Civil Disobedience

[Didymos Thomas]

The term was coined by HD Thoreau to describe public disobedience for laws considered unjust.

Uniform to acts of civil disobedience is some notion of a moral responsibility to disobey some law or directive. The objective is usually to communicate some message, namely that the law being disobeyed is unjust or wrong.

So, is civil disobedience acceptable? and if so, under what conditions?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Didymos Thomas

The term was coined by HD Thoreau to describe public disobedience for laws considered unjust.

Uniform to acts of civil disobedience is some notion of a moral responsibility to disobey some law or directive. The objective is usually to communicate some message, namely that the law being disobeyed is unjust or wrong.

So, is civil disobedience acceptable? and if so, under what conditions?

One of the seminal discussions of civil disobedience is in Plato's dialogue, Crito when Socrates, having already condemned to death is urged to escape by his visitors in Prison, and the discussion is whether one should obey the laws of the State (Athens) and why. Socrates argues that one has an over-riding obligation to obey the law, and so, goes to his death.

[Didymos Thomas]

Thinking on my "heroes", most are the sort who encourage civil disobedience. Thomas Jefferson advocated regular, violent uprisings against the government, every ten years was his suggestion. When I first read Crito, I remember saying out loud 'No, Socrates! Leave Athens' and I was certainly sad when he did not.

However, it has been many years since I last read Crito, so maybe you can help me. As I recall, Socrates says something to the effect of 'Athens is the best state, so if I cannot live here, I'd not want to live anywhere else'.

That potential argument aside, this is one interesting issue regarding civil disobedience: fidelity to law.

Again, there is the case of Thoreau. He refused to pay the poll tax, which funded the war with Mexico and the fugitive slave act, both pieces of legislation he opposed. For his protest, he spent some time in jail.

It seems we can openly, and intentionally disobey the law and still maintain our obligation to follow the law by willingly accepting the consequences of our civil disobedience - in the case of Thoreau, some jail time.

If we intentionally disobey the law in protest, and readily accept the legal consequences, have we met our obligations to follow the law and met our moral obligations to oppose that law (assuming, in this case, the law is unjust)?

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Didymos Thomas

Thinking on my "heroes", most are the sort who encourage civil disobedience. Thomas Jefferson advocated regular, violent uprisings against the government, every ten years was his suggestion. When I first read Crito, I remember saying out loud 'No, Socrates! Leave Athens' and I was certainly sad when he did not.

However, it has been many years since I last read Crito, so maybe you can help me. As I recall, Socrates says something to the effect of 'Athens is the best state, so if I cannot live here, I'd not want to live anywhere else'.

That potential argument aside, this is one interesting issue regarding civil disobedience: fidelity to law.

Again, there is the case of Thoreau. He refused to pay the poll tax, which funded the war with Mexico and the fugitive slave act, both pieces of legislation he opposed. For his protest, he spent some time in jail.

It seems we can openly, and intentionally disobey the law and still maintain our obligation to follow the law by willingly accepting the consequences of our civil disobedience - in the case of Thoreau, some jail time.

If we intentionally disobey the law in protest, and readily accept the legal consequences, have we met our obligations to follow the law and met our moral obligations to oppose that law (assuming, in this case, the law is unjust)?

That does not seem much of an argument by Socrates. And, I don't recall it. He had better arguments than that. For, example that not to obey the law would be tantamount to attempting to destroy the State because the foundation of the State is the law. And that to attempt to destroy the State would be an act of ingratitude to what protects, sustains, and educates you. In effect it would be an act of patricide.

The time Thoreau spent in jail was less than 24 hours.

Clearly you cannot have met your obligation to obey the law by disobeying the law, and substituting something else. I have not met my legal obligation not to murder by murdering and turning myself in. At best I have recognized my obligation, not met it.

[Didymos Thomas]

That does not seem much of an argument by Socrates. And, I don't recall it. He had better arguments than that. For, example that not to obey the law would be tantamount to attempting to destroy the State because the foundation of the State is the law. And that to attempt to destroy the State would be an act of ingratitude to what protects, sustains, and educates you. In effect it would be an act of patricide.

Again, I'm going on a very faint memory, so even if my recollection is remotely accurate, my paraphrase is certainly not. I'll have to give the text a look when a get the time.... and find my copy. The shift of moving is always frustrating - especially when trying to find that one particular book!

Clearly you cannot have met your obligation to obey the law by disobeying the law, and substituting something else. I have not met my legal obligation not to murder by murdering and turning myself in. At best I have recognized my obligation, not met it.

I'm not sure it's so clear, because I'm not sure the obligation is to obey the dictate of the law.

In the case of civil disobedeince, we assume that the law is considered by the agent to be unjust. Murder, of course, is unjust, so laws against murder are not unjust. Therefore, disobeying laws against murder does not seem to fit the criteria for civil disobedience.

Remember, this is very much an issue of reconciling two potentially opposed obligations - moral obligations, and obligations to the state. This is why Thoreau's example is compelling - he was opposed to the Fugitive Slave Act, certainly an unjust law. Should he have complied with the law, and supported the brutalization of slaves, or should he have opposed the law and thereby opposed the brutalization of slaves?

Recall that Socrates did not defend the law itself, but rather he argued that he should face his punishment in accordence with the law. He was sentenced to death, and right or wrong, he should accept that sentence in respect of the law.

In the case of Thoreau, he refused to obey a law he thought unjust (moral obligation), yet accepted his punishment in accordence with the law (obligation to the law). In the process, he did not protest that we have laws, but he protested those particular laws.

So, it seems, this is our question: what obligation do we have to obey the law, if any? And if we do have some obligation to the law, how far does it extend?

If we simply opposed the law, we would not obey the law, and we would avoid the established legal recourse.

However, if we oppose the law by disobeying the law, and then accept our punishment per the established legal recourse, we have stood up for our moral obligation (to disobey the unjust law) and stoop up for our obligation to the state, to respect the state that has invested so much in us by accepting her punishment for breaking the law.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Didymos Thomas

I'm not sure it's so clear, because I'm not sure the obligation is to obey the dictate of the law.

In the case of civil disobedeince, we assume that the law is considered by the agent to be unjust. Murder, of course, is unjust, so laws against murder are not unjust. Therefore, disobeying laws against murder does not seem to fit the criteria for civil disobedience.

Remember, this is very much an issue of reconciling two potentially opposed obligations - moral obligations, and obligations to the state. This is why Thoreau's example is compelling - he was opposed to the Fugitive Slave Act, certainly an unjust law. Should he have complied with the law, and supported the brutalization of slaves, or should he have opposed the law and thereby opposed the brutalization of slaves?

Recall that Socrates did not defend the law itself, but rather he argued that he should face his punishment in accordence with the law. He was sentenced to death, and right or wrong, he should accept that sentence in respect of the law.

In the case of Thoreau, he refused to obey a law he thought unjust (moral obligation), yet accepted his punishment in accordence with the law (obligation to the law). In the process, he did not protest that we have laws, but he protested those particular laws.

So, it seems, this is our question: what obligation do we have to obey the law, if any? And if we do have some obligation to the law, how far does it extend?

If we simply opposed the law, we would not obey the law, and we would avoid the established legal recourse.

However, if we oppose the law by disobeying the law, and then accept our punishment per the established legal recourse, we have stood up for our moral obligation (to disobey the unjust law) and stoop up for our obligation to the state, to respect the state that has invested so much in us by accepting her punishment for breaking the law.

I don't know what you mean by "the dictate of the law". But civil disobedience consist in disobeying a law which the disobedient believes is unjust. So the fact that murder is unjust really does not matter if a civil disobedient consider murder not unjust. For instance, the murder assassination of a tyrant.

A civil disobedient need not think all laws are unjust, but, as you say, a particular law. So why would that make the acceptance of punishment tantamount to obeying the law he disobeyed. I think you are confused here. It may be that the disobedient accepts punishment to show he respects the law as such. But that does not mean that he has not, in fact, disobeyed the particular law. He opposes the particular law, but he need not be opposed to the law in general. And he shows this by accepting punishment. I that is what you mean, then I agree with you. However. it may well be that there would be good reasons for a disobedient to evade punishment, for example, because he think that he needs to carry on his opposition to the law he has disobeyed. A case of this was Emile Zola who, after he disobeyed the law defending Drefus, he excaped to England where he carried on his defense. Or, it may be that in a corrupt country, a disobedient would consider that he had no moral obligation to obey the laws of that country. For example, Nazi Germany, or Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

[Didymos Thomas]

So why would that make the acceptance of punishment tantamount to obeying the law he disobeyed.

They are not the same. I never said otherwise. What I have said is that accepting the punishment may fulfill the obligation to the state. This is why I asked how far our obligation to the state extends.

Slow down, buddy. The goal isn't to prove everyone else wrong. I'm offering up thoughts for consideration and asking questions, not making arguments.

I don't know what you mean by "the dictate of the law".

This is part of the question "if we do have some obligation to the law, how far does it extend?" Do we have an obligation to follow what is being mandated (ex, do not chew gum), or do we have an obligation to accept the punishment determined by law should we break the law?
The problem becomes more difficult when you consider the general condition of civil disobedients - they break laws which they consider unjust. If we are like Thoreau, and standing in opposition to something as heinous as slavery, how do we evaluate our obligations, both moral and to the state, when they conflict?

You bring up examples such as Nazi Germany, and I have to agree, it seems odd to think anyone would have some moral obligation to such a state. But where do we draw the line? If we have no moral obligation to a particular state to even accept punishment for some crime because that state is immoral, how immoral must the state be before we write off our moral obligations to that state?

Myself, I'm not so sure we have moral obligations to the state, but I'm open to reasons why we would.

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by Didymos Thomas

They are not the same. I never said otherwise. What I have said is that accepting the punishment may fulfill the obligation to the state. This is why I asked how far our obligation to the state extends.

Slow down, buddy. The goal isn't to prove everyone else wrong. I'm offering up thoughts for consideration and asking questions, not making arguments.



This is part of the question "if we do have some obligation to the law, how far does it extend?" Do we have an obligation to follow what is being mandated (ex, do not chew gum), or do we have an obligation to accept the punishment determined by law should we break the law?
The problem becomes more difficult when you consider the general condition of civil disobedients - they break laws which they consider unjust. If we are like Thoreau, and standing in opposition to something as heinous as slavery, how do we evaluate our obligations, both moral and to the state, when they conflict?

You bring up examples such as Nazi Germany, and I have to agree, it seems odd to think anyone would have some moral obligation to such a state. But where do we draw the line? If we have no moral obligation to a particular state to even accept punishment for some crime because that state is immoral, how immoral must the state be before we write off our moral obligations to that state?

Myself, I'm not so sure we have moral obligations to the state, but I'm open to reasons why we would.

Clearly, the moral obligation to obey a particular law, and the moral obligation to obey the laws of the State are different. Whether I have satisfied my latter obligation when I accept my punishment although I disobeyed a particular law is, it seems to me, not clear. And I know of no argument which would persuade me one way or the other. It may be that it is true that we can say if someone accepts his punishment after having intentionally violated a law something like, At least it shows he respects the law" or something of that sort. But that is, of course, "subjective". He may respect the law, but that does not show he has satisfied his obligation to obey laws.

The dilemma of conflicting obligations is, of course, an old problem in moral philosophy. The question, then, is which of the conflicting obligations is the overriding obligation. An different philosophers have come up with different answers. And, the question about whether there is a moral obligation to the State is a different question. The parent/gratitude analogy offered by Socrates has some persuasive force it seems to me. But, it depends, as I pointed out, on the State. It seems to me, though, that the fact that we don't know where to draw the line is not only true about the kind of State to which we owe an obligation, but is also true about many vague concepts. A trivial example is that of "bald". Where do you draw the line as to whether someone is bald or not. In fact, not only where do you draw the line, but how do you draw the line? Is it the number of hairs on the person's head that distinguishes a bald person from a person who is not bald? Or is it the area of the head covered? Or is it some combination of the two? Or is it some third factor? Nevertheless, we use the concept of baldness with some facility even if we find we cannot "draw a line". I think that is because there are not only fuzzy cases when we do not know where to draw the line, but there are also, let us not forget, clear cases where there is no question that the person is bald, and clear cases where there is no question that the person is not bald, even if there are penumbal cases where there would be disagreement among people who knew the meaning of "bald" as well as anyone, i.e fluent English speakers. So the fact that there are unclear cases does not mean there are no clear cases too. And, in fact, it is a fallacy to infer from the fact that there are unclear cases, that there are no clear cases. So, just because it is not clear in some cases when a State does not deserve obedience, it does not follow that it is not sometimes quite clear that a State does not deserve obedience.

[rado]

I believe one should follow one's own moral and ethical codex and nothing else. That's also what the Danish philosopher Martinus said:

Martinus Institute

Rado

[kennethamy]

Originally Posted by rado

I believe one should follow one's own moral and ethical codex and nothing else. That's also what the Danish philosopher Martinus said:

Martinus Institute

Rado

Should Adolf Hitler have followed his own moral code?