Thought-Objects

[Arjen]

I am starting this topic as a spin-off from the topic: "Brain in a vat" because the question of what thought-objects are was raised and I think that easily deserves a seperate topic. I am creating this topic because I think Gottlob Frege has played an importanr role in conceptualising what takes places when forming thought-objects, although by no means the last.

Frege is a multiversed man who has studied mathematics and philosophy. Perhaps it is not much of a surprise that he created a formal language,in which languages and mathematics found a common factor, known as logic. Frege's logic, as noted in his work Begriffsschrift was later improved by men such as Bertrand Russel, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Willard van Orman Quine (among others).

In Frege's logic (and any other) it is clear that what is important are not the variables, but the connectives involved in any logical function. In reasoning appear precious few different connectives and these connectives are used to furmulate any logical judgement. An example of a logical judgement could be: "Whenever it rains I get wet", or any other thought what so ever. Frege names such thoughts "judgements".

Some "judgements" are named, one calls such judgements "predications". Some of these predications may in reality be contractions of several predications and the relations between them. An example might be that something is "all and one" at the same time, one would now use the word (predicate) "alone". Frege seperates predications in his work Über Funktion und Begriff. Frege seperates concepts from functions, where concepts are merely names where the predicate would be true or not depending if the object falls under the predication and functions are "truth values". Such "truth values" are based on the variables in the function. So the example "alone" would only be true if the thing one is "predicating" is "all and one". If one of the variable "predicates" would be untrue the function would be untrue and the predicate alone would not fit the bill. The example shows one of the (very small) youthfull problems of Frege's invention called "logic". The example is one which can be both function and concept, depending on how one looks at things.

In his work "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" Frege defines two different aspects of "meaning". The first meaning of meaning is "reference"; what a thought-object refers to, and the second meaning is "sense"; how a thought-object relates to something. From this moment on one can clearly see that thought-objects are something else than the objects on which is thought. A clear stipulation of this is that one may, in thought, re-examine the thought-object and form a different opinion; reshaping the thought-object. In "reality" (whatever that may be) the object remains unchanged.

In his works "Über Funktion und Begriff" and "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" Frege sets out a theory with which one can understand how thought-objects are formed. When percieving any kind of object one "grasps" (Frege uses the word "fassen") some things of which one percieves. This "grasping" refers to the process by which one forms a thought-object of an object. Grasping is involved in both reference (what object of all that one has percieved is one thinking of) and sense (in what way does it refer to the object).
From this point of view it is perhaps more clear that a predication-concept is used to form a thought-object by reference and a predication-function is used to form a thought-object by sense.


An illustration of "grasping". The magnified object is, in a way, "grasped" by the telescope (or the person wielding it).

What is also clear in Frege's work is that one "grasps" certain things from what one percieves. An important question might be what does this "grasping". I Frege's work the "grasping" takes the same place as that which is a priori in Kant's work. Predications, or thought-objects, are, in this sense, the equivalent of Kant's Judgements.

[de_budding]

Thanks Arjen,
I took a little detour off to the article about Kants judgments and categories; I wonder if Kant saw his Categories as Plato saw his 'forms'- a priori, embedded in us from birth. The concept certainly seems like a sort of institution that the mind uses to deal with all the information of every day experience, but I would not be so quick proclaim that they are fixed categories, predictable of Everything. It's a wonderful idea which I think accurately reflects how our minds process the multiplicity of information we absorb everyday.

For me Gottlob is describing language- and very well I might add. The 'sense' is how we relate the characteristics of something to everything and the 'reference' is that something, it is true of false. (e.g. that is a chair) if the chair is there it is true. Again I get a Platonic sense of forms here, we have words which seem to universally refer to the same thing for everybody and these could easily (perhaps mistakenly) be assumed a priori. But then there is the 'sense' which describes our relationship with an object and can account for how one word can carry more than one connotation... (e.g. that is a doormat) the example is a reference to an actual doormat but we can take the characteristics of doormat and relate them to say a human- he is a doormat. This use of language inevitably leads to Categories because we use burrowed characteristics, metaphors, comparisons (senses) to highlight how unrelated objects are similar. I think we could do away with this 'sense' in meaning, why not just give everything a reality-reference to describe it, like a picure of video.

Todays digital technology makes it possible to create a 100% ostensive super-encyclopedia which would use sound, pictures, video, textures etc. to describe the whole world.
Effectively doing away with words would do away with 'sense', and I think we could then see a far less categorical language.

While pondering the thread I have also noticed a pre-Socratic trait in this 'lingual philosophy'- trying and describe what reality is made of, but with acceptance of the fact that reality is something different for use than it really is. How much does language shape reality for humanity?

But other than those few thoughts I have read through the post noting the separation between reality and human-reality, it seems to relate back to my BIV post which mentioned interpreted-reality. Your ending note, once clarified, says a lot more than expected about the absorption of reality- 'predication-concept is used to form a thought-object by reference and a predication-function is used to form a thought-object by sense. We separate and form two worlds, one using only thought-objects developed by reference and one with thought-objects only developed by sense, only with a mixture of both does it become possible to developer a realistic language which I think reflects the sentiment by its two main categories of words- Nouns (reference) and Adjectives (Senses).

Dan.

[de Silentio]

Originally Posted by de_budding

Thanks Arjen,
I wonder if Kant saw his Categories as Plato saw his 'forms'- a priori, embedded in us from birth.

If I may jump in on one point. When talking about a priori it is important that one does not confuse Innate Ideas with a priori ideas. Innate means they are with us from birth, a priori just means that we gained the knowledge apart from experience.

Plato philosophy seems to sound more like Innate ideas, and Descartes definitely talks about Innate ideas (he may have coined the term?). They both hold that we have the ideas embedded within us from birth. Plato says that we 'remember' the ideas (like justice, courage, wisdom, etc.). I can't speak on Descartes Innate Ideas, because it has been a long time since first heard about them. But I do remember something about properties like color not being a property of an object, but that it is a property that we impose on the object?

Kant, on the other hand, used a priori to describe Ideas (or judgments as he calls them) that we gain a part from experience. It's not that we are born with these ideas, for he does say 'All knowledge begins with experience'. It's more to the tune that we can know certain things about objects before we experience those objects. Those certain things happen to be necessary information about an object. For example, that an object must exist within space-time for us to validly cognize the said object.

Now, are Plato and Descartes Innate Ideas a priori? Yes, since we have the ideas a part from experience. But Kant's a priori Ideas are not Innate.

[de_budding]

Nail on the head... embarrassingly, but thanks I won't make the mistake again.

But I would challenge Kant to explain how categories can exist before experience when 'All knowledge begins with experience'. I can imagine 'apart from experience by using our development of complex ideas from simple ideas as an analogy...

We have the idea of gold from experience and the idea of a mountain from experience but only in our mind can the complex idea of a golden mountain be composed.

I can only imagine a priori knowledge has mistakenly been labelled 'apart' from experience because it is fundamentally composed from and rooted in experience. Without the experience the a priori Categories wouldn't exist.

But I get the sense I might still be struggling with use of the term 'a priori'. I was first confused by the definition of 'before/separate from experience' when it was followed by the a posteriori example of…

'King X reigned from 18xx-19xx when he resigned' followed by the a priori example of…

'if King X resigned he must have reigned'- I saw this as a trick of words, we must know from experience how the word 'resigned' is applied to a king's career to be able to presume that kingly resignation is preceded by kingship.

Dan.

[de_budding]

Accidental Double Post

[Arjen]

Hold on guys, there are some facts being crossed here. I know it is a difficult topic, but please do check your facts before posting. It might teach you a thing or two. I know wikipedia isn;t perfect, but it has a lot of these little facts. I am going to link to the wikipedia so you can check what I am saying. In these few posts a lot of facts got crossed unfortunately.

De budding,

1) Kant saw his categories as Plato saw his logoi in some ways. Kant also uses some of Aristotle's idea in his judgements. I am noting this primarily because idea means "forms"; those are Aristotle's. You are right about the a priori part of Plato's logoi btw. Kant takes part of his inspiration from that. Judgements are a synthesis of a priori intuitions and perceptions. That reminds us of Aristotle's tradition.

2 Try to think of the what a thought-object refers to as an object; a certain set of dimensions. One can refer to an object and claim it is a chair which may or not be a chair. It could be a chair with a lot of imagination or there might not be a cohesive object there at all (in the case of vacüum or air for instance).

3) The categories are there a priori. That is how we decide what something is, or how it relates to something. The "sense" is of great importance in that way, because it points out how someone percieves something. I may overvaluate a form and thus describe that part of what I saw. That does not mean that it is all there was. Apart from that it is the key component in the entire theory. It proves that one judges by frame of reference and therefore that the first judgements must have had a "category" to be related to.

4) Thought-objects are formed in the mind and words refer to thought objects. Thought-objects refer to objects in reality (present, different or absent). One cannot do away with the "sense" because that would make any thought-object loose its value and thereby it's existence. For not judging something makes for the absence of predicating; which is the absence of thought-objects.

5) Reality is indeed linked with our vocobulary. We judge on the basis of our frame of reference (rulebase). In this lies the difference of hermeneutics.

6) Sense and reference go hand in hand. No thought-object is created by reference. It is the sense which forms it. The reference exists only as the basis on which we form our judgements. What I mean is this:
We need a thought or a perception to judge and a sense in which we judge it. That forms our judgement.

De silentio,

1) Kant saw his categories as Plato saw his logoi in some ways. Kant also uses some of Aristotle's idea in his judgements. I am noting this primarily because idea means "forms"; those are Aristotle's. You are right about the a priori part of Plato's logoi btw. Kant takes part of his inspiration from that. Judgements are a synthesis of a priori intuitions and perceptions. That reminds us of Aristotle's tradition.

2) Plato thinks that we remember certain things from before our birth. He literally says so in the republic where he explain his logoi quite thorouhly.

3) Descartes never said certain things, but he also never published certain things and rewrote certain books out of fear of the inquisition. One of the things that was punishable by death in the dark ages was saying that there are a priori part to mankind. In his meditations he writes since he doubts anything at least he can be sure he doubtes and therefore thinks. He must also conclude that there is something acting on that part which he is sure of. He writes that this must surely be "God". The funny thing about this is that it must be concluded that "God" is always action upon anything or else nothing would happen and everything would be just in the mind and therefore a priori. There are certain passages which makes one doubt that in a quite serious manner. Descartes refers to Spinoza quite often, who was accused of pantheïsm by the inquisition posthumously (he published his Ethica after death).

4) Hobbes held, as Galileo did, that only the extension, mass, and motion - what later came to be called the primary qualities - of bodies are in the objects percieved. Color, sound, taste and smell – what later came to be called the secondary qualities - are really in the eye of the beholder. In some passages Hobbes argues that these secondary qualities are motions in the brain of the beholder, but he often neglects to do so in favor of the difference between the tings in themselves and their appearances.

5) Categories are a priori according to Kant, judgements are a posteriori (although acquired by the use of categories).

6) To the question if Plato's and Descartes' ideas are innate, we must ask if you mean logoi or idea with ideas. I think you mean idea. Those are not even innate; theay are a posteriori.

[de_budding]

de Silentio,

My problems with the use of a priori are highlighted here, and one paragraph in particular hammers the point home for me...

'An abstraction is made from particulars. Once the abstraction is made, the process from which it was derived is then ignored. The base on which it was built is denied. The abstract knowledge is then said to exist without reference to reality, since the reference is ignored.'

The confusion between a priori and innate only exists because I was thinking the only way for something to be a priori was to be with us from birth, which I would say is wrong and that a priori is really a posterior just raised up above and the roots forgotten.

Arjen,

This is confusing my comprehension of Kant’s ideas, does he assume any a priori knowledge that is from a higher power, or with us from birth in the same way Plato imagined his world of forms?

Dan.

[Arjen]

De budding,

Plato has no world of forms. He has a world of logoi. Forms are Aristotle.

A priori is transcendental. Divine is transcendent. Kant does not believe in a Christian God. He does, however, believe. Everybody who is right in the head necessarily concludes something must have kick started everything. If one calls it big bang, God or a priori is of no consequence. Kant however was a teacher and as such was supposed to lead his class into church. Kant led his pupils in and let them out again. He himself waited at the door but never entered.

[de_budding]

I mean this- Theory of forms - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

[VideCorSpoon]

Arjen,

Are you sure Plato has no world of forms????