all threads of modernism a skepticism about science, progress, and reason.

I think the concern that informed modernism was not so much the rise of fascism as the repercussions of WWI (though in ?1936 the Spanish Civil War turned the attention of the world to Fascism). WWI destroyed Russell's generation, and Britain was absolutely rocked by it. The gas attacks, the Somme, the trenches, the shell shock, etc, were a tremendous indictment of modernity and "progress". I read somewhere that in Britain and France (and to a lesser degree the US) the concept patriotism has never lost a bit of irony since the end of WWI.

That aside, his concern absolutely pertains today. With greater populations the repercussions of bad decisions affects greater numbers of people. Our ability to discover far outpaces our ability to understand, and our capabilities are always beset by shortsighted planning and economic / political / diplomatic expediency.

But I'm not sure science has exactly the same hubris today that it had in 1930. The attitude about human brilliance that began with Newton and the Enlightenment was utterly shattered by late 19th and early 20th century events -- smaller things like the Panama Canal debacle (under the French) and the Titanic, but then enormous things like WWI, the Depression, the Holocaust, and finally the Cold War and the prospect of nuclear annihilation. These were REALLY humbling and I think the world thinks of science as far more dangerous and more of a double-edged sword than was the case a century ago.

[Arjen]

A quick note: Nationalism has a very strange aftertaste in Europe because it is the prime motivator for civilians to follow their governments into war. Such blind obedience is ludicrous (to me).

Ontopic:
I think Russell makes a very good point. Aedes and I had a similar discussion not too long ago. I do not think Aedes was really able to let go of the "authority" science has in his eyes (but perhaps that is only true from my point of view). If scientists view things in quite such a way as Russell points out is a question I wish to leave for a moment in favor of the question of the scientific method is capable of being a tool for uncovering any truth at all.

1. Use your experience: Consider the problem and try to make sense of it. Look for previous explanations. If this is a new problem to you, then move to step 2. 2. Form a conjecture: When nothing else is yet known, try to state an explanation, to someone else, or to your notebook. 3. Deduce a prediction from that explanation: If you assume 2 is true, what consequences follow? 4. Test : Look for the opposite of each consequence in order to disprove 2. It is a logical error to seek 3 directly as proof of 2. This error is called affirming the consequent.
Note that this method can never absolutely verify (prove the truth of) 2. It can only falsify 2.[7] (This is what Einstein meant when he said "No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong.

The thing of it is that, as you can see, the scientific method does not take into account that there are things science cannot explain. It simply suggests that one can be proven wrong at a later point (and that the process should repeat itself at that point). I still persist in the argument that some things are outside the grasp of science, as in my eyes is proven by the Gödel Theorems.

[Aedes]

Originally Posted by Arjen

Aedes and I had a similar discussion not too long ago. I do not think Aedes was really able to let go of the "authority" science has in his eyes (but perhaps that is only true from my point of view).

It is only true from your point of view, I'm afraid. I criticize science so frequently that I wonder how it is you even came to this point of view. I'm much more of a Kuhn fan than a Popper fan, so that should show you what my feelings are about the big picture of scientific epistemology.

My point when discussing this with you in the past was that to level critiques at science requires a certain amount of understanding of what science actually does, how scientists communicate scientific findings, how they disclose limitations of their research, etc -- and without that kind of understanding, a critique that comes from outside is all but meaningless.

Anyway, to be completely clear on this subject, I only think of science as authoritative about scientific subjects. I don't think of philosophers, theologians, politicians, etc as authoritative about scientific subjects. There are gray areas when it comes to practical matters, like the ethical or economic or political implications.

If scientists view things in quite such a way as Russell points out is a question I wish to leave for a moment in favor of the question of the scientific method is capable of being a tool for uncovering any truth at all.

If you're talking about absolute truth, there is a fairly easy three part answer for you:

1) Science has no access to absolute truth, so no, it cannot
2) Nothing else has access to absolute truth either
3) Who cares about absolute truth anyway?

If you're talking about the conventional truth that we share based on confidence, then that's what science is for. It establishes confidence in the things we "know". But knowledge is not absolute. If it were, we wouldn't ever need to philosophize.

The thing of it is that, as you can see, the scientific method does not take into account that there are things science cannot explain.

Of course not, because the scientific method does not philosophize about what is science and what is not. All it does is propose a method of study that limits bias. You can use the scientific method to investigate the absolute truth of God's existence -- but no methodology is going to allow you to establish it or not, so who cares?

I still persist in the argument that some things are outside the grasp of science...

But you have yet to differentiate what is by its nature inaccessible to science, as opposed to what is for technical reasons inaccessible to science. Or if you can differentiate it you haven't articulated it yet.

...as in my eyes is proven by the Gödel Theorems.

Which is exactly my point. Godel's theorems are inaccessible to science because they are not empirical. They are logical and syntactical, but they are not based in any observible evidence. So it takes the study of logic and syntax to make heads or tails of Godel -- it doesn't take a microscope or nuclear magnetic resonance.

On the other hand, the inability of science to describe the Big Bang itself is technical. Just as our inability to sequence the DNA of the world's earliest vertebrate is technical -- i.e. the evidence is either no longer in existence, we don't yet know where to look, or we don't have the tools to look. But those are within the capabilities of the scientific method, but for technical reasons a scientific study of this subject will fail.

Or in another example, the nature of beauty is not accessible to science a priori. But a cure for cancer IS, even if for technical reasons one is never discovered.

[Arjen]

Aedes,

Originally Posted by Aedes

It is only true from your point of view, I'm afraid. I criticize science so frequently that I wonder how it is you even came to this point of view. I'm much more of a Kuhn fan than a Popper fan, so that should show you what my feelings are about the big picture of scientific epistemology.

I think what I like most about Kuhn is that he said about an everlasting controversial discussion with Popper that the points that came up becuase of the discussion were very valiable. In that sense he respected his "adversary" because Popper drove him to new insights (as well as he Popper).

My point when discussing this with you in the past was that to level critiques at science requires a certain amount of understanding of what science actually does, how scientists communicate scientific findings, how they disclose limitations of their research, etc -- and without that kind of understanding, a critique that comes from outside is all but meaningless.

I understood that then as well. I said so on several occasions. I appreciate that when working within certain boundaries some things simply are "bent" by such boundaries. To me that is the very reason to be carefull (and to state this point again and again). A point in favor of such a tactic (the scientific one I mean) is that nothing can be said with axioms that define boundaries. Without predications one cannot predicate (thought-objects that is..).

Anyway, to be completely clear on this subject, I only think of science as authoritative about scientific subjects. I don't think of philosophers, theologians, politicians, etc as authoritative about scientific subjects. There are gray areas when it comes to practical matters, like the ethical or economic or political implications.

Which is exactly my point. Science works only in iets own set of axioms; its own boundaries which leads to observations, thoughtobjects and conclusions...within the boundaries of the axioms. That makes for the situation that nothing can be said with certainty in such a matter; except within the boundaries of the axioms.

If you're talking about absolute truth, there is a fairly easy three part answer for you:

Guilty as charged..

1) Science has no access to absolute truth, so no, it cannot
2) Nothing else has access to absolute truth either
3) Who cares about absolute truth anyway?

I think we are in agreement.

If you're talking about the conventional truth that we share based on confidence, then that's what science is for. It establishes confidence in the things we "know". But knowledge is not absolute. If it were, we wouldn't ever need to philosophize.

Knowledge is always subjective; the reality of the term contradicts the meaning of the term...which is quite unfortunate...

Of course not, because the scientific method does not philosophize about what is science and what is not. All it does is propose a method of study that limits bias. You can use the scientific method to investigate the absolute truth of God's existence -- but no methodology is going to allow you to establish it or not, so who cares?

It limits bias within the boundaries of the axioms. Looking at it without bias one sees that the axioms creates bias. So every scientist is biased on account of being a scientist..

But you have yet to differentiate what is by its nature inaccessible to science, as opposed to what is for technical reasons inaccessible to science. Or if you can differentiate it you haven't articulated it yet.

By nature the things-in-themselves are not accessible to science because science works within axioms. The technical reason for this is empiricism. Empiricism is the axiom set which creates the virtual boundry around the research: what is seen is true/needs to be researched. In a rational view the boundaries are very well realised because of the realisation that what one thinks to percieve, thinks about and articulates is in reality a thought object. There is a great topic on thought-objects btw. It focusses on Frege. It can be found here.

Which is exactly my point. Godel's theorems are inaccessible to science because they are not empirical. They are logical and syntactical, but they are not based in any observible evidence. So it takes the study of logic and syntax to make heads or tails of Godel -- it doesn't take a microscope or nuclear magnetic resonance.

Allow me to quote Plato:

For everything that exists there are three instruments by which the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted; fourth, there is the knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself which is known and truly exists. The first is the name, the, second the definition, the third. the image, and the fourth the knowledge. If you wish to learn what I mean, take these in the case of one instance, and so understand them in the case of all.

[...]

But in subjects where we try to compel a man to give a clear answer about the fifth, any one of those who are capable of overthrowing an antagonist gets the better of us, and makes the man, who gives an exposition in speech or writing or in replies to questions, appear to most of his hearers to know nothing of the things on which he is attempting to write or speak; for they are sometimes not aware that it is not the mind of the writer or speaker which is proved to be at fault, but the defective nature of each of the four instruments. The process however of dealing with all of these, as the mind moves up and down to each in turn, does after much effort give birth in a well-constituted mind to knowledge of that which is well constituted. But if a man is ill-constituted by nature (as the state of the soul is naturally in the majority both in its capacity for learning and in what is called moral character)-or it may have become so by deterioration-not even Lynceus could endow such men with the power of sight.

~Plato, The Seventh Letter



Or: It does not take logic to undersand what Gödel is saying, Gödel merely is saying it in logic.

On the other hand, the inability of science to describe the Big Bang itself is technical. Just as our inability to sequence the DNA of the world's earliest vertebrate is technical -- i.e. the evidence is either no longer in existence, we don't yet know where to look, or we don't have the tools to look. But those are within the capabilities of the scientific method, but for technical reasons a scientific study of this subject will fail.

No, this is not "technical", it is because of the axioms. One can describe the taking place of the "bang" (or is it a snap of the fingers?), but cannot find a cause for it becuase the cause (or start of the process) does not exist in an empirical manner. The process description can therefore not be completed. This is not factual, but merely due to the axioms. There are several things which are implicitly known, but science cannot concur because of its technical limitations.

Or in another example, the nature of beauty is not accessible to science a priori. But a cure for cancer IS, even if for technical reasons one is never discovered.

You are now going into the wrong direction. You are misled by the grammer of our language (as Wittgenstein would say) I think. I can several things about this which would only move this discussion into a direction where we do not want it to go. For now let it be said that you are making the difference between potentiality and actuality. This is a rational difference. Are you changing your mind on the standing you are taking in this sort of discussions?

P.s. I promised a short writing on these matters. I have finished writing that (yesterday), but I am re-reading it for spelling/grammatical errors, as well as for the most stupid thought-errors. I'll post it for your scrutinisation probably next weekend.

p.p.s. The point I am making is that what you call technical boundaries are in fact actual boundaries. Empiricism simply denies these boundaries. I would appreciate a reply on that argument. In this sense you are contradicting (and even refuting!) your own position in this; namely that the exceptions are technical and not real.

[Resha Caner]

It looks like I have something new to read. I hadn't heard of Kuhn. As you can probably tell, though not new to the practice of science, I'm relatively new to the philosophical side of it.

So, this may not add anything new to the conversation, but I'll say it anyway. I found it curious, that in the very same book as the above quote, and after admitting science will not discover absolute truth, Russell says:

"Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know."

This is not the same arrogance he referred to in the first quote, but it certainly is arrogance. In essence he says science is the ONLY way to attain knowledge, and does just what the religious are accused of doing when they say they have the only way.

If some things are outside of science, then science cannot know those things, and hence it cannot know what knowledge can or cannot be obtained by other means. To then dismiss them as unimportant (which he does in other parts of the book) is arrogance. He is, in a sense, saying: if certain knowledge does not meet me on the terms I set, if it does not conform to my standards, then it is not important.

If you could know something, why give up that opportunity merely because it is not discovered through science?

[Aedes]

Originally Posted by Arjen

By nature the things-in-themselves are not accessible to science because science works within axioms. The technical reason for this is empiricism. Empiricism is the axiom set which creates the virtual boundry around the research: what is seen is true/needs to be researched.

But what you're doing here is creating (what I regard as) a false dichotomy between that which is empirically observed and that which is not. The thing is that EVERYTHING we know about the world is garnered from sense data and communication. Even knowing where our limbs are in space is from proprioceptive sense data. Try to eliminate ALL sense data to figure out what is known in its absense. To understand what we know in the absence of empirical experience you would need to envision someone born without vision, hearing, olfaction, taste, discriminative touch, pain sensation, temperature sensation, vibratory sensation, balance, proprioception, vestibular sensation, and visceral sensation. That would be someone with pure unempirical knowledge.

So even Descartes had it slightly wrong when he surmised that he knew he was a thinking being. In the end, deprived of all, you don't get to I think, therefore I am. In the end, all that's left without senses, is I. And you can't get anywhere from I alone. That I is the same I experienced by a mouse or a hummingbird. It's the I of volition, and it's way beneath the rational self.

Beyond that first I EVERYTHING ELSE comes from experience of the world, including that which we learn from others. Science is merely a systemization of this experience, i.e. garnering sense data in a way that it can be most believable when presented to others -- as well as the logic that allows one to place that sense data in the context of our greater understanding. So while science may contain axioms, science is no different than normal life except in its deliberate methodology. It's not an axiom, it's not a worldview. And thus I cannot agree with you that science is a type of axiom itself, nor can I agree with your statements that follow from this premise.

As for things "in themselves", this is a perfectly fine metaphysical concept that is as useful as absolute truth. We can talk about it but we can never know it -- so who cares? When we discuss "things in themselves" we are merely abstracting from things we know through experience. If there is such a thing as an actual "thing in itself", we have no access to it by any means.

One can describe the taking place of the "bang" (or is it a snap of the fingers?), but cannot find a cause for it becuase the cause (or start of the process) does not exist in an empirical manner.

Do you know this for sure? Maybe something preceeded the Bang. We are technically unable to know for sure, just as we are technically unable to study the first multicellular organisms ever on earth. But whether the Big Bang was the "ultimate cause" (in the Aristotelian sense) is purely hypothetical -- we cannot say for sure. And at least in theory the possibility exists that we could study the entirety of the Big Bang if it's not the actual origin of existence.

Of course you'll respond then that we cannot study then the ACTUAL origin of existence. Fine. Science cannot answer the ultimate question of origin. But again, I ask whether that's actually important -- whether that knowledge is needed for anything?

I can several things about this which would only move this discussion into a direction where we do not want it to go. For now let it be said that you are making the difference between potentiality and actuality. This is a rational difference. Are you changing your mind on the standing you are taking in this sort of discussions?

Well, let's leave it that I don't have too much interest in artificial metaphysical constructs that don't really help us understand anything in the end other than our ability to verbally formalize abstractions.

p.p.s. The point I am making is that what you call technical boundaries are in fact actual boundaries. Empiricism simply denies these boundaries. I would appreciate a reply on that argument.

Yes, indeed a technical boundary is a type of actual boundary. So we were unable to discover cells until we developed microscopy. We were unable to study DNA until we developed electrophoresis. Etc. These were ACTUAL limitations until a technical obstacle was surmounted.

This is different than the ACTUAL limitation to empirically studying the existence of God; or the ACTUAL limitation to empirically studying whether existence is a unity or a plurality; or the ACTUAL limitations to studying whether there is such a thing as a soul. Why? Because even in concept there is no invention that will yield observations on this subject.

In this sense you are contradicting (and even refuting!) your own position in this; namely that the exceptions are technical and not real.

Well, sometimes we don't know if an exception is technical. But for enquiries into physical things, we can usually surmise that there IS a technical limitation. For instance we are technically unable to study the behavior of dinosaurs because they happen to be extinct and therefore cannot be observed. But our inability to empirically study the metaphysical basis of ethics is not technical.

[Aedes]

Originally Posted by Resha Caner

Russell says:

"Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know."

This is not the same arrogance he referred to in the first quote, but it certainly is arrogance. In essence he says science is the ONLY way to attain knowledge, and does just what the religious are accused of doing when they say they have the only way.

I stand with Russell that it's useless and uninteresting to talk about absolute truth, absolute knowledge, things in themselves, etc. We can take it for granted that these things exist, but we can never know it and therefore why bother with them?

So knowledge that is useful is a certain kind of human convention, i.e. we agree on what is true based on what science demonstrates is most likely to be true. Of course Kuhn would argue that science demonstrates this from within certain paradigms and with a paradigm shift this understanding can radically change.

If some things are outside of science, then science cannot know those things, and hence it cannot know what knowledge can or cannot be obtained by other means. To then dismiss them as unimportant (which he does in other parts of the book) is arrogance.

But remember his context. He was the master of "atomic logic", i.e. breaking down statements to their rudimentary information content. If a conversation boiled down to untestable concepts, it was devoid of meaning. He was not alone in this movement (Wittgenstein was even more extreme!). And I don't think that he's dismissing all colloquial discussion of things outside of science.

If you could know something, why give up that opportunity merely because it is not discovered through science?

Like what?

My memories, for instance, WERE discovered through my observation. That's the same process as science. But it's not generalizable unless it's shared observation. Keep down this line and you get to science.

[Resha Caner]

Originally Posted by Aedes

I stand with Russell that it's useless and uninteresting to talk about absolute truth, absolute knowledge, things in themselves, etc. We can take it for granted that these things exist, but we can never know it and therefore why bother with them?

Hmm. The thread begins to fracture into multiple long, protracted debates. I don't really want to try pursuing them all simultaneously. As for this one, I'll say there may be some circular reasoning in here, or it may be a matter of your assumptions. I don't know which, as we haven't exchanged enough information. At it's root I think we'll disagree on what can be known.

Originally Posted by Aedes

Like what?

Given we would disagree on what can be known, you wouldn't accept much of what I would say in answer to this. And, it wouldn't really belong in the "science" forum.

Originally Posted by Aedes

My memories, for instance, WERE discovered through my observation. That's the same process as science. But it's not generalizable unless it's shared observation. Keep down this line and you get to science.

So, I'll answer this first. I think you take some liberties here that Russell would disagree with. Namely, that memory has a scientific element. Let me quote once again:

"When a man of science tells us the result of an experiment, he also tells us how the experiment was performed; others can repeat it, and if the result is not confirmed it is not accepted as true; but many men might put themselves into the situation in which the mystic's vision occurred without obtaining the same revelation.... The mystic himself may be certain that he knows, and has no need of scientific tests; but those who are asked to accept his testimony will subject it to the same kind of scientific tests as those applied to men who say they have been to the North Pole."

I would take this to mean that since I cannot repeat your memory, it is not scientific evidence.

However, I would agree with you that your memory is "known" simply because I have no reason to call you a liar or insane (at least not yet). So, I guess we do have an example of what is known outside of science.

Again, to quote a big name that might help bolster my case, Tocqueville said:

"If a man were forced to prove for himself all the truths he employs each day, he would never reach an end; he would drain his energies in initial experiment without advancing at all. Since there is not time, because of the short span of our lives, nor the ability, because of the limitations of our minds, to act in that way, he is reduced to taking on trust a host of facts and opinions which he has neither the time nor the power to examine and verify by his own efforts but which have been discovered by abler minds than his"

[Resha Caner]

OK, actually Tocqueville wrote in French, and I don't know French, so I don't really know that he said the above quote, but I trust the translator.