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But the fact remains that Socrates intentionally violated the law in the first instance by teaching, but refused to violate the law in the second instance, by not escaping. Whether he "made up" for violating the law is really not to the point. He should not have violated the law if he thought it was wrong to do so. You don't make it all right to violate a law by accepting punishment for doing so. (It would be absurd to argue that it was all right to murder someone as long as I accepted punishment for doing so).
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Of course you do not "make up" for violating a law by accepting the punishment. But as you said, the issue was a matter of which obligation was stronger, the obligation to break the law, or the obligation to obey the law.
As for Socrates, why would his higher law obligate him to break some law, and then accept death; why would his higher law have him act against the state's decision, and then embrace the state's decision that his initial action, disobeying the state, was worthy of a death sentence? Wasn't one of the complaints that Socrates' teaching was heretical?
This higher power appeal seems to demand a higher power that cannot make up it's mind. The result, I fear, are some contradictory obligations to that higher power and to the state. How can a higher law justify obedience to a state that is worth disobeying?