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Originally Posted by Didymos Thomas Of course you do not "make up" for violating a law by accepting the punishment. But as you said, the issue was a matter of which obligation was stronger, the obligation to break the law, or the obligation to obey the law.
As for Socrates, why would his higher law obligate him to break some law, and then accept death; why would his higher law have him act against the state's decision, and then embrace the state's decision that his initial action, disobeying the state, was worthy of a death sentence? Wasn't one of the complaints that Socrates' teaching was heretical?
This higher power appeal seems to demand a higher power that cannot make up it's mind. The result, I fear, are some contradictory obligations to that higher power and to the state. How can a higher law justify obedience to a state that is worth disobeying? |
There is not merely the general obligation to obey the law, but the obligation to obey some particular law. There is no obligation, so far as I can tell, to break the law. (Maybe anarchists think there is such an obligation. I don't know).
I don't really know what you are asking when you ask why a higher law would obligate Socrates to disobey another law. I suppose the answer to that is that when two laws conflict, it is the obligation to obey the higher law that overrides the obligation to obey the lesser law. Who "embraced" the decision that his disobedience of the law was worthy of a death sentence? I don't recall any discussion of that in the dialogues. I just think that Socrates held that he had no good moral reason to disobey the law when he was sentenced to death. So that his obligation to obey the law in the case took precedence.
I don't understand your last question. Obviously, if we have a higher obligation to disobey a particular law, then that would override our general obligation to obey the law. The question of whether the Athenian State was "worth disobeying" never comes up. It is assumed that we have an obligation to obey the laws of the State. The only question is whether Socrates also has an obligation to escape, and, if so, is it a stronger obligation than his obligation to obey the laws of Athens. In
Crito, Socrates considers various arguments for escaping and comes to the conclusion that none of them are (even together) sufficient to make the case that he ought to disobey the law that sentences him to death, so that his obligation to obey the law is stronger than any obligation he has to escape, and, so, disobey the law.